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2. Abbreviations and common terms 
AIDS  Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
CCT  Conditional Cash Transfers 
CPRC  Chronic Poverty Research Centre 
CSG  Child Support Grant 
DFID  Department for International Development (United Kingdom) 
DG  Disability Grant (DG) 
EPRI   Economic Policy Research Institute 
FAO  Food and Agricultural Organisation 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
HIV  Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
NGO  Non-Governmental Organisation 
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PLAAS  Institute for Poverty and Agrarian Studies 
RSA  Republic of South Africa 
SASSA  The South African Social Security Agency 
SOAG  The State Old Age Grant 
Conditionalities: Making the grant contingent (conditional) on the recipients engaging in 
specified desirable behaviour, such as having children immunised or keeping them in school. 
Informal social protection: Informal (non institution-based) systems of support for vulnerable 
or marginalised individuals or households, typically based on interpersonal relationships, and 
characterised by of acts of charity, patronage, or kinship-based obligation. 
Social mutuality: Labour, resources or other forms of beneficence exchanged between two 
parties. See social reciprocity. 
Social protection: Public interventions intended to support poor, vulnerable or marginalised 
individuals or households and better enable them to deal with risk. At its most expansive, social 
protection includes cash transfers (social grants), social insurance, contributory social funds and 
social services. 
Social reciprocity: See social mutuality. Social reciprocity denotes the regularity and rule-
governed quality to these exchanges.  
Socially reproductive labour: Work within the domestic realm which is needed to ensure the 
continued survival of its members and perpetuate the household over time.  Usually performed 
by family this work includes caring for children, the elderly and the ill within the home, along 
with domestic work such as cooking, cleaning and routine household tasks such as maintaining 
the dwelling. This work can also include the often considerable task of producing food, and 
collecting fuel and water.  
Stokvels: Informal savings societies in which members contribute regularly and receive payouts. 
Also known as umcalelo. 
  
3.  Executive summary 
This research examines the effectiveness of social grants in South Africa, and how recipients use 
their grants. As a form of social protection, social grants not only ameliorate poverty and 
provide a safety net, they also potentially promote social transformation. The main report pulls 
together a number of aspects. First it reviews the scholarly literature on social grants, 
examining both the positive and negative outcomes associated with receiving social grants, 
focusing on state cash transfers to the elderly, children and the disabled. It then details 
qualitative and quantitative research undertaken to examine the effects of social grant receipt. 
This empirical research is combined and used to examine how social grants are used, including 
the extent to which they support household investments and contribute to financial activities. 
The report concludes by examining the policy implications of the findings.  
Research methods 
The research combines both qualitative and quantitative inquiries. The qualitative inquiry is 
built on a number of urban and rural case studies, and examines not only the way in which 
social grants are used, but also the larger context that drives decision-making. Four of these  
in-depth case studies are in the report. The quantitative analysis draws on a constructed panel 
dataset from Statistics South Africa’s Labour Force Surveys conducted in 2001, 2002 and 2003 
(Stats SA, 2001; 2002; 2003), and employs a quasi-experimental propensity score matching 
approach to compare grant recipients with non-recipients of a similar socioeconomic status. 
The qualitative and quantitative research findings are synthesised in the discussion. 
Key findings 
The report identifies a number of significant outcomes and dynamics in relation to social grants 
within contemporary South Africa. 
1. The literature review highlights a number of positive outcomes of state cash transfers 
delivered to impoverished and vulnerable people. These are delineated in four domains. 
Firstly, social grants elevate welfare, consumption and access to social services such as 
health and education. Secondly, social grants generate potential economic benefits, such as 
improving recipients’ ability to manage risk and insecurity, facilitating saving and 
investment, and supporting the development of local markets. Thirdly, social grants help to 
empower recipients in a social context. Fourthly, at an aggregate macro-social level, cash 
transfers have an important political effect in high-inequality, post-repression contexts such 
as South Africa. They are an effective redistributive mechanism, thereby tempering social 
unrest. They have also symbolically served as an important part of the renewed social 
compact between citizens and state. 
2. The literature catalogues a range of negative effects potentially attendant to social grants, 
including creating opportunities for patronage and corruption, distorting markets and 
creating a range of perverse incentives such as disrupting remittances, disincentivising 
  
work, displacing private savings, and elevating fertility rates.  Examining the evidence on 
South Africa, the report finds scant evidence of these negative effects.  The preponderance 
of available evidence shows little evidence for social transfers crowding out private 
remittances, elevating fertility rates, including among teens, generating labour disincentive 
effects, or generally leading to inappropriate expenditure.  
3. The empirical research confirms that cash transfers in South Africa support consumption 
and improve the welfare of recipients and their broader households. The data also suggests 
that social grants facilitate investments in human capital (nutrition and schooling), along 
with investments in productive assets and activities.  
4. The qualitative and quantitative data variously suggest that social grants support financial activities. 
Grant beneficiaries have higher levels of savings, and are able to engage with credit markets on 
generally more favourable terms. The data also point to the way in which social grant income helps 
satisfy beneficiaries’ needs for precautionary savings. 
5. The qualitative findings suggest that social grants allow people to enter into existing systems of 
social reciprocity on which the impoverished and vulnerable often depend for their survival. In this 
way, grants strengthen existing, deeply rooted informal social protection systems and social 
networks.  For instance, receipt of a state old age grant not only enables many rural grandmothers 
to care for their grandchildren, they also underwrite pensioners’ moral claims to support and 
protection within their own family networks.  
6. Social grants enable recipients to leverage and multiply their resources (including their time, energy 
and innovation in the task of maintaining a livelihood). Social grants therefore contribute to and 
strengthen existing systems of livelihood and productive activity. For instance, receipt of a social 
grant often supports informal economic activity. Often it allows recipients to undertake domestic 
labour or care work such as looking after the young, the ill, the disabled or the elderly. In many cases 
this care work frees up other, usually working-age adults to look for or do paying work.  
7. Social grants provide an important material basis for recipients and their households to engage in 
livelihood-supporting activities. They also introduce a flexibility to capture opportunities as well as 
mitigate shocks. The cash value of social grants allows recipients to explore options and even find 
other ways of making a living. 
8. Finally, grants empower otherwise marginalised household members such as the elderly and 
disabled, enabling them to participate in systems of social reciprocity, in that their control of the 
resources of the grant inserts them more firmly into systems of mutual assistance and reciprocity, 
than they might otherwise be  
Key policy implications 
A number of policy recommendations flow from the empirical findings of the research. 
1. The research affirms the positive developmental effects of social grants and supports 
the contention that social grants are economically and socially empowering. This 
strengthens the already considerable case for sustaining them, and also lends impetus 
  
to the need to consider expanding the social grants programme through scaling-up 
benefits and/or expanding eligibility.  
2. The research points to the importance of recognising the role played by systems of 
social reciprocity or mutuality. These forms informal social protection frequently 
underpin the livelihoods of the impoverished and vulnerable.  
3. The flexibility of the cash value and unconditional nature of social grants needs to be 
recognised. This is an advantage of the current system. It enables recipients and their 
households to use grants in highly flexible ways, and allows them to respond to their 
often-changing circumstances.  
4. The strength of the existing system of unconditional social grants has implications for 
ongoing debates about imposing conditionalities on current grant recipients in South 
Africa. The research identifies at least four arguments against imposing conditionalities 
within the South African context. Firstly, conditions are often used to solve problems 
largely unknown in the South African context (e.g. child labour, low school enrolment). 
Secondly, areas of low uptake of social services (such as health or education) typically 
reflect demand-side rather than supply-side problems. Thirdly, imposing conditionalities 
results in considerable costs, both administratively and for individual applicants. 
Fourthly, conditional cash transfers are often targeted at narrowly defined 
impoverished social groups marked by compound forms of social exclusion, often 
related to specific social factors such as caste, locality or social circumstance. However 
in South Africa, millions are poor primarily because of the adverse terms of their 
incorporation into the larger structure of the economy.  It is this lack of economic 
opportunity that patterns the poverty and vulnerability of most of impoverished South 
Africans. For these reasons, the report remains circumspect about the use of 
conditionalities and argues that debates about imposing them need to be informed by 
careful consideration of the value these would add to the existing range of social grants 
in South Africa.  
5. There is a need to consider how to better include people who currently fall outside of 
the social grant net, most notably working-age, able-bodied adults. There is scope to 
investigate how mechanisms such as a universal cash transfer or labour market subsidy 
might be extended to this group. 
6. There is a need to continue to strive to make social grants accessible. In the past the 
effectiveness of social grants has been underpinned by administrative inefficiencies and 
unsanctioned eligibility practices. Although many of these negatives have been 
addressed and contained, an ongoing challenge remains to make social grants accessible 
to eligible applicants. 
 
 
  
4. Introduction 
South Africa, in common with a number of middle-income countries, has substantially 
expanded its system of social grants in the last decade. More than 12 million South Africans, or 
roughly a quarter of the population, receive public transfers at present. This development has 
coincided with global trends towards increased publicly-funded cash transfer to the poor and 
vulnerable – alongside debates, research and advocacy about the effectiveness of these 
transfers. This report examines the use and effectiveness of social grants to the poor in South 
Africa. 
This report both reviews the literature and discusses research undertaken to examine a number 
of key issues. These include: the developmental impact of social grants; how they are used by 
recipients; the financial behaviour and activities that result from grant receipt; and the trickle 
down effects of social grants to individuals and households other than the formally designated 
recipients.  
Section 5 is a literature review on the use and effectiveness of social grants. It contextualises 
social grant receipt in South Africa, before it describes how social grants are associated with a 
range of developmental impacts, including improvements in welfare, consumption and access 
to social services; generally positive economic effects; and a range of social and political 
empowerment effects. The literature section concludes by critically examining the claims and 
evidence for the negative effects of social grant receipt. 
Sections 6 and 7 consider state social grants in South Africa by presenting and discussing 
empirical research. They focus on three broad issues. Firstly, they examine the impact of social 
grants on grant recipients and their larger households, including how recipients use their 
grants. Secondly, they consider the manner and mechanisms of the welfare effects associated 
with social grants. This is done through detailed analysis of the social networks within which 
grants are received and circulate. Thirdly, they examine the impact of social grants on financial 
market behaviour, including saving, investment and credit market activity.  
This research draws on a two-part methodology of quantitative and qualitative research. The 
quantitative component relies on a propensity score matching approach. Constructing a panel 
dataset from Statistics South Africa Labour Force Surveys, the propensity score matching 
approach employs a quasi-experimental design to compare grant recipients with non-recipients 
of a similar socioeconomic status. The qualitative analysis reviews a number of in-depth case 
studies, and examines how social grants are used and invested within the receiving households. 
The qualitative inquiry also documents how social grants circulate within the extended 
household context, and considers the local dynamics that animate these processes.  
Section 8 of the report draws on the qualitative and quantitatively derived findings in a 
concluding discussion, and Section 9 reflects on the policy implications of these findings.  
  
5. Literature review 
Conceptualising social protection 
In this section, the context of poverty and vulnerability that frames this review is briefly 
sketched out, before the concept and rationale for social transfers, under the banner of ‘social 
protection’, is discussed. 
South Africa is a highly unequal middle-income country in which enduring structural poverty 
relegates large swathes of the population to the economic periphery. Understanding the 
precise nature of poverty and vulnerability provides an important conceptual foundation from 
which to understand social protection. Conventional accounts of poverty view it in terms of 
deficits in income, consumption or expenditure – these material accounts of poverty are the 
foundation of much economic analysis. In the last decade, however, multi-dimensional 
conceptions of poverty have come to the fore, which increasingly view poverty as marked by a 
series of interlinked deprivations. Sen’s (1999) work, for instance, posits poverty as the product 
of a lack of various capacities, both intrinsic and instrumental, which include income, education, 
health and human and civic rights. Many of the poor are locked in poverty traps, with the cycle 
of low income, limited assets and opportunities constraining them from making the 
investments (in their health, education and livelihoods) to lift themselves out of poverty. 
Poverty, however, is not only defined by low incomes, consumption and capabilities – the poor 
have a heightened susceptibility to risk and the probability of catastrophic decline or death. 
Poverty is therefore also characterised by insecurity and an acute vulnerability to income 
variability over time (Baulch and Hoddinott, 2000). These ideas have become a part of the 
developmental orthodoxy and are reflected, for example, in the World Bank’s (2000) 
description of deficits in opportunity, security and empowerment as key issues in both 
conceptualising and addressing poverty. Two additional notions are useful in seeking to 
understand poverty. The first is that understanding poverty also requires attention to its 
temporal qualities – it is determined not only by its depth but also its duration, varying from 
relatively short-term transitorily poverty to enduring chronic poverty. The second point is that 
the nomenclature of ‘the poor’ potentially obscures the heterogeneity that characterises 
impoverished and vulnerable people: poor people differ from each other in terms of their social 
status age, gender and disability profiles. Insecurity is often exacerbated by factors such as 
limited claims to citizenship, geographical disadvantage (people who live in remote regions or 
those with certain natural resources, such as arid rangelands) and social discrimination 
(Addison, Harper, Prowse and Shepard, 2008).  
To recapitulate, poverty is multidimensional and reflects not only low levels of income and consumption 
but also restricted or unrealised capacities and elevated susceptibility to risk; it differentially unfolds 
over time and incorporates various social groups. 
 
 
  
Definitions, concepts and rationale  
Social grants, or social assistance, describe non-contributory cash transfer programmes, 
targeted at people who are poor or vulnerable (Grosh, Del Ninno, Tesliuc and Ouerghi, 2008). 
Social grants ameliorate poverty and reduce vulnerability by redistributing income, but also 
provide a social insurance function by helping to smooth consumption and avoid plunges into 
ultra-destitution following livelihood shocks. Social grants are conventionally financed by 
implementing states out of taxation revenue (except in several low-income countries where 
they are funded by international donor aid), and frequently subsumed under the expansive 
rubric of social protection. 
Social protection potentially includes not only direct cash transfers (to which eligibility is either 
means tested or categorical), but also various in-kind programmes (such as school-feeding 
schemes), price subsidies on food or energy (or, in South Africa, VAT exemptions on basic food 
stuffs), employment in public works programmes, or fee waivers on essential services, 
schooling, health or transport. Social protection is a key component of social policy alongside 
the provision of services such as health and education (Grosh et al, 2008). This review restricts 
its focus to publicly-funded direct cash transfers. 
Publicly-resourced social protection co-exists alongside two other broad varieties of social 
safety nets. The first (sometimes also subsumed beneath the moniker of social protection) is 
formal, private sector provision for retirement, disability or unemployment. These contributory 
pensions and insurance products are typically accessed by the formally employed and the more 
affluent, and are not a focus of this inquiry. The second is widespread, informal community and 
household support. While these practices can be part of institutionalised systems of 
humanitarian and faith-based support, they frequently reflect various forms of kinship and 
communal social reciprocity. Informal social protection (Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006) is often 
crucial to the livelihoods of the African poor, and is underpinned by complex patterns of inter- 
and intra-household resource transfers. As this mutuality both shapes the context into which 
social grants are received and mediates its effects, they are considered in detail later in this 
report.  
The redistribution of income via social grants directly impacts on levels of poverty and 
inequality, serving to reduce both the breadth (incidence) and the depth (severity). Social 
protection not only supports present consumption and welfare, it represents an investment in 
human capital, with potential benefits in the future. Social protection can disrupt chronic 
poverty, including its perpetuation across generations (Grosh et al, 2008). Holzmann and 
Jørgensen (2000) describe the effects of social protection in terms of the twin metaphors of 
safety net and springboard. While safety net captures the ameliorative, decline-arresting 
quality of social protection, the notion of the springboard suggests the prospect of social 
protection offering improvement or a leap upward. Devereux (2006) describes the objectives of 
  
direct cash transfers as having four characteristics, namely: protective, preventative, promotive 
and transformative.   
Firstly, social protection in the form of direct cash transfers can be protective by ameliorating 
poverty through redistributing income and providing a safety net for the vulnerable.  
Secondly, social protection can be preventative by averting deprivation and arresting the 
downward spiral of liquidating productive assets or spiraling ill health following a livelihood 
shock. In this way, they help households manage risk by avoiding irreversible losses and 
retaining productive assets. This is all the more salient as the poor often have limited access to 
markets for financial intermediation, lumpy assets’ (such as livestock, or land owned in 
communal tenure) and risk-sharing mechanisms that are often inefficient or poorly hedged 
against shocks such as a drought, or macroeconomic shock such as hyperinflation, rapid 
currency devaluations, food price hikes etc (Devereux, 2001a). 
Thirdly, social protection is potentially promotive because it can enhance existing capacities and 
resources. By helping the impoverished and vulnerable to avoid inefficient and narrowly short-
term focused survival strategies (often at the expense of long term wellbeing), it provides an 
opportunity for higher return activities. For instance, cash transfers not only enable the poor to 
overcome credit market failures, they also facilitate investment in human capital through 
enabling access to resources such as health and educational services. Social protection 
therefore enables the poor to make better investments in their future.   
Fourthly, social protection in the form of cash transfers is potentially transformative because it 
supports the efforts of marginalised or vulnerable social groups to attain equality. Social grants 
not only combat exclusion at a societal level, but also can positively shape inter-household and 
intra-household resource allocation and dynamics. 
South African’s structural context of economic marginality and vulnerability  
Understanding the context of poverty in South Africa is important to conceptualise the setting 
within which state social grants are received and used. The economic marginalisation of a large 
proportion of middle-income South Africa’s population reflects long historical racialised 
dispossession, along with more contemporary developments.   
Historical patterns of dispossession and impoverishment have seen the erosion of opportunities 
for land-based production and livelihoods (viz deagrarianisation) throughout much of Africa. 
With its long legacy of colonial and apartheid-era land dispossession, this process of 
deagrarianisation is deeply entrenched in South Africa. Opportunities for farming have 
diminished alongside declining industrial employment opportunities for the unskilled (largely 
African) workers in the last two decades, with the shift to capital-intensive tertiary production 
(Banerjee, Galiani, Levinsohn and Woolard, 2006). Accumulated disadvantage has therefore 
created a large underclass (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005), adversely incorporated into the 
political economy of South Africa. Comprising about 40 percent of the population, they fall into 
  
the bottom income decile. They are simultaneously dependent on the monetised economy for 
subsistence, yet are estranged from employment opportunities and lack the ability to engage in 
agriculture. 
Racial discrimination was abolished with South Africa’s political transition of the early 1990s, 
but sharp social divisions, largely contoured by race, endure. The South African economy’s 
growth path has become increasingly unaccommodating of large numbers of relatively unskilled 
workers. Agricultural market liberalisation since the early 1990s has seen increased 
concentration and consolidation within the agricultural sector, and the shedding of hundreds of 
thousands of agricultural jobs. In the metropolitan centres many corporations have 
restructured, listed abroad, externalised and casualised their labour force (Bassett, 2008).  
In addition, the prospects for upward social mobility remain constrained. Not only does high 
unemployment endure (25 percent of work seekers, rising to almost 40 percent if discouraged 
work seekers are included), but relatively poor educational outcomes mean that rates of return 
to education for impoverished African youths are low. Poor prospects for farming combined 
with urban areas marked by high levels of corporate concentration and the enduring legacy of 
apartheid’s racialised spatial regime (with Africans located far from economic opportunity), 
undercut the prospects for incipient African entrepreneurs (Du Toit and Neves, 2007b).  
Enduring economic marginalisation and vulnerability moreover interact in a recursive, vicious 
circle with other kinds of demographic and social change. These include diminishing 
opportunities for traditional forms of household formation, the fragmentation and 
demographic unbundling of traditional household units and communal ties, and the changing 
nature of the contemporary conjugal contract and the pernicious effects of high levels of HIV 
and AIDS.  
In this national context, the post-1994 poverty headcount increased marginally (Hoogeveen and 
Özler, 2006); this was followed by small reductions in the poverty headcount and increased 
incomes to the poorest between 2001 and 2005 – mainly due to the increased take-up of social 
grants. If the benefits from the social wage and public services are included, there have been 
discernible increases in welfare after 2000 (Bhorat and Kanbur, 2005; 2006). An extensive 
system of social grants and a progressive system of taxation combine to exercise an important 
redistributional function, tempering the depth and severity of poverty and inequality in South 
Africa.  
Social protection in South Africa 
The provision of social protection in contemporary South Africa has its roots in both history and 
more recent policy developments. Historically, white South Africans have long been 
incorporated into systems of social protection, first devised in the 1920s and modelled on the 
classic European welfare model. Extended by the 1960s, and reflecting the highly skewed 
racially allocative principles of apartheid, the state social pension provided the architecture for 
more recent developments. By the 1980s the National Party government had moved towards 
  
racial parity and African old age pensions as a percentage of white pensions, increased from 16 
percent in 1972 to 85 percent by 1993 (Bhorat, 1995). The political transition of the early 1990s 
saw the entitlement to social protection constitutionally mandated (Haarmann, 2001), and 
disparate welfare administrations and practices incorporated into a unitary system based on 
the principles of racial equality and integrationi. The post-apartheid state fundamentally sought 
to redefine the role of social welfare, the white paper of 1997 positing a vision of 
‘developmental social welfare’, while strenuous efforts were made to build a more 
comprehensive system of coverage.   
The previous system of welfare was not only heavily biased toward the white population, it was 
also predicated on the availability of employment and generally treated welfare receipt as an 
exception or transient phenomenon (Taylor, 2002 in Pauw and Mncube, 2007). In the post-
apartheid period, social protection has had to accommodate deep and widespread African 
poverty, underpinned by enduring structural factors and the inequality of the South African 
distributional regime. In this context spending on social grants grew from the mid-1990s and 
continued at an annual average rate (in real terms) of about 20 percent between 2001 and 
2002, and 2006 and 2007. The rapid escalation in the value of social grants has peaked, slowing 
down to approximately 10 percent per annum, with current expenditure of just over three 
percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) representing a comparatively generous proportion by 
middle-income country standards. Although non-contributory cash transfers are found in many 
countries, the global norm for state expenditure is in the region of between one and two 
percent of GDPii (Grosh et al, 2008).  
The post-apartheid transformation of the social welfare system has seen the racial composition 
of its beneficiaries change and the extension of grants to children has been a key component of 
the expanding system of social assistance (Pauw and Mncube, 2007). In the mid-1990s 
pensioners accounted for over 63 percent, and children 12 percent of grant expenditure; a 
decade later child grants totalled 35 percent and pensions 37 percent of spending. While 
expenditure on pensions grew about 6.3 percent in real terms between 2001/02 and 2005/06, 
spending on child grants comfortably outpaced demographic growth, increasing between 30 
and 50 percent (Pauw and Mncube, 2007).  
Social grants in South Africa 
This section discusses South Africa’s main categories of social grants. 
Social grants for the elderly 
The Old Age Pensions Act (1928) made whites and coloureds eligible for state pensions, and 
was extended to Africans and Indians in 1944. Moves toward racial parity date to the 1970s and 
coincide with a period of rising demand for black workers, the waning of job reservation and 
repeal of the prohibitions against black trade unions. By the 1980Fs the incremental moves 
toward racial parity were partially resourced by lowering the benefits for whites, with elderly, 
working class whites a politically insignificant group (Pauw and Mncube, 2007, p.9). The State 
  
Old Age Grant (SOAG)iii has been central to post-apartheid efforts to universalise welfare (Van 
der Berg, 1997), and is a categorical means-tested grant payable to people of retirement age 
(women over 60 years and, until recently, men over 65 years of ageiv). At a current (2009) 
R1 010 per month it has, by developing country standards, comparatively generous eligibility 
thresholds and benefit levels (approximately double the per capita median income for 
Africans). Between 1997 and 2006, numbers of SOAG beneficiaries rose by an annual average of 
2.7 percent, from a total of 1.7 to 2.1 million people, or about five percent of the total 
population.  
The long-standing SOAG, and the effects of its receipt, is probably the best researched and 
documented of South African social grants (Lund, 2002). It is a significant source of income for 
more than two million South Africans and contributes not only to recipients but also their 
household’s wellbeing and food security (Ardington and Lund, 1995; Case and Deaton, 1998). 
Woolard’s (2003) modelling suggests that (assuming perfect uptake) it reduces ultra poverty 
among the elderly from almost 40 percent to 2.5 percent. The SOAG is generally well targeted 
to the poor, with a limited leakage to the non-poor. The means test is applied to self-reported 
income and assets of the applicant and his or her spouse, but there is the suggestion that it is 
not strictly applied. Consequently, if an applicant is African and neither conspicuously wealthy 
or in receipt of a government employee or private pension, the SOAG is relatively easy to claim. 
It is well targeted to the rural areas and to women, who receive it at an earlier age and have 
longer life expectancy than men, and are less likely to receive a private pension (Ardington and 
Lund, 1995). Take-up rates and awareness of the grant are high (Van der Westhuizen and Van 
Zyl, 2002).  
Although some commentators have suggested that a focus on unemployment would be more 
effective in reducing poverty (Van der Berg, 2002), or greater developmental gains might be 
wrought with transfers to support the young, the SOAG enjoys high levels of support, both 
popular and official, within South Africa. Globally, social pensions are regarded as an effective 
and politically acceptable way of injecting purchasing power into impoverished areas, because 
they are less likely to create work disincentives than other forms of social protection (Grosh et 
al, 2008). Not only is old age a readily verifiable criterion, but pensions are also arguably less 
subject to moral hazards than other forms of social protectionv (Lund, 1999). Within South 
Africa the SOAG is associated with larger household size and there is evidence of demographic 
effects, including attracting unemployed family members into the household. Many 
impoverished rural households are, in effect, formed around a recipient pensionervi. 
Paradoxically this serves to mask some of the grant’s welfare effects, as per capita incomes are 
diluted.  
The remaining state grant for the elderly is the war veteran grant, for veterans of the Second 
World War and the Korean War. This beneficiary group is statistically negligible, comprising of 
fewer than 2 000 individuals, who are rapidly declining through natural attritionvii.  
 
  
Social grants for children 
Three social grants are targeted at children in South Africa: the care dependency, child support, 
and foster care grants. Although a prominent and growing component of the post-apartheid 
welfare regime, child grants have long antecedents in South Africa’s racialised systems of state 
welfare. The Children’s Act of 1913 instituted maintenance grants for impoverished white 
minors, and these were extended to Indians and coloureds around the mid-century. By 1990 
about half of maintenance and foster care grants were received by coloured children, a large 
proportion by Indians, a small proportion by the (comparatively affluent) white population and 
a fraction of a single percent by Africans – this despite the fact that Africans comprise roughly 
three-quarters of the population (Alderman, 1999). The 1996 Lund Committee on Child and 
Family Support was tasked with reviewing the child maintenance grant, and sought to reconcile 
fiscal constraints with the imperative of extending the grant to Africans (RSA, 1996). The pre-
1998 maintenance grant of R160 was replaced by a universal, means-tested Child Support 
Grant (CSG) of R100. The CSG increased to R142 in 2006 (representing high levels of annual 
growth for a grant, of six percent) (Pauw and Mncube, 2007) and is currently (2009) R240. 
South Africa’s CSG has two distinctive features. The first is that, rather than limiting eligibility to 
a biological parent or legally adjudicated foster or adoptive parent, the child’s primary 
caregiverviii is designated the grant recipient. This serves to accommodate widespread patterns 
of kinship care and household flux within the South African context.  
The second notable feature is that the CSG provides an unconditional cash benefit, rather than 
the more common international practice of either an unconditional in-kind benefit or a 
conditional cash benefit (Case, Hosegood and Lund, 2005). While eligibility for the CSG is 
unconditional, the administrative requirements, particularly the need for Department of Home 
Affairs-issued identity documents, can be onerous and even exclusionary (Leatt, 2006). 
Eligibility is also tempered by the widespread practice of officials imposing informal, de facto 
conditions, including the beneficiary child’s clinic cardix or proof of school enrolment and 
affidavits attesting to the recipient’s unemployment, registration as a job seeker (Hall, 2007) or 
having sought maintenance from the child’s father (Goldblatt, 2005). 
Initially only children less than seven years of age were eligible for the CSG, but the grant was 
extended to children under 14 years in 2005, and to those under 15 years in 2009. Recipients 
are overwhelmingly female, mostly African and have lower levels of education (and therefore 
access to employment) than non-recipients (Delany, Ismail, Graham and Ramkissoon, 2008). 
Numbers of beneficiaries have risen sharply from under one million in 2001 to 6.8 million by 
2006. While targeting is reasonably effective and the leakage of grant benefits through errors of 
inclusion moderately contained (13 percent), errors of exclusion at almost 21 percent are 
relatively high.x Budlender, Rosa and Hall (2005) compared General Household Survey data with 
Department of Social Development data to show that by late 2003 an estimated 78 percent of 
children eligible for the CSG were receiving it.  
  
The evidence suggests that children who do not have their biological mother as their primary 
caregiver (Budlender, Rosa and Hall, 2005), and the poorest, are the least likely to access the 
CSG (Barrientos and De Jong, 2006; Hall, 2007). The exclusion of these groups probably reflects 
compound patterns of deprivation and vulnerability. Yet in the context of an HIV and AIDS 
pandemic, orphans and other groups of vulnerable children are arguably best supported by 
equitable access to the CSG (Meintjes, Budlender, Giese and Johnson, 2003).  
One weakness is that the original CSG means-test thresholds were unrevised for almost a 
decade from 1998xi so in real terms the income thresholds declined and eligibility criteria 
became stricter. In addition, some commentators have suggested that the means test is 
administratively expensive (Budlender, Rosa and Hall, 2005; Hall, 2007), ineffective, imposes 
onerous costs on applicants and is largely redundant in areas of widespread poverty. They 
argue it ought to be simplified or abandoned altogether (Rosa, Leatt and Hall, 2005; Goldblatt, 
Rosa and Hall, 2006). 
The second variety of grant targeted at children is the Care Dependency Grant. This means-
tested grant is payable to the caregivers of minors suffering from severe mental or physical 
disability and in permanent home care, and is valued at R820 a month (2006). Relative to the 
CSG, it is received by comparatively small numbers of beneficiaries.  
The third variety of social grant targeted at children is the Foster Care Grant. Receipt of this 
grant entails that the child be formally placed in the custody of a recipient who is not the 
biological parent. It requires a relatively complex administrative and legal process, supervised 
by a social worker and endorsed by a court. As fostering a child is not regarded as a poverty 
alleviation issue, the grant is not means tested, and amounted to R590 a month in 2006.  
Partially reflecting the effects of a deepening HIV and AIDS pandemic, the number of Foster 
Care Grant beneficiaries rose from 43 000 in 1997 to 300 000 in 2006 (Pauw and Mncube, 
2007). Some have suggested that the administratively complex, time and resource intensive 
process of allocating Foster Care Grants is undesirable, particularly when weighted up against 
the relative ease (and lower administrative costs) of extending the unconditional CSG to larger 
numbers of poor and vulnerable children (Meintjes, Budlender, Giese and Johnson, 2003). In 
addition, it draws an unhelpful distinction, particularly between orphans and other categories, 
of at-risk children.  
Social grants for the disabled 
The Disability Grant (DG) is intended for adults who are severely incapacitated by mental or 
physical disability and therefore unable to work. Eligibility is determined by medical criteria, 
working age (between 18 years and retirement age), and is subject to a means test. Grants are 
either temporary (six months) or permanent (subject to periodic review), and the grant of 
R1 010 in 2009 is received by approximately three percent of the South African population or 
1.3 million peoplexii.  
  
The medical model of disability sees the applicant’s capacity to work adjudicated with no 
reference to the very limited availability of work. Evidence suggests that the application of the 
medical eligibility criteria has been rather inconsistently applied (Lund, 2006). In the context of 
an HIV and AIDS pandemic, the clinical criteria for assessing AIDS-related disability remain 
equally inconsistent, even ‘obscure’ (Natrass, 2005, p.7), but generally only terminal, late-stage 
AIDS constitutes sufficient of a disability to legitimately access a DGxiii.  
The literature on the use and effectiveness of social grants  
This section examines evidence of the benefits of social grants. Although many aspects of the 
use and effectiveness of social grants have been relatively well researched and documented, a 
number of gaps exist that partially reflect the difficulties in making attributions of the longer-
term impacts in the absence of longitudinal data. The often complex social effects of grants, 
although broached in the review that follows, remain an enduring gap in much of the research.  
This review predominantly examines South African studies, but where appropriate, findings 
from elsewhere are discussed. As the largest component of South Africa’s system of social 
transfers, the focus is primarily on the SOAG and CSG. Although many of the impacts and 
underlying dynamics are similar, the different cash values and targeted beneficiaries of these 
two grants make it important to distinguish between them.  
The effects of social grant receipt are described in terms of a number of different levels of 
analysis, including individual, household and communal. The text is ordered in the following 
four categories: welfare benefits, economic benefits, social benefits and political effects. 
Although somewhat schematic and overlapping, these categories serve to aid clarity and reader 
comprehension.  
The positive effects of social grant receipt  
1. Improvements in consumption and welfare 
Social grants enable people and families to avoid destitution and have a marked positive effect 
on consumption and welfare. Not only have cash transfers reduced South Africa’s poverty gap 
by 49 percent, and the Ginixiv inequality measure by seven percentage points (Samson et al, 
2004), but analysis of household datasets in South Africa suggests social grants support 
development, including poverty reduction, and improved levels of nutritional, health and 
education for grant recipients and their children.  
Social transfers are robustly associated with improvements in the quantity and quality of food 
consumption, which improves nutritional status and lowers documented levels of morbidity 
and stunting (Gertler and Boyce, 2001; Devereux, 2001b). These effects are evident in relation 
to both the SOAG (Ardington and Lund, 1995; Case and Deaton, 1998; Lund, 2002), and the CSG 
(Delany et al, 2008). Food is typically the largest category of expenditure for the poor; 
comparative studies between CSG recipients and matched households that have CSG-eligible 
but non-receiving individuals clearly shows differential levels of food expenditure (Delany et al, 
  
2008). The improvements in nutritional status associated with social grant receipt are a 
significant developmental outcome. Inadequate nourishment, particularly in preschool children, 
leads to lower levels of physical growth and impaired cognitive development. Chronically 
undernourished children show higher levels of morbidity and disability, and lower levels of 
education. Not only are the deleterious effects of malnourishment largely irreversible, they also 
perpetuate poverty in the next generation. Furthermore, individual nutritional deficits 
ultimately exact aggregate social costs.  
The loss of productivity associated with under-nutrition has been relatively well documented. 
Horton (1999) estimates the productivity losses from malnutrition in low-income Asian 
countries to be two to three percent of GDP, while the FAO (2002) suggests a figure of between 
two and four percent. In Zimbabwe, children affected by the 1982–1984 drought lost an 
average of over two centimeters of height, 0.4 grades of schooling and experienced a school 
delay of almost four months (Hoddinott and Kensey, 2001). When correlated with Zimbabwean 
employment data, Hoddinott and Kinsey (2001) compute that the affected children would 
experience a seven percent loss in lifetime earnings.  
By subsidising current consumption, public cash transfers not only support human welfare, but 
there is also ample evidence that they facilitate the accumulation of human capital via 
investments in health and education. The international evidence suggests that the direct costs 
of schooling (fees, uniforms, transport, school supplies) are frequently the second largest 
expenditure after food (DFID, 1999). Data from South Africa catalogues how CSG recipients 
report not only increased expenditure on food (79 percent), but also school feesxv (26 percent), 
school uniforms (25 percent) and electricity (22 percent) (Delany et al, 2008). In addition, 
research shows that social grants support investments in productive physical capital, such as 
improved housing and, particularly in rural areas, investments in smallholder agriculture, with 
concomitant increases in food consumption (Martinez, 2005).    
Although much evidence points to improvements in levels of wellbeing associated with grant 
receipt, these effects are not uniformly experienced across all contexts and recipients. Instead 
they are mediated by factors such as the extent to which income is pooled within the 
household, along with the gender of the grant recipient. Evidence of the extent to which 
income is pooled is strongly associated with improvements in the welfare of household 
members other than the formally designated grant recipient.  
Examining the effects of the SOAG, Case and Deaton (1998) note how pooled income raises the 
welfare of all household members, but no such effects are discernible in households that do not 
pool SOAG income. These effects are strong – reported pooling of the pension income is 
significantly correlated with improvements in grandchildren’s height (Lund, 2002) and general 
health. Examining health, Case (2001) notes that in over 90 percent of cases where SOAG 
income is pooled, it improves the health of multiple household members, including children. 
The evidence points to even the relatively diminutive CSG being pooled. Delany et al (2008) 
report 51 percent of CSG recipients reporting pooling their grant or grants, a figure that is likely 
  
to be understated as respondents generally know the grant is intended only for the recipient 
children.  
The pooling of grant income is generally associated with the gender of the grant recipient; this 
is a quality that functions to mediate the benefits of its receipt.  
Pension receipt by a female is durably associated with improvements in health status (and 
school enrolment) of grandchildren (Case, 2001). Duflo (2003) documents positive gains on 
granddaughters’ anthropometricxvi data when their grandmother receives the SOAG, with no 
commensurate effect for pension receipt by a grandfather. This is consistent with robust 
international evidence that grant receipt by women is associated with enhancing the welfare of 
children (Lund, 2002).  
These gender differentials also start to suggest the way in which receipt of state transfers may 
feed into processes of altering resource allocation within households: it empowers those 
traditionally responsible for the care of children. Evidence sees CSG recipients report relatively 
high levels of financial decision-making autonomy, with around half making important financial 
decisions in the household themselves and 22 percent in conjunction with another household 
member (Delany et al, 2008) being significant. A larger proportion of rural and informal urban 
resident women indicate being involved in financial decision-making than women in formal 
urban areas, a dynamic that probably reflects the greater likelihood of resident male partners in 
the latter group. 
Improved access to social services  
The receipt of state cash transfers is associated with an elevation in the uptake of social 
services. In several social grant systems accessing specified social services is a conditionality of 
grants directed at children. This section therefore also examines the Latin American Conditional 
Cash Transfers in relation to South Africa’s unconditional CSG.  
The evidence linking receipt of social grants with improved nutrition has been recounted, and 
links receipt of the CSG with improved nutritional status and anthropometric outcomes (Delany 
et al, 2008). In addition, the CSG is associated with elevated school enrolment (Samson et al, 
2004; 2005; Case, Hosegood and Lund, 2005). The General Household Survey shows a positive, 
albeit small, correlation between CSG and school enrolment (Budlender and Woolard, 2006). 
CSG receipt serves to elevate school enrolment (by 8.1 percent for six year olds) and school 
attendance for six, seven and eight year olds to highs of 83, 97 and 98 percent respectively 
(Budlender and Woolard, 2006). These improvements are notable, despite the fact that 
households with CSG-receiving members are poorer, have lower levels of employment and 
adult educational attainment than non-eligible households. School enrolment figures drop off 
after 15 years of age, but this coincides with the end of the compulsory school-going age and is 
likely to be influenced by other factors such as the absence of school feeding programmes in 
secondary schools.  
  
Although receipt of the CSG is associated with improved school enrolment, validating the exact 
impact of the grant is difficult because of the spectre of confounding variables that may 
influence the effects of grant receipt. In other words, does the CSG result in higher school 
enrolment, or are the characteristics that see caregivers apply for the CSG related to those that 
see them enroll their children in school? 
Longitudinal data from demographic surveillance systems combined with the age-graded 
phasing in of the CSG provides an answer by enabling current school enrolment data of grant 
recipients to be compared with that of their older siblings. The older siblings of current day 
beneficiaries offer a counterfactual, control group ‘for what would have been true for younger 
siblings, if the Child Support Grant had not been introduced’ (Case, Hosegood and Lund, 2005, 
p.469). Retrospective examination of the longitudinal data reveals that when observed at an 
earlier point in time, the older (and then grant-ineligible) siblings of younger (and presently 
grant-receiving) beneficiaries were significantly less likely to have been enrolled in school than 
their age cohort. This probably reflects the poverty of these households, which subsequently 
came to be CSG receiving (Case, Hosegood and Lund, 2005). The significance of this finding is 
that it serves to discount the hypothesis that the correlation between grant receipt and 
schooling simply reflects an unobserved variable that sees particularly effective, conscientious 
or motivated caregivers both enrolling their children in school and applying for grants. Instead, 
it is receipt of the CSG that significantly raises the probability of school enrolment.  
Within the welfare system design, attaching conditions to grants is viewed as a powerful way of 
attaining desired developmental outcomes. Debates around imposing conditionalities see 
South Africa’s universal CSG compared with Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) programmes in 
Latin America. The relative paucity of research on the South African CSG (introduced without 
randomised control trials or baseline surveys) (Case, Hosegood and Lund, 2005) further 
encourages the tendency to look to the robustly researched Latin American CCT programmes.  
In the last decade a new generation of CCT programmes in Latin America have attached 
preconditions that encourage desired health-seeking and educational enrolment behaviour 
(such as accessing clinics, immunisation programmes and enrolling children in school) to state 
cash transfers. These programmes seek to combine the short-term objectives of social safety 
nets with the longer-term goals of interrupting intergenerational poverty traps (Brito, 2006, in 
Pauw and Mncube, 2007). The strongest evidence comes from the Oportunidades and Bolsa 
Familia programmes, which reach approximately a quarter of the Mexican and Brazilian 
populations respectively. Mexico’s Oportunidades (formerly termed Progresa) links cash and in-
kind transfers to school clinic and school attendance; Brazil’s Bolsa Familia is a family stipend 
that requires school attendance, growth monitoring and immunisation and prenatal care for 
pregnant women (De Janvry et al, 2005). Both programmes are well targeted, highly effective in 
terms of positive outcomes on indices such as child health (Gertler, 2004), school enrolment 
and performance, and reduced child labour (Skoufias, 2005; De La Briere and Rawlings 2006; 
Rawlings and Rubio, 2005).  
  
Despite this evidence from Latin America, there are two arguments for not imposing 
conditionalities within the South African context. The first is that conditions typically generate 
substantial costs. These include both administrative costs associated with dispensing grants, 
along with the various transaction, opportunity and social costs invariably borne by those 
seeking to access grants.xvii The second and perhaps even more compelling argument is that 
many of the problems they seek to address, such as child labour and lower levels of school 
enrolment for girls, are virtually unknown in the South African context. Although CSG receipt 
elevates school attendance, it does so off an already extremely high base (Delany et al, 2008). 
While there is a gender difference in school attendance, it is only among older children and, 
contrary to the international experience, sees fewer boys aged 14–17 (91 percent) attend 
school than the corresponding cohort of girls (94 percent). Not only are school enrolment rates 
relatively high and undifferentiated by gender, the empirical evidence suggests that clinic visits 
and participation in immunisation and growth monitoring programmes are also high (Delany et 
al, 2008). Instead, where social services are underused, the problem frequently is a supply-side 
constraint rather than a demand-side problem (Lund, Noble, Barnes & Wright, 2008). Even 
within the Latin American CCTs, research has increasingly foregrounded these supply-side 
constraints (Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite, 2002; Rawling and Rubio, 2005). Some argue that 
an important effect of conditions with CCTs is to garner political support from politicians and 
the public (Grosh et al, 2008). 
Finally, it is useful to point out the limits of the data in understanding even the comparatively 
well-researched Latin American CCT programmes. Firstly, it remains difficult to establish 
precisely whether it is the conditions or the cash that exact the developmental gains (Gertler, 
2004). Secondly, after running for little more than a decade, longitudinal data on access to 
social transfers as long-term interrupters of poverty is not yet available. However, it seems 
likely that breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty requires more than just access to 
primary health care and school enrolment – it will depend on a host of factors such as the 
quality of education, the availability of employment and the rates of return to education. 
2. Economic effects  
Economic benefits of social grants 
Social transfers generate complex economic effects, both at a micro level for beneficiaries and 
at an overarching macro-societal level. The literature on the relationship between social grants 
and macroeconomic growth is neither systematic nor definitive. Some of the most notable 
efforts to discern the effect of social transfers on economic growth have been conducted in the 
developed world, and consist of cross-country studies comparing social expenditure and 
economic growth, the hypothesis being that if social grants inhibit economic growth, social 
expenditure would be negatively correlated with country level growth. However, many factors 
influence economic growth and much of this data is inconclusive. Gauging the effects of social 
grant expenditure on economic growth is further hampered by the fact that supporting 
economic growth is seldom an explicit objective of social transfers, or measured (Barrientos, 
  
2008). Many studies consequently show either no statistically significant correlation between 
social transfers and growth (cf. Perotti, 1992), or as a relatively detailed Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) study suggests, significantly positive results 
only for certain types of direct social transfers (Arjona, Ladaique and Pearson, 2001). 
Conversely, little evidence exists to suggest they inhibit growth (Bourguignon, 2004). 
There is considerably stronger evidence of social transfers supporting a host of microprocesses 
that benefit grant beneficiaries, their households and communities. The preceding section 
describes how cash transfers support improvements in consumption and the accumulation of 
human capital. This in turn enhances labour productivity and potentially earnings, and if there 
is a degree of intra-household sharing and mutuality, these individual gains ought to benefit 
other household members (Devereux, 2001b). There is also evidence of the economic returns 
strengthening the accumulation of human capital; Behrman and Rosenzweig (2001) estimate 
that within the developing world every US dollar invested in early childhood nutrition produces 
at least a threefold increase in economic gains. There is much anecdotal evidence for this: for 
instance, high levels of social expenditure (including a social pension for five decades) are 
credited with lowering once high Mauritian poverty rates to the lowest in Africa (Roy and 
Subramanian, 2001). Public transfers also strengthen the economic position of beneficiaries by 
supporting economic activity. In the South African context cash transfers have been variously 
shown to support investments in productive assets and activities (Lund, 2002; Ardington and 
Lund, 1995); facilitate labour market engagement (Keswell, 2004; Kingdon and Knight, 2000; 
Posel, Fairburn and Lund, 2004); and contribute to the development of local markets (Cichon 
and Knop, 2003). The mechanisms and processes by which these economic effects work are 
described in the following three sub-sections: improving the management of risk and insecurity; 
facilitating saving and investment; and supporting the development of local markets. 
Improving the management of risk and insecurity 
Public transfers not only elevate present consumption, they can also enhance security and the 
management of risk, thereby protecting consumption, income and assets in the future. As 
suggested at the outset of this review, vulnerability, defined as the susceptibility to livelihood 
threatening shocks, is a defining feature of poverty 
Social transfers potentially protect recipients against various livelihood shocks, such as illness, 
drought and the loss of employment, by providing a larger resource buffer than they would 
otherwise have access to. In the absence of such a buffer, as much of the literature on coping 
suggests, households facing livelihood threatening insecurity trade away long-term economic 
viability for short-term consumption (Corbett, 1988; Devereux, 2001c). This is because shocks 
induce ‘distortions in inter-temporal resource allocation, forcing a focus on current 
consumption in preference to investment’ (Barrientos, 2008, p.27).xviii Social transfers therefore 
help the impoverished avoid liquidating their productive assets such as tools, livestock or land 
(often at depressed prices), or engaging in survivalist behaviours with long-term negative or 
irreversible effects, such as eating their seed stock, or cutting back on their children’s nutrition 
  
or schooling. Examining data from Honduras following a hurricane, Carter (2007) demonstrates 
the cumulative quality of poor households’ downward spiral of disinvestment: a 10 percent loss 
of assets depressed household growth by 18 percent, relative to cases where assets had been 
retained. Keswell (2004) examines South African panel data to show how the SOAG enables 
poor households to avoid inefficient insurance mechanisms.  
Social transfers not only provide a safety net to prevent people from having to exchange their 
long-term welfare for their immediate survival, they potentially provide a springboard into 
potentially higher-value activities. To protect current consumption from shocks and avoid 
fluctuations in income, the poor tend to be highly risk averse. They engage in precautionary 
low-risk, low-return agriculture and production methods, pursuing strategies to diversify rather 
than specialising in activities and keeping savings in liquid but low-yield forms (Morduch, 1999). 
Although the cost of these risk management strategies is difficult to quantify, and much data is 
derived from studies of rain-fed smallholder agriculture and pastoralism, Dercon (2006) 
estimates the poor sacrifice as much as a quarter of their income in return for security. Social 
transfers provide opportunities by enabling the poor to take risks, and to generate higher 
returns for resources such as their labour and assets.  
Finally, through its tempering of risk by buffering consumption in the face of shocks, and by 
enabling grant recipients to harness risk in more lucrative activities, social transfers compensate 
for poor people’s lack of access to markets for insurance against risk. This is significant because 
private markets for risk and financial intermediation among poor people are generally 
underdeveloped and ineffective. Devereux (2001a) attributes this to ‘information asymmetries, 
chronic poverty, lack of collateral, covariant risk and high transaction costs’ (p.514). Within the 
South African context, many impoverished black South Africans purchase funeral cover (and a 
smaller group, life insurance), yet formal insurance against disability and the loss of income, 
and short-term insurance, tends to be extremely rare. Social transfers are useful not only 
because markets for risk sharing are ineffective, but also because there is a general paucity of 
alternative policy instruments available to address this (Jalan and Ravallion, 1999).xix 
Facilitating saving and investment 
By enabling impoverished households to better plan for the future and smooth consumption, 
public transfers not only facilitate savings on the part of beneficiaries, they allow them to 
access and leverage other resources and finance. Although cconcerns have been expressed that 
receipt of social pensions may crowd out savings, this is not borne out by empirical data. 
Instead, the evidence suggests that social grants increase savings (Barrientos, 2008).  
The investment effect associated with social grants is robust and has been noted in several 
countries, including Bolivia, Brazil and South Africa (Grosh et al, 2008). The economic effects of 
public transfers are further magnified if they are used to multiply income, with Devereux noting 
‘At the individual level, even tiny consumption-smoothing public transfers can have “mean-
shifting” outcomes, since the capital-constrained poor often invest some incremental income in 
farming or small-scale enterprises’ (2001a, p.515). For instance, in Kenya the lean season’s 
  
Work for Food programmes enabled households to acquire additional agricultural inputs and 
increased net returns to farming by 52 percent. In Bolivia the annual Bonosol social pension in 
rural areas, routinely spent on agricultural inputs, raised food consumption by an equivalent of 
165 percent of the value of the grant (Martinez, 2005). Sadoulet, De Janvry and Davis (2001) 
compute a productive conditional transfer to have income multipliers of 1.5 to 2.6 in Mexico. 
These benefits are enabled by the cash value of the grant, and also by the certainty and 
regularity of the transfer, which allows beneficiaries to plan around a reliable income stream. 
Social transfers help beneficiaries to access bank credit in Latin America and are an important 
part of microcredit programmes in Bangladesh (Lund, 2002).  
In South Africa, Lund (2002) notes how rural beneficiaries strategise to use grant income to 
secure credit, hire equipment, and buy agricultural inputs across the entire production cycle of 
ploughing, planting, weeding and harvesting. Other evidence from South Africa shows how 
savings from the state pension allow people to buy consumer durables, improve housing and 
invest in productive assets (Ardington and Lund, 1995). The potential investment benefits of 
social grants are contextually dependent and vary across programmes, groups and settings. 
Barrientos (2008) suggests: ‘Broadly, transfers have greater effects amongst rural households 
with deficits in complementary “productive” assets (e.g. inputs, labour)’ (p.26), in both low and 
middle income country contexts. Although the way social grants support economic activity 
within South Africa’s urban contexts is more varied and perhaps more difficult to analytically 
capture than readily observable rural agriculture, there is evidence of similar economic 
synergies (Du Toit and Neves, 2006; 2007a).  
Even though the CSG is significantly smaller (less than a quarter the size) of the state old age 
pension, and the literature on social transfers is far from unanimous on whether there are 
critical income levels below which households cannot invest (Carter and Barrett, 2006), 
research shows evidence of savings and investment. Child Support Grant recipients are more 
likely to have bank accounts and some form of savings than those who are eligible but non-
receiving. Of CSG recipients, 42 percent have a bank account (versus 24 percent of eligible non-
recipients) and are more likely to report savings in some form, versus 20 percent of grant-
eligible non-recipients (Delany et al, 2008, p.34).  (However the causal directionality of the 
relationship is not entirely clear: grant recipients might open bank accounts or bank account 
holders may be more likely to successfully apply for grants). Disaggregated by province, about 
30 to 40 percent of recipients have bank accounts reflecting that they are relatively near to 
bank facilities and range from a high of 56 percent in Gauteng to a low of 23 percent in the 
Northern Cape. Delany et al (2008) find that although having a bank account was more 
common in urban areas, the proportion of savings accrued did not vary markedly across urban 
and rural sites. Focus group data suggests that while savings levels are low, the CSG grant does 
enable recipients to participate in stokvels (informal mutual savings societies).  
 
 
  
Supporting the development of local markets 
Not only do social safety nets encourage diversification into riskier activities that offer 
potentially higher returns, individual economic gains potentially have aggregate or cumulative 
economic effects. Receipt of social grants functions as a Keynesian stimulus to growth by 
increasing purchasing power in the most economically marginalised of areas. Within the South 
African context, grants are often received within particular kinds of spatial poverty traps: the 
former homelands areas and the ethnic urban townships of South Africa. These areas continue 
to bear the imprint of apartheid-era planning, which has inhibited the development of 
conventional settlement patterns and functioning local markets. Social grants therefore inject 
liquidity and stimulate local trade in what are not only resource-poor zones, but also thin and 
underdeveloped markets. The effects of social grants within these locales are vividly evident in 
the large, itinerant monthly markets that cluster around pension payout points in South Africa. 
The precise magnitude of the multiplier effects is difficult to judge and is typically computed 
only for grant beneficiaries, rather than larger groups. This is a fecund topic for future inquiry. 
International evidence, such as two studies in Mexico, observed increases in both productive 
assets and consumption among non-beneficiaries in receiving areas, relative to control groups 
(De Giorgi and Angelucci, 2006; Barrientos and Sabates-Wheeler, 2009). 
3. Social empowerment effects 
This section looks at the social effects of grant receipt, and the way social grants serve to 
empower beneficiaries within informal systems of social exchange is considered. This is 
followed by a review of the evidence for relatively subtle social empowerment effects in 
relation to the state. 
Empowerment within informal systems of social exchange  
Formal systems of publicly-funded social protection coexist alongside informal forms of social 
support and what Bracking and Sachikonye (2006) term ‘informal social protection’. Systems of 
informal social protection are an important component of the context into which resources 
from formal systems of social protection enter and circulate. These informal systems mediate, 
and are simultaneously shaped by, social grant receipt. The livelihoods of the poor are often 
highly complex and varied, frequently incorporating disparate activities and actors across 
multiple areas, particularly as many African households are often stretched across the urban 
and rural poles (Spiegel, Watson and Wilkinson, 1996). This diversity of activities, household 
members and locales enables impoverished households to capture opportunities and mitigate 
shocks. Key to these is inter- and intra-household reciprocity and exchange. 
The poorest and most marginal of the poor, however, face constraints in gift exchanges and 
systems of exchange ‘because they have weak social networks and lack tradable assets 
(including labour)’ (Devereux, 2001a). Social grants, because they are paid regularly and in cash, 
provide bargaining power within these systems of reciprocity. They give recipients something 
valuable to trade socially, either directly in the form of resources or in the ability to give their 
labour and time (Møller and Sotshongaye, 1996). Du Toit and Neves suggest: ‘Gifts and favours, 
  
formal exchanges, family histories, financial, emotion[al] and moral debts all have an impact in 
reciprocation practices, and balancing of the resulting obligations take place according to 
calculations shaped by social norms and personal relations’ (2009a, p.23). Social grants are 
therefore an important lubricant in these networks of social exchange.  
Social grants strengthen the position of the marginalised within networks of social reciprocity, 
without which they would be disempowered. Both Sagner (2000) and Barrientos and Lloyd-
Sherlock (2002) document how the SOAG allows otherwise marginalised elderly people to 
acquire social capital and transact within these informal networks. Pension receipt incentivises 
the care of the elderly and underwrites their claims to receive support when frail as well as 
repositioning them within households. It cements the role of (particularly) elderly women as 
the resource lynchpins around which marginalised households are constituted and also enables 
them to engage in care work, specifically of grandchildren.  
In understanding how receipt of a social grant animates these larger networks of mutuality and 
reciprocal exchange, it is useful to consider how formal systems of public and private welfare, 
including social transfers, are invariably augmented by unpaid domestic work. Largely invisible 
and highly gendered, the burden of care work is disproportionately borne by the most 
impoverished and marginalised of women, for not only do daily demands need time and energy 
in the absence of resources (such as basic infrastructural services and domestic appliances), but 
they are likely to care for the dependents and tend the homes of the less poor. Across the globe 
impoverished care work tends to be externalised downwards to the less affluent, in spatially 
extended ‘care chains’ (Hochschild, (2000; Katz, 2001).  In the South African context a common 
pattern is for the homes and children of the urban middle classes to be tended by a woman 
whose own children and home is tended (perhaps in a distant rural area) by other female kin in 
a spatially extended sequence of care.  In this way the task of reproducing the household is 
‘outsourced’ down to the poorest, and frees up everybody else in the chain to engage with the 
labour market.  This largely unacknowledged labour, delivered daily in the peripheral areas of 
the townships and former homelands, represents the social back end of systems of formality. 
The bottom links of the care chain are where the disabled, retrenched, occupationally injured, 
the retired and children of migrant mothers are cared for. 
While social protection underpins systems of social reciprocity, it is important not to over 
idealise them, for they are both fragile and exact high costs. Not only are these informal 
transfers between the poor susceptible to shocks such as the mounting care burden imposed 
by HIV and AIDS, they also exist in a realm marked by the exercise of power and even coercion  
along the familiar social stratifiers of race, class, lineage and generation. Social reciprocity is 
often underpinned by the power of dominant groupings compelling the less powerful to play 
their part in the exchange, and should not be idealised as an unequivocal, costless good.  The 
functioning of social reciprocity does not simply reflect an altruistic maximisation of resources, 
but also unequal and gendered relationships (Sagner and Mtati, 1999). Some commentators 
have cautioned that expanding systems of public welfare such as the conditionalities of the 
  
Latin American CCT programmes (Molyneux, 2006), or appeals in South Africa for voluntarism in 
home-based care for the AIDS sick, risks compounding the burden of unpaid labour (Hunter, 
2006). Social grants strengthen networks of care, but they can also potentially displace even 
larger responsibilities for the dispensing of care on economically marginalised women, already 
bearing considerable burdens of sustaining their households. 
Social empowerment in relation to the state  
Many of the effects of social protection are relatively discernible, but it is important to also be 
attentive to less readily apprehendable effects. There is evidence of subtle empowerment 
effects associated with social transfers. In Colombia for instance, mothers had to interact with 
schools as part of their conditional cash transfer (CCT programme). Evaluations revealed 
Progresa in Brazil served to raise awareness of the importance of educating girls (Grosh et al., 
2008). It also eroded the status-based barriers that marginalised, poorly educated parents often 
experienced when engaging with the education system (Combariza, 2006). In Mexico, 
educational conditionalities have seen increased community attention to, and pressure against, 
teacher absenteeism (Grosh et al, 2008); in Turkey, the registration by women of their 
marriages and children functioned to draw them into the protection conferred by family law 
(Ahmed, Quisumbing and Hoddinott,  2007). Although these empowering (or conversely, 
marginalising) dynamics appear to be under-researched within the South African context, many 
of the underlying aspects of social exclusion (gender, education, locality) are broadly applicable. 
In addition, millions of residents of the former homelands have their rights as the citizens of 
formal civic authority curtailed by their status as the subjects of hereditary traditional authority 
(Mamdani, 1996). On one hand successfully accessing a social grant requires one’s claim to 
citizenship be affirmed through the acquisition of an identity book, in a process that may evoke 
an ethos of citizen participation and voice. On the other hand, the micro politics of exchanges 
between applicants and officials is not inherently empowering: some researchers have 
observed officials deliver exhortations to CSG applicants that are patronising and moralising 
(Goldblatt and Yose, 2004, cited in Lund et al, 2008). How, precisely, grant receipt interfaces 
with entitlements of citizenship, empowerment and identity in the South African context seems 
largely unknown and undocumented. 
4. Political effects  
In addition to the welfare, social and economic benefits associated with social transfers, social 
grants can potentially generate substantial effects within larger political processes.  
While social protection is occasionally imagined to be inimical to growth-led development, 
particularly by commentators on the right, it is frequently part of the political changes 
associated with market liberalisation. The socially ameliorative function of social protection 
potentially enables states to undertake market-orientated political change. By fulfilling their 
redistributive goals through social protection, policymaking in sectors such as macroeconomic 
policy, trade and labour are absolved of this imperative. This enables these sectors to price for 
efficiency and focus on growth rather than job protection, a common experience both in the 
  
developing world and the transitional economies of Central and Eastern Europe. Several, such 
as the World Bank (2005), therefore endorse the use of specific redistributive mechanisms, 
advancing them as preferable to compensatory mechanisms within each sector.  
The use of social protection to free up a market-focused state, and mitigate the harshest social 
effects of structural adjustment and economic liberalisation, is not without its historical 
contradictions and reversals. For example, consistent with structural adjustment throughout 
Africa, Malawi abandoned market-distorting fertiliser subsidies in the 1980s. Yet acute food 
insecurity in the 1990s convinced foreign donors to finance an annual programme of fertiliser 
and seed because subsidising food production is more cost-effective than delivering food aid 
(Devereux, Baulch, Macauslan, Phiri and Sabates-Wheeler, 2007). This study notes how the 
policy pendulum swing has seen the reintroduction of economically rational policies to support 
the rural poor, only now under the banner of ‘social protection’. 
Social transfers not only potentially free up a market-orientated state, they also elevate the 
likelihood that economic growth will benefit the poor. Although the relationship between 
inequality and economic growth is complex, and there is considerable evidence of variation in 
growth-related poverty reduction both within and between countries (Chen and Ravallion, 
2004; Barrientos, 2008), comparative studies show that inequality undermines the 
redistributive effects of economic growth, perversely skewing the benefits to those who are 
better off (World Bank, 2005). Focused redistributive mechanisms, such as public transfers, 
help ensure that the opportunities and benefits of economic growth are likely to include the 
poor, a group that is often far removed from the benefits of growth (Bourguignon, 2004). As 
high levels of inequality tend to buttress institutions and policies profitable to incumbent elites, 
public transfers that serve to narrow the inequality gap serve to shift these policies (De Ferranti 
et al, 2004). Hence reducing inequality can feed into forms of political and economic change 
that support accumulation by the poor. Seekings (2002) argues that the combination of an 
efficient, progressive income tax system and generous state social pension serves to reduce 
inequality in South Africa by more than anywhere else in the developing world. 
Apart from allowing the state to engage with growth-orientated reform and shifting political 
process to be more inclusive of the poor, social protection frequently incorporates other kinds 
of local political imperatives. These often reflect the specifics and histories of implementing 
societies. In several states the expansion of state welfare has been a key part of efforts to forge 
a renewed social compact between the state and citizenry, with great symbolic importance. The 
expansion of public transfers coinciding with the repudiation of military dictatorship in Brazil in 
the late 1980s, and the 1990s demise of apartheid in South Africa are good examples of this 
(Barrientos et al, 2003). In South Africa the replacement of the highly racially skewed State 
Maintenance Grant (received by less than one percent of Africans) with a lower cash value 
universal Child Support Grant, served to underscore the national commitment to non-racialised 
social solidarity (Lund, 2008). Social grants have contributed to social cohesion and, 
notwithstanding occasional dissent, enjoy comparatively high levels of support across all strata 
  
of South African society. Findings from the HSRC 2006 South African Social Attitudes Survey 
(Noble, Ntshongwana and Surender, 2008) accordingly showed that approximately two-thirds 
of respondents agreed with the assertion that ‘The government should spend more money on 
social grants for the poor, even if it leads to higher taxes’. All the more remarkable, nearly 63 
percent of those in paid employment (and therefore actually paying tax, or closest to the 
prospect of doing so) agreed with the statement (Noble, Ntshongwana and Surender, 2008, 
p.13). In addition, the political effects of expansions in public transfers extend beyond their 
contribution to social solidarity; they have had far more pragmatic political effects.  
In middle-income, high inequality societies such as South Africa and Brazil commentators have 
suggested that welfare grants function to reduce social unrest, especially in economically 
marginalised peripheries (Barrientos, 2004). In addition, they represent effective and politically 
palatable ways of bolstering purchasing power, especially in rural areas, and, with state 
pensions, doing so at little risk of creating work disincentives. Social grants crucially support 
rural livelihoods in both societies, particularly in the context of structural change and 
liberalisation of the agricultural sector. In Brazil the pension and disability benefit has become a 
key instrument in supporting rural development and agricultural policy (Lund, 2002), whereas 
in South Africa state pensions have not only become the key resource for many rural 
households, they are also the resource lynchpins around which rural households are formed. 
Evidence suggests that many rural South African households are effectively formed around the 
grant receipt (Woolard and Klasen, 2004). Social grants have arguably served to temper urban 
migration from rural areas and slowed down South Africa’s urban transition.xx The smaller value 
CSG is more loosely associated with demographic effects, but households where a respondent 
receives it are larger than those that do not (Delany, Ismail, Graham and Ramkissoon, 2008). 
South Africa’s political, social and demographic landscape may look very different if it were not 
for social grants.  
5. Negative effects of social grant receipt 
Debates surrounding social grants invoke concerns about their negative effects, including how 
they provide opportunities for clientalism and corruption in relation to the state, dependency, 
the distortion of markets, negative impact on family structures, work disincentives and 
discourage private savings. Perverse incentives such as elevating fertility rates among teenagers 
have also been attributed to social protection. Several of these, such as the potential problems 
of clientalism, market distortions and dependency, either appear to be under- or unresearched, 
or are generally unamenable to empirical inquiry. The following section examines labour 
disincentive effects, the displacement of private remittances in the face of public transfers, the 
potential perverse incentive effect of social grants on fertility, and the question of unproductive 
and wasteful expenditure of grant income.  
Labour disincentive effects 
In certain contexts social grants are associated with labour disincentive effects, where the 
income from public transfers induces beneficiaries or members of their households to withdraw 
  
from, or become reluctant to engage in, labour markets (Moffitt, 1992). This is consistent with 
standard economic theory that holds that rising incomes result in lower labour supply, as 
beneficiaries enjoy leisure over work. Labour disincentive effects are more likely to be felt in 
developed countries and are associated with comparatively generous benefits, which substitute 
for labour market earnings, and eligibility criteria that are tied to income levels. They are 
generally of less concern in developing countries because benefits levels are relatively low, and 
social transfers complement rather than replace the earnings of able-bodied adults. Much of 
the evidence from Mexico (Parker and Skoufias, 2000), Brazil (Leite, 2006) and Romania (Birks 
Sinclair & Associates, 2004 cited in Grosh et al., 2008) suggests that grant-receiving adults work 
no less than randomised control groups. Barrientos suggests ‘The predicted adverse effects of 
social transfers on labour supply are not observed in many developing countries because of 
offsetting factors. Notably, transfers can facilitate migration, encourage additional labour 
supply from other household members, and reduce the incidence of days in which recipients 
are unable to work due to ill health’ (Barrientos, 2008, p.33). 
In South Africa the comparatively generous SOAG is associated with withdrawal from the labour 
market by its beneficiaries, although pensioners are generally not expected to work. In fact, as 
able-bodied, working-age adults are excluded from the South African system of social transfers, 
and none of the various categories of beneficiaries (children under 15 years, the disabled, the 
elderly) are presumed to be working, it is extremely difficult to suggest that social grants in 
South Africa have direct disincentive effects on beneficiaries. While the CSG might be received 
by a working-age adult on behalf of a beneficiary child, it is equally difficult to argue that the 
sum of R240 might displace, rather than augment, other earnings. With the larger SOAG, the 
eligibility criteria for the SOAG are not necessarily scrupulously applied, and only consider the 
income and assets of the applicant and his or her spouse, and not that of the household more 
broadly. The SOAG therefore appears to provide limited incentive for other household 
members to withhold their labour. After all, co-resident, prime-age adults could continue to 
work (or look for work) secure in the knowledge that their earnings will not reduce welfare 
transfer income to the pensioner in the household.   
Despite this, Bertrand, Mullainathan and Miller (2003) examined South African data and found 
what they argued were work disincentive effects: in pension-receiving households prime-aged 
(15–30 year old) male household members undertake less work and have a lower probability of 
employment. However, when Posel, Fairburn and Lund (2004) re-examined the data they found 
that the Bertrand et al study was inattentive to the realities of the dispersed nature of many 
impoverished South African households – in almost a third of cases the household had a non-
resident household member that was missed out in the Bertrand et al study. This finding 
effectively switched the association between pension receipt and labour supply from negative 
to positive and thereby negated Bertrand et al’s argument.  
Pension receipt in South Africa is associated with higher levels of migration from rural 
households, particularly by working-age women. These effects are particularly strong when a 
  
woman, as opposed to a man, receives the SOAG. It is suggested that receipt of a SOAG aids 
prime-age women within the household to negotiate and overcome constraints they face to 
urban labour migration. These include not only the costs associated with migration, but also the 
need to care for children, who can be entrusted to a pension-receiving grandmother. In much 
the same way as social transfers serve to lift credit constraints, they can lift care constraints 
within households. This is consistent with international evidence suggesting that where receipt 
of social transfers lower labour supply by elderly adults and children, it is often compensated 
for by increases in labour supply among adults (Barrientos, 2008). 
Crowding out private remittances 
A strand of argument raises the concern that public transfers may serve to displace or crowd 
out private remittances. This displacement of private transfers would dilute the effects of public 
transfers and make the erstwhile sender of a remittance an indirect or secondary beneficiary of 
the transfer programme (Cox and Jimenez, 1995). Crowding out dynamics are likely to be 
context specific but research suggests no evidence of them in Ethiopia and Kenya (Lentz and 
Barrett, 2005), or China, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Vietnam (Gibson, Olivia and 
Rozzelle, 2006).  
In the South African context, research over a decade ago suggested that 40 percent of black 
South Africans receive or give remittances (Cox and Jimenez, 1997). Examining national data 
sets, Jensen (1998) calculates that each publicly-funded rand received by a household reduces 
private transfers between 20 to 40 cents. But in much the same case as Bertrand et al (2003) 
this statistic did not take into account the structure of African households. Jensen could not tell 
how many of the sampled households were spatially stretched, or what the withdrawn 
remittances were being spent on. Lund cautions: ‘Crucially, the “crowding out” theory depends 
on the idea of households with clearly defined boundaries; societies in which labour can be 
deployed freely; and societies in which types of work and the form of income and remittances 
can be accurately measured. South Africa offers challenges in all these respects’ (Lund, 2002, 
p.687–688). Posel’s (2001) re-examination of some of the data found that the (typically urban) 
remitters were generally not living by themselves (the most common household form was of 
two adults and one child), and that the presence of children of school-going age at the 
remittance sending pole of the household was associated with declines in the amounts 
remitted to rural households. Simply because a remittance ceases to be sent to the rural pole of 
the household, does not necessarily mean it is not being productively redirected in the urban 
locale. The welfare effects of private remittances are a zero sum game only if the various 
interconnected components of households are considered in isolation.  
A final point in thinking about the dynamic between private and public transfers is that 
eligibility assessments for state old age support in Germany, Italy Portugal and Spain take 
income of the applicant’s children into account; by contrast jurisdictions such as Belgium, 
France, the Netherlands and United Kingdom do not (De Neubourg, C., Castonguay, J. and 
Roelen, K. (2007)). The precise relationship between private and public resources in the claims 
  
to public transfers are therefore far from universally understood or applied. Instead, they entail 
political, ethical and cultural understanding of the relationship between public and private, 
between younger and older generations, between entitlement and obligation. 
Elevating fertility rates 
The concern that the CSG might be incentivising women to bear children is a frequently cited 
popular concern in South Africa. However, the precise contours of this concern do not appear 
to be clearly enunciated in the literature (Goldblatt, 2003). Generally, it may include the fear 
that the grant may be elevating fertility rates among adolescents and that women bear children 
to access the CSG while passing the care of these children onto others, thus inappropriately 
using the grant for their own consumption. Intuitively, it seems unlikely that a relatively small 
benefit would have a significant decision on reproductive decision-making in light of the total 
psychological effort, time and monetary investment required to bear and raise a child. Hunter 
and Adato (2007) document how young women have a clear understanding of these costs 
associated with children, but there is further evidence to counter concerns over mothers 
claiming the grant and leaving their child in the care of others. Only a fifth of teenagers who 
bear children are CSG recipients (Makiwane, Desmond, Richter and Udjo, 2006). The data 
indicates that children whose mothers are present are more likely to receive a grant (44 
percent) relative to those whose mothers are not present (38 percent) (Case et al 2005), thus 
calling into question the spectre of mothers receiving the grant and abandoning their children 
to the care of others. Even more convincing is that the parents of grant-receiving children are 
older than average. Case et al (2005) draw on area-based demographic data to show that only 
3.7 percent of CSG grant recipients were teenage mothers, versus the 8.7 percent of teenage 
mothers who are not receiving a grant – a significant five percent differential. Therefore, 
despite popular concerns of teenage girls becoming pregnant to access the CSG, they are less 
likely to claim it: ‘disproportionately, it is older mothers who apply for grants’ (Case et al, 2005, 
p.469). Finally, studies of the CSG (Makiwane et al, 2006; Department of Social Development, 
2006; Moultrie and McGrath, 2007) note that fertility rates for teenage girls rose rapidly in the 
1980s, then declined before the introduction of the CSG in 1998, and have since remained 
stable despite the presence of the grant. Finally these increases in teen fertility were across 
virtually all social groups including those, such as middle-class white teens, who would 
generally be ineligible in terms of income criteria.  
Inappropriate and wasteful expenditure 
Arguments against direct state cash transfers focus on the irrational, wasteful and misdirected 
spending that recipients engage in, or can potentially engage in. Du Toit and Neves (2006), 
drawing on data from a study commissioned for the National Treasury, suggest that although 
some evidence can be found of wasteful expenditure among the 48 case studies they 
examined, adjudicating the appropriateness of grant beneficiaries’ expenditure is difficult. 
Describing a specific case study, they show how the expenditure on a range of consumption 
items (such as in traditional ceremonies) served an important role in cementing otherwise 
  
vulnerable grant recipients within social networks and strengthened their entitlement. In light 
of the fact that poor people support themselves from a variety of sources and that these are 
diverse, concerns over the appropriateness of expenditure on certain non-essential 
commodities often reflects limited understanding of the complexity of impoverished 
livelihoods. Given the reality of impoverished livelihoods it is difficult to think of material goods 
and commodities that could not in some way support them. For instance, Skuse and Cousins 
(2007) demonstrate the importance of cellular telephony, (initially viewed as a technology item 
for the affluent), for maintaining links with distant benefactors. Even alcohol, often a 
touchstone of inappropriate consumption, is often an integral part of forging social mutuality, 
particularly when consumed communally (McAllister, 2001). Du Toit and Neves (2006, 2009b) 
do not suggest that there are no instances of inappropriate and wasteful expenditure, they 
simply argue that much of what is regarded as inappropriate expenditure reflects a lack of 
understanding of the livelihoods of the poor.  
A final point concerns the common refrain that social grants may be generating dependence. 
Much of the previous section indirectly speaks to this question, and suggests the way in which 
social grants serve to strengthen welfare and individual autonomy. Lentz, Barrett and 
Hoddinott (2005) critically re-examine the notion of dependency, and make a useful distinction 
between ‘positive dependency’, which is welfare enhancing, and ‘negative dependency’, where 
external aid undercuts recipients’ ability to meet their own basic needs in future: they find little 
evidence of the latter in the African context. Furthermore, Devereux (2001a) argues that 
‘displacing informal safety nets with public or market-based alternatives is likely to be socially 
and economically preferable’ (p.513). It is useful to note that in many cases, narratives 
concerning the negative effects of social transfers in the South African context uncritically 
recapitulate North American and western European concerns regarding perverse incentives, 
moral hazards and dependency (Meth, 2004). These concerns reflect the particulars of the 
social contexts from which they originate, namely relatively affluent societies with high 
employment rates and often historically comprehensive welfare benefits. Simply transposing 
these concerns locally is inattentive to the specifics of the South African context, and the 
precise dynamics of how social grants are actually used. These issues are the focus of the 
empirical findings section of the research.  
  
6. Qualitative analysis  
Introduction: data and methodology 
The qualitative research focused on the Cape migrant network, which incorporates the urban 
Western Cape and rural Eastern Cape. This has been shaped by the economic and social 
dynamics described in the literature review. In the impoverished peripheries of the Eastern 
Cape’s former Transkei homeland the local agrarian economy has waned and urban 
remittances have declined. In the metropolitan centre of Cape Town in the Western Cape, 
employment prospects for unskilled urban dwellers have receded. Although the Cape migrant 
network has a particular geographical context, many of the underlying dynamics and patterns 
of urban and rural livelihoods are broadly applicable to African households elsewhere in South 
Africa.  
The qualitative inquiry builds on a household survey undertaken by PLAAS and the Chronic 
Poverty Research Centre (CPRC) in 2002, which sampled 1 358 households. This was followed 
by extensive qualitative fieldwork in 2005 when 48 households from this sample were 
interviewed in detail. Evenly split between urban and rural, these households were selected 
from the lowest deciles of income distributions and reflect a comparatively impoverished sub-
group. Of this group, 10 households, each of which had at least one social grant-receiving 
member, were studied in depth through multiple visits and interviews over several months. 
This fieldwork consisted of interviewing various household members as well as understanding 
the webs of social exchange within which each household was located. The latter was through 
interviews with other individuals and households, identified as significant sources or recipients 
of aid by the index household. Return visits in 2008 and 2009 captured changes over time 
within the households. Four of these case studies are presented in this report. 
Although the case studies are specific, the strength of the qualitative inquiry resides neither in 
its broad representivity, nor its generalisability in an expansive, quantitative sense. Instead, the 
value of the case study material lies in illustrating particular points and dynamics, along with 
specific social and structural relationships. In the discussion that follows, the larger dataset of 
qualitative case studies are drawn on, but the selected four case studies are used to illustrate 
particular points and dynamics. First, however, the context of the research setting is detailed. 
Research setting: Impoverished households within the Cape migrant network  
Black African households have since the early twentieth century been constituted in the context 
of oscillatory rural-urban labour migration. Households frequently take on a geographically 
stretched (Spiegel, Watson and Wilkinson, 1996) quality, described in the literature review, as 
they are split between rural and urban locales. Throughout much of South Africa, including the 
Eastern Cape, unaccompanied circular male migratory labour under apartheid has become 
supplanted by female, informal, oscillatory labour migration in the post-apartheid era. 
Migration to locales such as the migrant-receiving Western Cape enables impoverished African 
  
households to access urban opportunities. These include employment, including informal self 
employment, and the benefits of infrastructure such as electricity, water and housing, and 
more ready access to urban-based state services such as education and medical care. However, 
urban migrants frequently maintain links with the rural areas, which remain a base for 
livelihood-threatening shocks such as illness or the loss of a job and eventual rural retirement. 
For instance, a common response to urban shocks such as illness or retrenchment is to send 
non-economically active household members, such as children, back to rural homes where they 
are often cared for in ‘skipped generation’ homes of grandchildren and grandmothers.  
The livelihoods of the impoverished also frequently take on this spatially dispersed quality. 
Geographical diversification enables household members to capture livelihood supporting 
opportunities and to hedge against risk and shocks. Similar diversification is evident in the often 
broad range of livelihood supporting activities members of impoverished household engage 
with and the portfolio of financial instruments they draw on. Key to understanding the use of 
social grants entails understanding these dynamics, along with the social relationships that 
animate them. 
The systems of social reciprocity described in the literature review section are crucial in 
underpinning the survival of impoverished households. Social reciprocity, exchange and 
informal social protection (Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006) are frequently evident within and 
between households, and take in the rural-urban extended networks described above. 
Constituted through practices, institutions and ideologies of mutuality (including church, sports, 
youth, savings groups; local community and trade associations; traditional ceremonies, 
initiation rituals, funerals, feasts), they are crucial in understanding impoverished livelihoods. 
These practices provide the context within which social grants are received and used, and 
determine how opportunities and costs are distributed within extended social networks. Four 
case studies that capture these dynamics are briefly summarised below. The unabridged 
versions are in Appendix I. A detailed discussion follows the brief case study vignettes.  
Case Study 1: Mamzoli Fikile 
Social pension-receiving Mamzoli is an elderly woman living in the deep rural Eastern Cape 
region of the former Transkei who receives a social pension. She was visited by the research 
team between 2005 and 2009. Mamzoli’s comparatively comfortable homestead is the rural 
pole in a much wider system of social reciprocity and kin-based support. The widowed Mamzoli 
worked as an urban-based domestic worker for many years, following which she retired to the 
village. Mamzoli’s extended rural household consists of herself, her daughter-in-law and half a 
dozen grandchildren. Although Mamzoli’s household benefits from the moral and material 
support of several of her urban-based adult children, a key benefactor is Mamzoli’s son, 
Simpiwe. Simpiwe is formally employed and this has enabled him to support his siblings and 
improve their education and employment prospects. He also bought his mother the gas-
powered fridge she uses to augment her pension by vending meat and alcohol. This, and 
Mamzoli’s petty agricultural production, enabled her to leverage and multiply the resources of 
  
her social pension. The full case study documents the larger synergies between the people in 
this extended system of livelihood making, and also details how Mamzoli’s receipt of a social 
pension enabled her son to send a smaller remittance. Relieved of this burden, Simpiwe worked 
fewer hours, completed his schooling and demonstrably improved his employment prospects. 
Case Study 2: Vavile Xaba 
The Cape Town township residence of SOAG-receiving Vavile looked like a distinctly failed 
investment when first visited by the research team in 2005. The RDP-style housexxi was nothing 
more than an incomplete shell abutted by a dark and damp shack, and was home to elderly 
Vavile, his wife, their adult daughter, young granddaughter and a disabled adult stepson. With 
Vavile’s relatively unfavourable history of informal work and low levels of asset accumulation, 
the household subsisted largely off the stepson’s disability grant, Vavile’s social pension and the 
small-scale vending of fruit and vegetables. By 2009 the picture had changed: the household 
had saved their grant income and successfully mustered the labour and materials required to 
complete the house. The quality of their accommodation had improved markedly, which the 
household members proceeded to furnish with the credit-based purchase of various consumer 
durables and furniture. The case study suggests these are significant investments in urban 
domesticity and respectability. Furthermore, it speaks to the household’s firm commitment to 
urban-based investment and residence.  
Case Study 3: Vuyiswa Magadla 
Vuyiswa is a partially-sighted and arthritic elderly Xhosa woman living in a shack settlement on 
the outskirts of urban Cape Town. After the death of her husband three decades before, 
vulnerable and marginalised Vuyiswa managed to get herself reincorporated to her premarital 
extended kin. She had worked in Cape Town in the 1980s as a domestic worker, and received a 
disability grant in 2000, which was later superseded by a state social pension. The full case 
study details how Vuyiswa’s grant income not only enabled her to subsist, it also supported a 
diverse range of productive activities, either by her or others. These activities included 
Vuyiswa’s small-scale vending, her care for her (employed) niece’s infant, and even her saving 
up for her daughter’s izila (coming out of mourning) ceremony. By 2009 the household’s 
composition altered, a change catalysed by the upgrading of the shack settlement.  This 
resulted in Vuyiswa’s boyfriend becoming co-resident, and she was tending his small shebeen, 
now run from her shack. The case study suggests that Vuyiswa’s receipt of a social grant has 
been key to her survival. She used the grant in dynamic ways to generate value within the 
household and cement her place within extended networks of social reciprocity.  
Case Study 4: Simon and Veronica Zama 
In 2005 Simon, his wife Veronica and two minor sons, occupied a pair of mud huts in the former 
Transkei region of the rural Eastern Cape. Even by modest village standards the household was 
extremely impoverished; its economic marginality had its roots in Simon’s occupational injury 
and loss of employment following a mine accident decades earlier. At the time of the research 
  
team’s first visit in 2005, Simon and Veronica were ailing and eking out a livelihood by doing 
menial labour within the village (mud block making, mud plastering, wood gathering), and 
receiving some child support grant income and a remittance from an urban-based adult 
daughter. The household also relied on social reciprocity within their extended kin network but, 
significantly, Simon was poised on the age-eligibility threshold for a social pension. The research 
team’s subsequent return saw the household use Simon’s new social pension income in ways 
which they had themselves earlier predicted: they improved their food consumption, upgraded 
their housing and proceeded to invest in livestock and agrarian production. By 2009, at the 
conclusion of the research period, Simon and Veronica were investing considerable effort and 
grant income in building a new home nearby for their soon-to-be-adult teenage son. They 
readily explained this investment of resources was intended to cement their entitlement on 
their son; his nearby residence intended to ensure them of support in their old age.  
Discussion of qualitative results  
The place of livelihood strategies 
The case study material draws attention to the importance of understanding grant recipients’ broader 
livelihood and survival strategies. Although the research participants are all relatively impoverished, and 
have largely unfavourable histories of employment and asset accumulation, the strategies pursued in 
the four case studies are highly divergent. Mamzoli sought to position herself as a source of rural 
succour and kin care, at the same time presiding over small-scale retail and agrarian production, all 
within a much larger and geographically dispersed system of formal sector employment and 
provisioning. Vavile and his household sought to engage in small-scale retail and consolidate his efforts 
and investments in a respectable urban residence. Vuyiswa engaged in a shifting repertoire of survivalist 
activities, which she used to maintain her supportive social connections and foothold in a shifting urban 
context. Simon and Veronica used a social pension to engage in petty rural accumulation as they 
invested in cementing their enduring entitlement on their eldest son into their old age. Beyond the 
overarching objective of securing survival, these strategies reflect particular constellations of individual 
capacities, opportunities and histories. Because they serve to shape household level decisions 
concerning proper social relations, residency, investments and accumulation, these factors need to be 
adequately conceptualised to understand how social grants are used. 
A key quality unifying the research participants is their careful strategising to exploit existing resources, 
juggle constraints and attain their desired future outcomes. While these elements were gleaned from in-
depth interviewing about both past actions and future plans, many of these elements became starkly 
evident when examining the shifts in activities that accompanied significant social and material 
transitions. These transition points were evident in Vuyiswa’s reconfiguring of her household in 
response to the departure of her niece, the sequence of expenditure associated with Simon’s receipt of 
a social pension, and Simpiwe’s reconfigured remittance to his mother Mamzoli following her receipt of 
a SOAG. These key transition points serve to elucidate both the objectives of a recipient’s household 
members and the underlying logic that often drove it.  
 
 
  
Household decision-making  
Examining the livelihood strategies of grant recipients also needs careful attention to decision-
making processes. The data shows that coherent and effective decision-making is associated 
with households able to marshal resources and co-ordinate the actions of their members. A 
major component of success is that the household has a centre of authority, and is able to co-
ordinate its collective efforts. For example, in the case study of Mamzoli, decision-making 
between her and her son Simpiwe saw them connected in a complex, spatially extended kin 
network which allowed them to co-ordinate their actions and reallocate Simpiwe’s resource 
flows. This process of decision-making and livelihoods is enacted over time and becomes fully 
comprehensible only when taking a longitudinal view.  
In addition, it is helpful to bear in mind that decision-making processes are seldom readily 
explicable in terms of altruism, selflessness or a universal imperative to maximise collective 
good. Instead, they are shaped by deeply held, culturally-embedded norms of acceptable 
behaviour, appropriate social relations, of justifiable entitlement and obligation. People do not 
simply rationally pursue context-free optimal strategies to secure their livelihoods, instead they 
act in ways that are socially meaningful and culturally congruent. These processes, however, 
are not over-determined by culture either and they frequently reflect local and contextual 
accommodations. For example, Samkile’s continued residence at his stepfather’s house is 
inconsistent with traditional Xhosa mores concerning residential arrangements and the norms 
of patrilineal descent. However, Samkile’s need for care, the absence of maternal kin who can 
adequately care for him and, crucially, the material incentive provided by his disability grant, 
prompt the pragmatic decision to retain him in the household.  
Social grants and consumptive expenditure  
A common theme within the case studies is the use of social grants to support consumptive 
expenditure, such as food, fuel and other basic subsistence goods. Food was a key item of 
expenditure and research participants unfailingly described using social grants to buy food and 
basic grocery items. Recipients often reported shopping for groceries on the day of, or day 
after, receiving their grants. In the small towns of the former homelands where social grants 
represent a major source of income, grant payout days, which are staggered and do not 
necessarily fall on the last day of the month, result in a massive and discernible influx of 
shoppers into towns. In the rural areas, grant payout days also catalyse itinerant, pick-up truck-
based travelling markets, which trail the mobile cash payout convoy.  
  
 
 
 
The way larger value grants, particularly the SOAG, benefit household members in addition to 
those formally named as beneficiaries is relatively well-documented in the case studies. In 
addition the qualitative inquiry also elicited details of how even the smaller value CSG is often 
apportioned and distributed among several final recipients or activities. This is evident in the 
example of Vuyiswa’s daughter remitting R200 of her CSG to her mother in the Eastern Cape 
with whom her child is resident, and retaining R40 for her own purposes. In reality, resources 
are not only split and circulated, they are commonly pooled. In response to researcher 
questioning, many research participants would cite the appropriate official response, namely 
that the CSG they received was used for consumptive expenditure for the designated child. In 
many cases, however, further sensitive inquiry saw respondents readily concede to pooling the 
resources of the grant for use among older, officially ineligible children, and even the 
household more generally. This accounts for the spread of the welfare effects of the CSG 
among other non-receiving children within households, noted in the quantitative inquiry. 
Although food and consumables are a frequently reported source of expenditure in the 
qualitative data, judging the precise magnitude of the expenditure – especially by appealing to 
A transient pension-day market close to a grant payout point in the rural Eastern Cape. An armoured 
pension payout van is visible in the background. Photo: David Neves 
  
the notion of average monthly expenditure, in lives often filled with contingency, seasonality 
and little insulation from livelihood shocks – is difficult to do with precision. It is far easier to 
gain a sense of what research participants bought with their grants, and the findings are 
considered in the following section.  
Social grants and expenditure on productive assets, physical and human capital 
After food, fuel and other basic consumptive items the second most commonly cited use of 
social grants was for schooling children or grandchildren (or even great grandchildren). 
Schooling-related expenses were a major reported use of social grants and included school fees  
– widely paid, particularly in rural areas, despite the fact that grant recipients are officially 
exempt – transport for schooling, uniforms, stationery and other small, irregular amounts (for 
field trips, sports days, cultural events). Examples of school-related expenditure are noted in 
the case studies of Simon and Veronica, Vuyiswa and Mamzoli. The qualitative data validates 
the generally well-documented finding that not only the CSG, but also the SOAG and DGs are 
frequently used for education-related expenditure. The costs of providing school-going children 
with lunch, or money for a snack at school, was readily enumerated by research participants as 
part of the package of expenses associated with schooling. Support for children’s schooling was 
an often cited part of the social grant expenditure; it represents a significant trans-generational 
transfer and investment in human capital formation for many impoverished households.  
After consumptive expenditure and schooling, a third major avenue of expenditure was the 
upgrading of accommodation and housing. The expenditure of social grant resources on  
accommodation was framed by the strategies and decision-making imperatives discussed 
earlier concerning  the optimal place of residence, domestic investment, household 
composition and proper social relationships. Upgrading accommodation was a common 
objective to which grant income was directed, saved and leveraged. In the qualitative data 
these investments were particularly discernible in relation to the SOAG and DG, due to their 
comparatively large size (especially relative to the CSG). Accounts of investment in housing 
were prominent in the case studies of Vavile and Simon and Veronica, and were also 
undertaken by Mamzoli. Housing is not only a durable asset, which represents an investment in 
quality of life; it is also often an important part of propriety and respectability. So ubiquitous 
were investments in accommodation that the act of not investing is significant: Vuyiswa’s 
expenditure of limited money and effort in the upgrading of her accommodation was not 
simply an act of omission, but reflects her assessment of the impermanence of shack living. The 
impending upgrading of the entire settlement will see the existing structures razed and 
replaced. In addition shack dwellers also frequently report to limiting investment because of 
the risk of devastating shack fires.  
Simon and Veronica invested in livestock and aimed to buy fencing; however, there were other 
examples in the 2005 inquiry of investments in productive assets such as agricultural 
implements, hand tools and the occasional sewing machine.  
  
Social grant receipt and financial market behaviour  
This section examines social grant receipt in relation to financial market behaviour, including 
investing and borrowing. Other kinds of important but non-monetary activities facilitated by 
social grants are then examined.  
Social grants and savings behaviour  
Social grants recipients routinely save their grant income through a range of informal saving 
mechanisms. Reports of umcalelo (mutual savings society) membership were relatively 
widespread and evident in the case studies of Vavile and Mamzoli. It was not always easy to 
discern what umcalelo savings were intended for, although spending on homebuilding (such as 
Mamzoli’s new room), consumer durables and furniture, along with ceremonies (particularly 
traditional rituals and Christmas) were prominent. The enforced quality of umcalelo savings, 
located as they are in regular social gatherings, and the way they serve to protect income from 
claims by others, appeared to be a major part of their appeal. Research participants also 
occasionally reported engaging with formal and retailer-driven forms of savings, including lay-
buys for clothing or building materials and buying Christmas stamps from supermarkets 
(vouchers purchased throughout the year and redeemable in December).  
In the larger qualitative dataset, reports of bank account use were comparatively rare and 
generally associated with two groups. The first group was the often urban-based younger 
women, most likely to be receiving child support grants. They possessed the literacy and social 
confidence required to open and use a bank account, and often rudimentary English or 
Afrikaans language skills. The second group of was clustered among often older research 
participants who had a history of formal employment, and were therefore usually men. This 
group was often of retirement age, had varying degrees of literacy, and usually some 
vocationally-acquired English or Afrikaans language proficiency. Many opened accounts while 
working in the formal sector. This group was also the most likely to report a variety of other 
savings mechanisms such as endowments, annuities, fixed deposit bank savings and provident 
funds. While an even smaller minority reported saving provident fund payouts in bank 
accounts, bank accounts were generally used as transactional rather than savings vehicles.  
For the impoverished grant recipients, the transactional abilities conferred by bank accounts 
often constituted a major part of their attraction. Recipients occasionally complained of bank 
fees (they ‘eat the money’ is a common refrain), although recipients often had their grants paid 
into their bank account to overcome the need to be at a designated pension payout point, at a 
fixed time, each month. This is an important strength in the context of widespread oscillatory 
urban-rural migration. In addition, accounts were often used to distribute funds, for example 
recipients would often lend ATM cards and PINs to family members to transact (usually 
withdrawing cash) on their behalf. It was also evident in even more complicated practices, such 
as Veronica’s Johannesburg-based daughter receiving two CSGs in her bank account, which she 
transferred into the account of an Eastern Cape resident kinswoman, who in turn withdrew the 
  
cash in a small town, which was subsequently collected by Veronica’s husband on horseback 
from her village. In these transactional practices, the infrastructure of the formal banking 
system was intertwined with informal practices of sociality. 
In considering the use of savings instruments, an important methodological issue is that the 
precise nature of financial investments held were not always understood by the respondent. 
Respondents, for example, described having life insurance when they actually had an 
endowment policy, or they complained their medical expenses were not covered by their 
‘insurance’, which on further scrutiny proved to be a life policy. Much of this detail could only 
be unravelled by perusing participants’ documentation. In light of the vagueness among 
informants concerning the nature of their savings instruments, along with the occasional 
difficulty even the experienced fieldworkers had in categorising instruments (for example, was 
an equity-linked retirement annuity a pension or a unit trust?), two caveats need to be flagged. 
Firstly, it underscores the fact that these behaviours and mechanisms are best explored with a 
focused enquiry on financial instruments (Collins, 2005), which was well beyond the brief of this 
research project. Secondly, it may call into question some of the purported precision with 
which the larger national datasets record savings instruments.  
Social grants and borrowing 
Social grant recipients engaged in both formal and informal borrowing. Bank borrowing was exceedingly 
rare, and not documented in any of the in-depth case studies. This may reflect the theory that 
recipients’ often low income poised them beneath the threshold of bankability. A relatively common 
form of borrowing, exemplified in the case studies by Vavile, was furniture store credit. Other often 
cited sources of retail-based credit were extended by hardware stores and building materials merchants.  
Straddling the division between formal and informal was credit extended for the purchase of 
consumables and grocery items by local spaza shops or rural trading stores.xxii Levels of borrowing and 
debt seem to increase in line with the household income, notably the social grants received. The 
regularity and (relative) certainty of social grant receipt, along with the often public nature of grant 
receipt (particularly in rural areas), often appeared to make many grant recipients relatively attractive 
borrowers for retailers and informal lenders.  
In several cases respondents reported little borrowing, but when interviewed in-depth and located 
within their larger social networks, much higher levels of informal borrowing emerged. Much of the 
informal borrowing was intertwined with social obligation. Borrowing blurred into social relationships, 
and was subsumed within the practices (and registers) of boleka (loosely ‘borrowing’), isipho (gift-like 
giving), uyampha (helping; or more discrete or unceremonious giving) or tshintsha (forms of exchanging) 
and remittances. In the realm of informal borrowing a distinction was often made between forms of 
borrowing, where the borrowed commodity was to be reciprocated with the same item (usually money 
or food) in future versus forms of borrowing where an item of only approximate commensurate value 
and type was to be returned. The varied nature of the borrowing and some of these fine gradations are 
evident in the single example of Veronica and Simon’s relationship with Philemon. Philemon loaned 
them various objects (livestock, money), purchased groceries or replaced a broken tool for which they 
paid him back, and engaged in more indeterminately reciprocated transfers of food or money. The 
  
centrality of social reciprocity in relation to borrowing is highly significant and discussed in detail in the 
section on Social grants and social reciprocity.  
Using social grants to leverage household resources 
Grants were not simply consumed, saved or borrowed against; they were used to leverage household 
resources in other ways. This included synergistically supporting economic activities, such as informal 
economic activity and labour market engagement, along with providing the material basis for care work.  
Social grants and economic activity  
Social grants are used to support economic activities. In the 2005 research it was calculated that in at 
least 10 out of a total of 42 grant-receiving households, receipt of a social grant directly supported other 
economic activities (Du Toit and Neves, 2007a), functioning as seed capital or operating capital for small 
survivalist enterprises. Within the expanded case studies these dynamics were evident in the case 
studies of Mamzoli and Vuyiswa. In seeking to understand how grants support these economic activities, 
it is important to stress that the focus ought not simply to be on the grant-receiving individuals or their 
immediate households, but on the broader social network or system. For instance, Mamzoli’s beer and 
meat retail drew on efforts by her minor grandchildren (dispatched to purchase alcohol for subsequent 
resale), and also relied on those of her distant son Simpiwe, who had his own family and household. This 
arbitrage between social grants and informal economic activity enables receiving households to harness 
their time, labour and social connections to maximise the value of the transfer. 
Social grants and care work 
Social grants are not only used to leverage economic activity within receiving households, they 
also frequently facilitate the generation of other kinds of value, namely performing care work. 
Care work is analytically elusive and frequently overlooked in analysis, yet central to the lives 
and livelihoods of impoverished people. Understanding care work is crucial to understand 
decision-making, along with inter- and intra-household resource flows. The 2005 data showed 
that in 14 out of 42 grant-receiving households (which were predominantly clustered in the 
rural Eastern Cape), receipt of a pension or disability grant made it possible to do care work, 
such as looking after minor children or other kin in need of care. The higher value SOAG and 
Disability Grants proved especially important in bolstering the extended care networks that 
enabled this childcare; however the CSG was also routinely received by caregivers. The way in 
which social grants enabled a recipient to reconfigure their activities and engage in caring for 
children or a disabled person is documented in the case studies of Mamzoli and Veronica’s care 
of their grandchildren and Vavile’s disabled stepson Samkile. Grant receipt in some cases 
provided the material basis for care work, which in turn freed up other working-age household 
members to engage in paid work, or even migrate to look for work. Hence Mamzoli and 
Veronica’s care for their grandchildren facilitates their adult daughters’ (and in Mamzoli’s case 
also her daughter-in-law’s) ability to take on paid employment. Similarly, Vuyiswa’s case study 
shows how her receipt of a DG enabled her to care for her niece Nolusindiso’s child, while 
Nolusindiso in turn secured employment as a domestic worker.  
  
As noted in the literature review, the demands of care work can constitute a considerable 
burden (Hunter, 2006), around which households carefully strategise and organise. The 
demands of care work were particularly evident in relatively labour constrained households. 
For instance, elderly Vavile returned to tending his stall throughout the day after his 
intermittently-ill daughter was drawn away to care for her newborn infant and could no longer 
help him. The imperatives of socially reproductive labour, of which care work is an important 
part, meant that even children frequently contribute to it, such as 13-year-old Zandile, in 
Vuyiswa’s case study, who both received and provided care at her grandmother’s rural 
homestead. In the skipped-generation households of grandparents and grandchildren which 
feature so prominently in rural South Africa, grandchildren are seldom entirely passive 
recipients of care. They often contribute significant labour within impoverished households, as 
is evident in the case studies of Veronica and Mamzoli’s grandchildren, who were drawn into 
small-scale agricultural labour.   
The key imperative to engaging in socially reproductive labour, including care work, reflects a 
number of factors within impoverished households. The absence of resources magnifies the 
demands of social reproduction. Substantial effort is needed to substitute for the absence of 
labour-saving devices and utilities such as piped water and electricity, which means that water 
must be fetched and wood collected. The burden of this domestic labour accrues 
disproportionately to the social group typically responsible for the internal economy of the 
household, namely women. The economically marginalised are compelled to engage in care 
work, because they are often least able to pass the burden of social reproduction downwards – 
for it is they who provide the cleaning, guarding, child and elder care for more affluent groups. 
Hochschild (2000) describes how care work is delivered by poor women, whose own children 
are tended to by even poorer women, often within geographically extended care chains. The 
demands of this socially reproductive labour are compounded by other factors, such as the 
informal property regimes of the poor, whereby continued access to resources is often secured 
through possession, occupation and communal recognition, rather than through formal 
systems. In the South African context, the need for care work is increased by high levels of 
migration, whereby households are frequently stretched between sites of urban economic 
opportunities and the rural locales of lower-cost residency where the young, incapacitated and 
the elderly often live.  
Social grants and social reciprocity  
This section argues that social grants support the livelihoods of the impoverished, and the 
informal social protection introduced in the discussion, by facilitating social reciprocity. The 
institutions, ideologies and practices of mutuality are where entitlement and obligation are 
enacted. Social reciprocity and the redistribution of value it facilitates are central in the survival 
of impoverished South Africans. Theoretically, the working of social reciprocity has been 
described in a number of ways, including in terms of social networks and social capital. 
Although social reciprocity is sometimes described in terms of a socio-biological register, of 
  
‘self-interested’ or ‘altruistic’ behaviour, it is particularly useful to think of it in terms of cultural 
rules and historical trajectories. This section argues that social reciprocity represents not only a 
strongly felt social and moral imperative, but constitutes an important form of investment in 
their survival by economically marginalised people, by strengthening their ability to make moral 
claims against others in future.  
The workings of social reciprocity can be thought of in terms of two separate but intertwined 
dimensions: the first is that recipients demonstrate that they are deserving and worthy of 
assistance, and the second is that they are able to reciprocate in future.  
The first dimension is a person’s worthiness as a recipient. Encompassing their self-
presentation, this entails they be dignified and respectable, and often relies on a carefully 
cultivated comportment, captured in the Xhosa word of isidima (dignity). This quality is marked 
by dignity, propriety and appropriate forms of sociability or what Nyamnjoh (cited in Ross, 
2005) calls ‘conviviality’. The case studies illustrate the role of social respectability, strongly 
evident in the self-presentation of Vuyiswa and Simon and Veronica, and a key part of their 
ability to access the beneficence of better resourced individuals. For instance, Vuyiswa saved a 
considerable sum from her Disability Grant to fund her daughter’s izila ceremony. The 
ceremony required a lavish (for an impoverished household) celebration, complete with food 
and drink for all guests, along with buying new clothes and consumer durables (including a bed) 
for the daughter. On the face of it, diligent saving for a once-off event seemed imprudent and 
even perplexing. However, when this decision was understood in its social context, including 
the manner in which successful completion would enable the daughter to remarry (and secure 
her place in a new patrilineage) and to rightfully return to work (thereby generating an income), 
these actions become far more comprehensible. The extent to which it served to reaffirm 
Vuyiswa’s moral claims to support against her daughter and cement herself within her kinship 
network was important. In contrast, by way of a hypothetical example, if Vuyiswa were to 
become an unco-operative, undignified, uncivil, argumentative or cantankerous aunt or 
grandmother, it is difficult to imagine that her extended kin would support her to the extent 
that they have. 
The worthiness and respectability of an individual is distinct from, yet linked to, the second 
dimension – their ability to enter into exchange. Reciprocation implies the ability to exchange at 
some point in future, but as the recipients of social reciprocity are recipients precisely because 
they are resource constrained, this often sees them performing socially reproductive labour. 
They engage in tasks such as looking after the children, the sick or frail, they maintain 
homesteads, cook, clean, and provide agricultural labour. As was suggested in the literature 
review, social grants fulfil a crucial role by providing the material basis to engage in these forms 
of labour, and thereby effectively underpin systems of social reciprocity and systems of 
informal social protection (Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006). In this way, formal systems of grant 
receipt interact with these informal systems of social protection. South African society has been 
highly monetised for a century; there are scant prospects for an autarkic existence in a realm 
  
outside of monetised exchange. It is these networks and horizontal exchanges between people 
of broadly similar socioeconomic status that link formal social protection to informal social 
protection, and serve to connect marginalised people to the resources for their survival.  
Several examples exist of these investments in social reciprocity, including Veronica and 
Simon’s investing of their grant income in building a homestead for their son; Vuyiswa’s use of 
her DG in caring for her niece’s daughter and support for her widowed daughter’s izila 
ceremony; and Mamzoli’s care for her grandchildren and storing items in her fridge for others. 
These acts can be thought of as investments because they divert resources from immediate 
consumption, with the (often tacit yet reasonable) expectation of reciprocation and support in 
the future. The gains of these investments are not interest, dividends or capital growth, instead 
they are about cementing future social entitlements from others. 
Two additional points can be made about social reciprocity. The first is that networks of social 
reciprocity incorporate their actors on different terms. The particular form that provisioning for 
ones’ household and kin assumes depends on a host of factors, including the individuals’ 
demographic characteristics and position in relation to resources. For example, both Simpiwe 
and Vuyiswa support their households, but do so in typically gendered ways. Simpiwe supports 
his kin network through remittances from his formal job, his careful allocation of resources, and 
support and encouragement to his extended family. Vuyiswa supports her household through 
the care she primarily delivers within her kin context. Both of them contribute to their 
households and enable its survival, but in very different ways.  
The second is that it is important to note that while these dynamics are social and relational 
they have important material manifestations. Prosperity involves the accumulation of 
appropriate material goods. The rural case studies illustrate one of the traditional sources of 
rural respectability and wealth, namely ownership of, or access to, livestock. The centrality of 
livestock to rural accumulation strategies and its place as a store of wealth and source of social 
prestige is suggested in the case study of Simon and Veronica. Even the loan of livestock 
enabled them to lay claim to the animals’ value and social prestige. Anthropological literature is 
replete with accounts of the social dignity and value associated with cattle ownership and its 
centrality to communal life. Although the communally harnessed spans of oxen for purposes of 
animal traction are rare, the use of oxen for ritual slaughter, transfer (through bridewealth 
payments or lobola) and communal consumptive purposes (feasts) continues to tie them to the 
most potent of public acts in the Southern African countryside. In the decline of agrarian 
livelihoods, a solid marker of rural respectability is a comfortable rural homestead, particularly 
the reception rooms of slightly better off households. Furnished with store-bought furniture 
rather than grass mats or rough wooden benches, this is where visitors, such as the research 
team, are received. These rooms are not simply investments in domestic comfort (indeed, they 
were often relatively unused for day-to-day living), they are significant markers of social 
respectability. They proclaimed the inhabitants to be people of substance, to be dignified, 
successful and worthy of respect.  
  
Urban areas offer up different contexts for material accumulation and the accoutrements of 
dignified living with which inhabitants surround themselves. Material artefacts and furnishings 
are a important part of popular conceptions of a respectable home, and markers of social 
respectability.  Hence the formal upgrading of shacks introduces an imperative to formalise 
relationships and invest materially. In urban township contexts of formal housing, ownership of 
goods, such as domestic appliances, is often central to local construction of proper urban and 
modern living (Meintjies, 2001). The centrality of material investment as a marker of social 
respectability was echoed in Vavile’s strenuous investments in his domesticity and household 
durables. 
Summary of qualitative findings 
The qualitative data suggests the importance of paying careful attention to the livelihoods and 
the processes of decision-making of grant recipients, in order to understand how they use 
social grant income. The case study material documents how resources from social grants are 
directed towards consumptive expenditure, along with a variety of investments in productive 
assets, physical and human capital. Looking at financial market behaviour, the qualitative data 
points to the way in which grants are frequently saved via informal savings mechanisms, 
whereas bank accounts are comparatively rare among the impoverished research participants. 
Bank accounts, but to a much larger extent other formal savings instruments, are generally 
found among people with a history of formal employment. Where they are held, bank accounts 
are treated as transactional rather than savings vehicles, and are sometimes used by people 
other than the formally designated account holder. With borrowing, bank loans appear to be 
rare, possibly reflecting the poverty of the small sample. Far more common were reports of 
obtaining credit from both formal and informal retailers. The data also suggests that the 
regularity and reliability of grant income enabled recipients to borrow. Finally, when borrowing 
behaviour was located within the minutiae of research participants’ social lives, comparatively 
high and variegated forms of informal borrowing and mutual assistance became apparent.  
The qualitative analysis also sought to carefully understand the way in which social grant 
receipt serves to leverage household level resources. Clear examples of grant income being 
used to support economic activity were presented, as this often provided the material basis for 
recipients to perform unpaid socially reproductive care work. This generated value and, in 
several cases, this freed up working-age adults to engage in remunerative employment. These 
dynamics are in turn reliant on the way in which social grant receipt functions to underpin 
social reciprocity. In this way, formal systems of social protection support systems of informal 
social protection. Social reciprocity is intertwined with social respectability. Social grants 
strengthen the ability of recipients to enter into cycles of social reciprocity, and thereby 
ameliorate their vulnerability. Social grant receipt therefore does not simply elevate 
consumption, or facilitate forms of fiscal investment, it enables investment in social 
relationships that are crucial to how poor people survive. 
  
7. Quantitative analysis 
Introduction  
This section buttresses the findings of the qualitative analysis by employing both descriptive 
statistics and a more rigorous propensity score matching approach. The latter identifies a 
credible comparison group that serves as a substitute for the absence of a formal control group, 
in accordance with quasi-experimental design. Building on past quantitative research (Samson 
et al 2008), this analysis sheds light on how receipt of South African social grants affects 
savings, credit and other developmental indicators such as education, nutrition and reported 
hunger.  
The findings from the analysis suggest that those receiving social grants (treatment group) had 
an increased tendency to save using bank saving accounts or stokvels, owned life insurance and 
used other savings mechanisms when compared to individuals in a similar socioeconomic 
standing who were eligible to receive social grants, but did not (control group). Moreover, it 
finds that the treatment group had a decreased tendency to use more formal borrowing 
mechanisms relative to the control group, particularly with commercial banks and building 
societies. This is an encouraging finding since it indicates that grant recipients are less exposed 
to unfavourable terms of formal lending given their increased levels of income (e.g. high 
interest rates). However, in contrast to this, the treatment group has an increased tendency to 
borrow from informal, relationship-based lending sources such as family members and local 
shops.xxiii Drawing from a recent propensity score matching study completed by EPRI in 2008, 
further developmental impacts are found with respect to Child Support Grants. ‘Specifically, the 
findings show that amongst all CSG-eligible children, school attendance was increasing and 
hunger was declining during the 2002–2004 period, but the reduction in hunger was 
approximately 4 –7 percentage points greater and the proportion newly in school was about 6–
8 percentage points higher amongst those receiving the grant.’ (Samson et al, 2008). 
Data and samples  
The main objective of the analysis is to evaluate the impact of the receipt of grants on 
household participation in financial activities. The dataset used in this analysis is a panel dataset 
extracted from Statistics South Africa’s Labour Force Surveys for the years 2001, 2002 and 
2003. Individuals who received any kind of social grant were linked across these years in the 
surveys of about 30 000 households. The final panel dataset contains 14 223 individual 
observations and 5 303 households. The panel data allows the researchers to see the impacts of 
grants receipt on the changes in the variables of interest over time. 
The sample frame for this analysis is the set of linked households across the three years which 
did not receive any kind of social grant from the South African government in 2001. Two 
treatment groups were identified: individuals who received no grants in 2001, but received one 
or more grants in 2002 and 2003; and individuals who received no grants in 2001, but received 
  
one or more grants in 2003. The impact of the receipt of grants on use of savings in bank 
accounts, savings in stokvels, savings in pension plans or retirement annuities, cash loans which 
are expected to be repaid, life insurance and other savings is assessed. The impact of the 
receipt of grants on the use of various borrowing mechanisms, namely cooperatives, 
commercial banks and building societies, land banks, government agencies, stokvels and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) is also assessed.  
Methodology  
In impact evaluation, the theoretically ideal situation (ignoring practical and ethical issues) is to 
conduct a randomised experiment. In a randomised experiment the researcher assigns 
individuals or households to treatment and control groups randomly, which helps to eliminate 
certain kinds of bias. The fundamental assumption is that the individuals or households in the 
treatment and control groups are statistically comparable observations (i.e. they have the same 
observable and unobservable characteristics that influence the outcome, but are uncorrelated 
to the assignment to the groups, in this case all the idiosyncratic changes on the final outcome 
due to something other than the treatment is the same across all individuals in all groups and, 
therefore, impacts can be measured by applying a difference-in-difference approach). 
Alternatively stated, the effect of the treatment is simply the difference of outcomes between 
the treatment and control groups. Unfortunately, social scientists rarely have the opportunity 
to work with randomised experiments because of the serious issues of ethics and practicality. 
Giving a grant to someone and refusing it to another on a random basis is unfair to the non-
recipients and has enormous welfare implications on the participants of the experiment. 
Therefore, ethical concerns of randomised experiments in policymaking combined with the 
large implementation costs often make it politically impossible.  
The nature of this project is necessarily non-experimental. Almost all grants are either means 
tested or categorical (awarded to designated categories of recipients), or both, which makes 
the grant recipients and non-recipients non-comparable without a correction for the resulting 
selection bias. This is why an alternative approach is necessary – propensity score matching 
provides such a technique for correcting selection bias; it creates a quasi-experimental dataset 
from a previously non-experimental one. Unable to simply take the recipients as treatment and 
non-recipients as control groups, this technique identifies a comparable control group – 
alternatively stated, as a credible comparison group – and estimates the effects. 
Propensity score matching is an approximation of the counterfactual – it identifies an estimated 
credible comparison group that appears to be eligible for the grants, but that is not receiving 
them.xxiv The reason it is an approximation of the counterfactual and not simply the 
counterfactual is because it is not guaranteed that this credible comparison group is truly 
eligible for the grants. In a quasi-experimental setting the main problem is that the individuals 
in the treatment group are systematically different from the people not in the treatment group 
because of selection bias. Moreover, geographic and demographic differences may lead to 
  
additional bias. To demonstrate this point, let Y1 be the outcome on the treatment group, Y0 be 
the outcome on the control group and D={0,1} be the indicator if the treatment is received or 
not, that is if D=1 the individual received the treatment and if D=0 the individual did not receive 
the treatment. In our case Y1 can be thought of as the savings indicator for the people who do 
receive grants and Y0 is the savings indicator for the people who do not receive grants. The 
average effect of the treatment on the outcome will be found by: 
E(Y1-Y0|D=1) = E(Y1|D=1) – E(Y0|D=1) 
Where E(Y1|D=1) is just the outcome of the treated group and E(Y0|D=1) is the counterfactual 
expected outcome on the treatment group participants had they not been treated, which we 
do not observe. What we do have at our disposal is E(Y0|D=0), the outcome on the control 
group, and there is no reason for it to be equal to E(Y0|D=1). But if we identify a set of 
observable characteristics, X, such that conditioned on X, Y and D are independent, then we can 
treat (Y1|D=1,X) and (Y0|D=0,X) as statistically identical and can substitute the counterfactual 
E(Y0|D=1) with the observed E(Y0|D=0) (Sianesi, 2001).  
Propensity score matching 
Conditioning on a set of observable characteristics, X, is a complicated process. A propensity 
score is the probability of an individual of being in the treatment group given X, P{D=1|X=x}. It 
can be shown that conditioning on X is equivalent to conditioning on the propensity scores.  
The basic idea is that we find individuals who look a lot like our treatment group but who do 
not receive grants based on their propensity scores and identify them as our matched control 
group. Once we have the control and the treatment groups, we can estimate the difference-in-
differences in savings and credit behaviours and observe the level of significance of our results. 
There are different ways of matching individuals and households. The method we employed is 
caliper matching.xxv This method increases the quality of matches but may run the risk of 
increasing the variance of the estimates (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).  
Estimation of Propensity Scores  
The propensity scores are estimated by finding variables that are expected to have a high 
correlation with the receipt of grants (see Table I). Since only eligible households are included in 
the sample we expect these models to include factors relating to the household ability and 
motivation. For example, the private costs of applying for grants – travel expense, time lost in 
the application process, and application requirements – may be more burdensome to some 
families. In addition, awareness of social grants will most likely affect participation. Moreover, 
the expected future returns to the investment in the grant application process depend on the 
life horizon and the age of potential recipients.  
There were two treatment groups employed for this analysis – ‘Treatment 1 All’ and ‘Treatment 
2 All’. Treatment 1 All is made up of those individuals who received no grants in 2001, but 
received one or more grants in 2002 and 2003. Treatment 2 All is made up of those individuals 
  
who received no grants in 2001, but received one or more grants in 2003. Use of Treatment 2 
All allowed for a larger sample population from which to draw results and findings. The model 
was estimated with a total sample size of 8 381 households, as per the Treatment 2 criteria. 
With time series data it is necessary to use the difference-in-differences approach to eliminate 
the time variant in the estimates. But because our variables of interest are dummy variables 
(e.g. it takes the value of 1 if the household has savings in a bank account and 0 otherwise), 
differencing them is less intuitive. Instead, a dummy variable was identified that takes the value 
of 1 if an individual made use of a financial service in 2003 but did not engage in it in 2001 and 
0 otherwise. Our analysis is completed using this newly created dummy variable.  
Table I shows the final variables used in predicting receipt of grants and estimating the 
propensity scores. Not all variables are individually statistically significant at conventional 
thresholds (95 percent or 90 percent confidence level), but they are jointly significant.  
The bigger the household size, the more likely the household receives a grant. Also, the number 
of children under seven years of age has big positive and statistically significant impact on the 
receipt of grants, whereas the presence of a working age male has a slightly negative but 
statistically significant effect. Some of the provinces also have quite significant explanatory 
power on the receipt of social grants, while others do not (e.g. provinces 4, 5 and 6).  
Table I: Statistical determinants of participation in social grants
1 
Treatment Group: Treatment 2 All2 Coefficient Std error z-statistics P(z) 
Household size in 2001 .153 .012 11.84 0.000 
Household working age men in 2001 -.050 .024 -2.10 0.035 
Household elderly members in 2001 1.00 .060 16.72 0.000 
Percent of the household male members -.27 .094 -2.86 0.004 
Household children under seven in 2001 .2007 .0218 9.17 0.000 
Household children between 7 and 14 in 2001 -.094 .0187 -5.03 0.000 
Ownership of a car .390 .029 13.40 0.000 
Province 1: Western Cape -.247 .0918 -2.69 0.007 
Province 2: Eastern Cape .151 .088 1.71 0.088 
Province 4: Free State .0506 .094 0.53 0.593 
Province 5: KwaZulu-Natal -.0455 .0902 -0.50 0.614 
Province 6: North West .0528 .0904 0.58 0.559 
Province 7: Gauteng -.345 .0937 -3.68 0.000 
Province 8: Mpumalanga .204 .094 2.17 0.030 
Province 9: Limpopo .363 .087 4.14 0.000 
                                                 
1
 Province 3 (Northern Cape) was dropped from the first stage model by Stata due to high multicollinearity (viz. 
highly correlated predictor variables in a multiple regression, which make for erratic responses following even 
small changes in the data). 
2
 Treatment 2 All is made up of those individuals who received no grants in 2001, but received one or more grants 
in 2003. 
  
Results I: Impact of social grants on ownership of financial assets (saving behaviour)  
This part of the quantitative analysis focuses on the impact of social grant receipt on savings 
and investment behaviour, that is, the ownership of financial assets. A priori, receipt of a social 
grant should allow individuals to save or invest more of their income, allowing for more long-
term economic stability and enhanced human development. Savings and investments are 
disaggregated into several types – this includes bank savings accounts, savings in stokvels, 
pension or retirement savings, investments in unit trusts or shares, cash loans, life insurance, 
and all other types of savings. Those receiving social grants in 2003 had a higher increased 
tendency to take part in saving via bank saving accounts, saving in stokvels, ownership of life 
insurance and other savings mechanisms than individuals in a similar socioeconomic standing 
who did not receive social grants. On the other hand, in the cases of ‘pension or retirement 
savings’, investment in ‘unit trusts or shares’ and ‘cash loans’, those receiving social grants had 
a decreased tendency to save via these mechanisms than those in a similar socioeconomic 
standing who did not receive social grants. 
Before applying the propensity matching techniques, a look at basic descriptive statistics 
comparing those receiving grants with those not receiving grants is useful. On the whole, those 
receiving grants and those not receiving grants differ in the types of saving mechanisms they 
employed. In 2003, on average, recipients tended to use stokvels and ‘other savings’ more than 
non-recipients, with a usage rate 2.1 percent and 3.2 percent higher than that of non-
recipients, respectively (see Table 2). For all other types of savings, on average, non-recipients 
of social grants had higher usage. Notably, non-recipient use of ‘bank savings accounts’, 
‘pension or retirement plans’ and ‘life insurance’ was 16.3, 18.0 and 18.2 percent higher, 
respectively, than recipients’ use of the same mechanisms in 2003. Given that those who are 
not receiving grants are likely to have higher incomes and engage more with the formal sector, 
these observed differences are expected – the higher one’s income the less likely there will be a 
need to save via informal mechanisms like stokvels and ‘other savings’ (recall that these 
descriptive statistics are based on the full sample, with no propensity matching techniques 
employed). Notably, for both those receiving grants and those not receiving grants, saving 
behaviour increased from 2001 to 2003, but the recipients outpaced the non-recipients with an 
increase in participation in saving behaviour of 1.4 percent (non-recipients increased saving 
behaviour by only 0.4 percent over the same period).  
 
 
 
  
Table 2: Savings by grant receipt status (descriptive comparison, with no propensity score matching):  
Does this household, or a household member, own any of the following financial assets3? 
Receiving grants (%) Not receiving grants (%) Type of Saving 
2001 2003 New in 2003 2001 2003 New in 2003 
Bank savings account 35.6 41.2 19.0 53.5 57.5 17.4 
Savings in stokvels 7.6 8.5 7.5 7.9 6.4 5.2 
Pension / Retirement 8.2 7.6 5.2 22.0 25.6 13.4 
Unit Trusts / Shares 1.7 1.1 0.7 7.3 6.5 3.8 
Cash loans 2.1 1.6 1.3 4.2 3.4 3.0 
Life insurance 19.0 20.5 12.6 39.8 38.7 12.1 
Other savings 2.0 5.8 5.8 3.0 2.6 2.6 
Total (average) 10.9 12.3 7.4 19.7 20.1 8.2 
Applying the propensity score matching methodology to the constructed Labour Force Survey 
Panel data, the estimated impacts of the social grants on savings behaviour are identified using 
difference-in-differences statistical calculations to isolate the impact (see Table 3). Recall that 
propensity score matching, a quasi-experimental methodology, compares two similar groups of 
individuals – in this case, one group (treatment group) that is currently receiving the social 
grant and another (control or a credible comparison group) that is eligible, but not currently 
receiving the grant. While several treatment groups and versions of the mechanism variables 
were constructed for the analysis, the results for treatment group 2, which is comprised of 
individuals who received one or more grants in 2003 but not in 2001, are shared below since 
this iteration has a higher sample population, allowing for more robust conclusions. The dummy 
variables for the mechanisms were used as they are much more intuitive than difference 
constructs and there were minimal differences observed in significance of the results between 
the dummy and difference variables for the savings variables, with the exception of pensions, 
stocks and cash loans (see Appendix II). In the latter case of cash loans, the result was 
strengthened.4  
                                                 
3
 Constructed Panel Dataset from Statistics South Africa’s Labour Force Surveys 2001 and 2003.  
4
 In addition to difficulty of interpretation, difference constructs often require subjective judgments to be made 
regarding the importance of each difference. For example, if there is a variable that takes on values of 1  5, a 
judgement must be made regarding the importance of 1 versus 2 versus 3 versus 4, etc. The coding of 1 may be 
‘Always’, 2 as ‘Sometimes’, 3 as ‘Frequently’, and so on. The quantitative analysis of the difference between 2 and 
3 should not be the same as the analysis of 1 versus 2, and yet it is unclear how these differences in weights should 
be accounted for. Finally, the statistical properties of dummy variables are well-documented and essentially 
  
The treatment group had an increased tendency to take part in saving via bank savings 
accounts, saving in stokvels, ownership of life insurance and ‘other savings’ mechanisms 
relative to the control group. More specifically, when matched, the treatment group’s increase 
from 2001 to 2003 was 4.0 percent higher for bank savings account, 3.2 percent higher for 
saving via stokvels, 2.6 percent higher for life insurance ownership and 4.0 percent higher for 
use of ‘other savings’ mechanisms than the control group. All four of these findings are 
statistically significant at a 99 percent confidence level with t-statistics of 3.40, 4.43, 2.65, and 
6.77 respectively.  
On the other hand, there are cases where the treatment group exhibits a decreased tendency 
to use particular savings and investment instruments relative to the control group. These 
exceptions are ‘pension or retirement savings’, investment in ‘unit trusts or shares’ and ‘cash 
loans’ (see Table 3). For these saving mechanisms, compared to the control group, the 
treatment group has a 4.0 percent lower tendency to save using pensions, 1.4 percent lower for 
unit trusts or shares and 0.6 percent lower for cash loans, with the former two being significant 
at the 99 percent confidence level with t-statistics of 4.50 and 3.11 respectively, and the latter 
insignificant at the 90 and 95 percent confidence level with a t-statistic of 1.37. These 
unexpected findings, particularly with respect to the use of pension or retirement savings, may 
point to an issue that generally arises when conducting quasi-experimental studies – the 
problem of finding a credible comparison control group. Individuals that may appear to be 
eligible based on the matching criteria employed may not actually be eligible to receive social 
grants.  
Table 3: Impact of social grants on savings (change from 2001 to 2003) 
Type of savings  Treated (%) Control (%) Difference 
(%) 
T-Stat 
Unmatched  19.0 17.4 1.6 1.76 Bank savings accounts 
Matched 19.7 15.8 4.0 3.40 
 
Unmatched 7.5 5.2 2.3 4.11 Savings in stokvels 
Matched 7.4 4.2 3.2 4.43 
 
Unmatched 5.2 13.4 -8.2 -11.24 Pension / Retirement 
Matched 5.4 9.4 -4.0 -4.50 
      
Unmatched 0.7 3.8 -3.1 -7.88 Unit Trusts / Shares 
Matched 0.8 2.2 -1.4 -3.11 
                                                                                                                                                             
proven at this point, whereas the statistical properties of difference constructs are more arbitrary and dependent 
on the specific context of each various construct. For these reasons and for ease of analysis, the dummy variable 
has been employed.  
  
      
Unmatched 1.3 3.0 -1.7 -4.73 Cash loans 
Matched 1.3 1.9 -0.6 -1.37 
 
Unmatched 12.6 12.1 0.5 0.68 Life insurance 
Matched 12.7 10.1 2.6 2.65 
 
Unmatched 5.8 2.6 3.2 7.38 Other savings 
Matched 6.0 2.0 4.0 6.77 
Still, on the whole, the data suggests that the treatment group has displayed an increased 
tendency to save and invest, particularly with basic financial mechanisms (bank accounts, 
stokvels). Although the treatment group is still not using bank accounts and life insurance as 
much as non-recipients, the gap is progressively narrowing. The same cannot be said for more 
advanced financial instruments like stock ownership and pensions; this is not unexpected as 
engagement in these areas suggests a higher level of connection with the formal, more 
advanced economy. Many of the current grant recipients, and even those who are ‘officially’ 
eligible, tend to lack connection or meaningful engagement with this level of economic 
interaction. In addition, the findings about pensions and stock ownership suggest that the 
matching model used for the analysis may have room for improvement.  
Results II – The impact of social grants on credit market activity (borrowing behaviour)  
This section of the quantitative analysis focuses on the impact of social grant receipt on 
borrowing behaviour. A priori, receipt of a social grant should allow individuals to borrow less 
as more of their core needs are now being covered by the grant. Borrowing, here, is 
disaggregated into several types of credit lending activities. These include acquiring credit from 
co-operatives, commercial banks/building societies, land banks, government agencies, stokvels, 
NGOs, family members, neighbours, local dealers/shops, mashonisas (informal moneylenders), 
commercial farmers, and ‘other’ lending. Those in the treatment group exhibit a decreased 
tendency to borrow relative to the control group, particularly from commercial banks/building 
societies, government agencies, neighbours, land banks and commercial farmers.  
Looking at descriptive statistics, on the whole, those receiving grants and those not receiving 
grants differ in their borrowing behaviour. Based on 2003 figures, those receiving social grants 
tended to borrow slightly less (0.4 percent less on average) than those not receiving social 
grants (see Table 4). This is true for most types of credit – on average, in 2003, those receiving 
grants tended to use borrowing mechanisms 1.1 percent less for cooperatives, 8.6 percent less 
for commercial banks, 0.7 percent less for land banks, 0.4 percent less for government 
agencies, 0.5 percent less for stokvels, 0.3 percent less for moneylenders and 0.4 percent less 
for commercial farmers than those not receiving grants. However, for lending from family, 
neighbours and local dealers, grant recipients have higher usage rates than non-recipients with 
  
differences of 3.9, 1.9 and 0.7 percent respectively. For NGOs and ‘other’ credit the differences 
are negligible in 2003. Over the period from 2001 to 2003, recipients of grants decreased their 
average use of borrowing mechanisms by a bit less than non-recipients, with recipients 
decreasing their use over the period by 0.2 percent and non-recipients by 0.3 percent.  
Notably, the borrowing behaviour of the social grant recipients differs greatly from the savings 
behaviour of the same individuals. Instead of borrowing increasing, it decreased from 2001 to 
2003. This inverse relationship is encouraging and indicative of the positive benefits of social 
grants on long-term household economic stability and sustainable human development.  
Table 4: Credit by grant receipt status (descriptive comparison, with no propensity score matching): 
Did this household or a household member receive cash loans or buy on credit from any of the 
following in the past 12 months?5 
Receiving grants (%) Not receiving grants (%) Type of credit 
2001 2003 New in 2003 2001 2003 New in 2003 
Cooperative 
0.9 0.3 0.3 2.0 1.4 1.2 
Commercial Bank6 / 
Building Societies 
2.8 2.4 2.4 8.8 11.0 8.5 
Land Bank 
0.5 0.1 0.1 1.6 0.8 0.5 
Government agency 
0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.4 
Credit from stokvels 
1.4 0.9 0.9 1.5 1.4 1.3 
NGO 
0.9 0.7 0.7 2.0 0.7 0.7 
Family 11.9 12.1 10.0 10.3 8.2 6.7 
Neighbour 
12.3 9.3 7.6 8.2 7.4 6.0 
Local dealer/Shops 
15.7 19.8 14.7 17.0 19.1 14.0 
Money lender/Mashonisa 
3.0 2.7 2.2 3.9 3.0 2.4 
Commercial farmer 
0.2 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 
‘Other’ credit 
1.5 0.6 0.6 1.5 0.6 0.6 
Total (average) 
4.3 4.1 3.3 4.8 4.5 3.6 
 
                                                 
5
 Constructed Panel dataset from Statistics South Africa’s Labour Force Surveys 2001 and 2003.  
6
 Includes credit cards.  
  
Again, in order to more clearly isolate the impact of social grants on borrowing behaviour, use 
of the propensity score matching techniques are employed, using difference-in-differences 
statistical calculations to highlight the effect (see Table 5). The results from the propensity 
matching analysis confirm the suggested findings of the descriptive statistics – the treatment 
group has a lower propensity to borrow relative to the control group. More specifically, this 
decreased tendency disaggregates to 0.2 percent less for cooperatives, 2.3 percent less for 
commercial banks, 0.4 percent less for land banks, 0.4 percent less for government agencies, 
0.2 percent less for stokvels, 1.6 percent less for neighbours, 0.4 percent less for moneylenders 
and 0.3 percent less for commercial farmers. However, only the commercial bank, land bank, 
government agency, neighbour and commercial farmer findings are significant at the 95 
percent confidence level and above with t-statistics of 3.31, 2.22, 2.51, 2.14 and 2.10 
respectively. Propensity matching findings for cooperatives, stokvels, NGOs, moneylenders and 
‘other’ credit are insignificant at the 90 percent confidence level (see Table 5). As mentioned, 
dummy variables for the mechanisms were used as they are much more intuitive than 
difference constructs. However, unlike findings observed in savings variable specifications, in 
the case of borrowing behaviour there were substantive changes to robustness depending on 
the specification of the variable, implying that the results for borrowing mechanisms are not as 
strong as that of savings mechanisms. Specifically, employing the difference construct rendered 
the findings for commercial banks, land banks, government agencies, family and commercial 
farmers insignificant (see Appendix II). 
As indicated by the descriptive statistics for borrowing from family members and local dealers, 
there is a contrary impact observed of social grants on borrowing from these two sources. The 
treatment group increased its use of family for lending purposes 1.4 percent faster than the 
control group over the same period. Moreover, the treatment group increased its use of local 
dealers for lending purposes by 1.9 percent faster than the control group over this period. Both 
results are statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level with t-statistics of 1.64 and 
1.81 respectively.  
Table V: Impact of social grants on credit (change from 2001 to 2003) 
Type of credit  Treated (%) Control (%) Difference 
(%) 
T-Stat 
Unmatched  0.3 1.2 -0.9 -3.88 Cooperative 
Matched 0.4 0.6 -0.2 -0.84 
 
Unmatched  2.4 8.5 -6.2 -10.60 Commercial 
Bank7/Building Societies Matched 2.5 4.8 -2.3 -3.31 
 
Land Bank Unmatched  0.1 0.5 -0.4 -2.48 
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 Includes credit cards.  
  
Matched 0.1 0.5 -0.4 -2.22 
      
Unmatched  0.1 0.4 -0.3 -2.40 Government agency 
Matched 0.1 0.5 -0.4 -2.51 
 
Unmatched  0.9 1.3 -0.4 -1.56 Stokvel 
Matched 1.0 1.1 -0.2 -0.55 
 
Unmatched  0.7 0.7 0.0 0.20 NGO 
Matched 0.7 0.5 0.2 0.80 
 
Unmatched  10.0 6.7 3.3 5.29 Family 
Matched 10.5 9.1 1.4 1.64 
 
Unmatched  7.6 6.0 1.6 2.83 Neighbour 
Matched 7.9 9.5 -1.6 -2.14 
 
Unmatched  14.7 14.0 0.7 0.82 Local dealer/Shops 
Matched 14.9 13.0 1.9 1.81 
 
Unmatched  2.2 2.4 -0.1 -0.41 Money 
lender/Mashonisas Matched 2.3 2.7 -0.4 -0.86 
 
Unmatched  0.0 0.4 -0.4 -3.21 Commercial farmer 
Matched 0.0 0.3 -0.3 -2.10 
 
Unmatched  0.6 0.6 0.0 0.15 ‘Other’ credit 
Matched 0.6 0.3 0.3 1.30 
 
Assuming that local shops are generally interpreted by respondents as non-chain, spaza-like 
shops, both borrowing from local dealers/shops and borrowing from family generally requires a 
beyond cursory relationship and represents the extension of the grants benefits to the greater 
community and family. This links directly with previous findings from Du Toit and Neves 
(2007b): the authors found that the use of grants often extends beyond basic expectations and 
that these grants are typically transferred within large informal exchange networks with the 
community and other connected households. Increased lending from family members speaks to 
the increased informal social safety net provided for by one household’s receipt of a grant (i.e. 
with guaranteed income, the recipients feel more comfortable lending from family members 
for additional needs). This is also described as ‘trading on a grant’ (Du Toit and Neves, 2009b). 
While more formal credit lends itself to greater risk due to interest rate fluctuations stemming 
from external shocks, the same is not true for informal, relationship-based exchange 
  
relationships between family members or members of the community. Still, it should be noted 
that the ‘borrowing from family’ finding was rendered insignificant when employing the 
difference variable (see Appendix II). Moreover, borrowing from family is difficult to measure as 
most loans from family members are remittances rather than loans that are expected to be 
paid back.  
Assuming that households go to family for remittances and to neighbours for dealing with 
shocks, receipt of a grant provides an income buffer, lowering the need for loans from 
neighbours. Since maintaining and building social respectability is central at all levels of society, 
the reduction in requests for loans from neighbours is consistent with expectations, as these 
requests are not looked on highly. 
In general, the data suggests that the treatment group is increasing its use of more formal 
borrowing mechanisms at a slower rate than the control group, particularly with commercial 
bank lending. On the one hand, this is an encouraging finding as it implies that households are 
less vulnerable to economic shocks that impact interest rates directly. On the other hand, the 
findings imply that already vulnerable households are either removing themselves or being 
removed from access to more formal credit. This could place those receiving social grants in a 
cycle of economic dependency on the government for their economic welfare indefinitely. This 
concern is somewhat offset by the findings on borrowing from family members and local shops. 
However, in the event that an opportunity (e.g. entrepreneurial venture) presents itself, it is 
unclear whether these people will have enough credit history to access meaningful levels of 
funding from more formal lending institutions. Thus, while savings are increasing and recipients 
are borrowing from family and local shops, the formal and informal social protection network 
provided by social grants may be insufficient to fully lift individuals out of a cycle of 
dependency.  
As a final consideration, in South Africa, borrowing historically has been employed as a 
substitute for a precautionary demand for saving. With receipt of a grant, a household’s 
income, social capital and social respectability increase. This allows for precautionary demand 
for savings to grow (as evidenced by the increased tendency to engage in savings behaviour), 
improved consumption smoothing (as evidenced by a disproportionate increase in the 
tendency to borrow from local shops) and decreased tendency to borrow from neighbours 
during shocks.  
Results III – Nutrition and education: review of recent child support grant findings 
from the 2008 EPRI Department of Social Development study (Samson et al, 2008) 
Beyond the impact on savings and borrowing behaviour, there are further direct developmental 
impacts of social grants on education, nutrition and reported hunger. Reviewing results from a 
recent propensity matching study conducted on Child Support Grants by EPRI, the data points 
to a positive relationship between receipt of a CSG and increased school attendance of children 
and decreased child hunger. The treatment group in this study was households that had 
  
received a CSG in both 2003 and 2004. Two hypotheses were tested – whether hunger among 
children in the household was reduced from 2002 to 2004, and whether school attendance 
increased among children in the household from 2002 to 2004. The data for this analysis is 
derived from Statistics South Africa’s General Household Survey (GHS). The surveys of 
approximately 30 000 households over three years (2002–2004) were linked to allow for the 
analysis of changes in children’s outcomes over this period (Samson et al, 2008). 
Focusing on the impact of CSGs on hunger, Table 6 presents a summary of the impact 
estimation results obtained using five alternative matching techniques. Radius caliper matching 
excludes matches for which the difference in propensity scores (of the matched treatment and 
comparison group members) exceeds the specified caliper, in this case, a conservative 0.01. 
Because a common support is imposed, cases that do not meet this criterion are excluded from 
the estimation. The kernel matching estimator applied is based on a normal density function, 
and the local linear regressions specify the kernel types as normal and biweight. Each of these 
first four techniques is implemented in Stata statistical software using the ‘psmatch2’ module. 
The fifth technique in the analysis, nearest-neighbour matching with bias adjustment, is a 
newer technique that was developed in response to concerns first articulated by Abadie, 
Drukker, Herr and Imbens (2002) that even after removing the conditional bias, matching 
estimators with a fixed number of matches may not reach the semiparametric efficiency bound 
for average treatment effects. Their alternative approach, recently incorporated into Stata as 
the ‘nnmatch’ command, implements a bias-correction that removes the conditional bias 
asymptotically, making matching estimators root-N-consistent (see Abadie , Drukker, Herr and 
Imbens , 2004; Samson et al, 2008). 
‘We see larger reductions in hunger for CSG recipient households than for those not receiving 
the CSG (the differences shown in the matched row for each model estimated). As anticipated, 
the standard errors are slightly larger in the matching estimation as well. The estimate of the 
difference in reduction in hunger between treatment and comparison group households is fairly 
consistent across the first four matching methods, ranging from 4.2 to 4.9 percent, but comes 
short of statistical significance at a 95 percent confidence level. However, the first three 
differences are very close to statistical significance at a 90 percent confidence level, and the 
estimated impact in the local linear regression with a biweight kernel type is statistically 
significant at a 92 percent confidence level. In addition, the final nearest-neighbour matching 
estimate that includes the bias adjustment shows a larger difference between the two groups in 
the reduction of hunger (7.4 percent), and this estimate is statistically significant at close to a 99 
percent confidence level. Thus, with the adjustments made for differences between the 
treatment and comparison groups through matching, the effect of receipt of the CSG on 
reducing hunger (from 2002 to 2004) is two to three times larger than the unmatched (raw) 
difference of 2.5 percent (Samson et al, 2008). 
 
  
Table 6: Impact of social grants on hunger (change from 2002 to 2004)
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Propensity score matching technique Treated 
(%) 
Control (%) Difference 
(%) 
T-Stat 
Unmatched sample 32.3 29.7 2.5 1.12 
Matched samples  
Radius, caliper = 0.01 32.2 27.7 4.5 1.61 
Kernel (normal) 32.3 28.0 4.2 1.60 
Local linear regression  
(kernel-type = biweight) 
32.3 27.7 4.6 1.61 
Local linear regression  
(kernel-type = normal) 
32.3 27.3 4.9 1.74 
Nearest-neighbour with bias adjustment  32.3 24.9 7.4 2.44 
Shifting focus to the impact of social grants on educational outcomes, Table 7 presents the 
results from the models estimating changes in school attendance from 2002 to 2004. ‘The 
findings are unambiguous in this case; the impact of the child support grant on school 
attendance is positive and statistically significant with greater than 95 percent confidence in 
each estimation. For the radius, kernel and local linear matching estimates, the matched 
difference of approximately 6.0 (the percentage point increase in households with children 
newly attending school in 2004) is the same as the unmatched difference between the 
treatment and comparison groups. The difference-in-differences estimate produced by nearest-
neighbour matching with bias adjustment is again slightly larger than the others.’ (Samson et al, 
2008). 
Table 7: Impact of social grants on school attendance (change from 2002 to 2004) 
Propensity score matching technique  
Key variable: ‘Newly in school’ 
Treated 
(%) 
Control (%) Difference 
(%) 
T-Stat 
Unmatched sample 40.6 34.7 5.9 2.51 
Matched samples  
Radius, caliper = 0.01 40.6 34.3 6.2 2.04 
Kernel (normal) 40.6 34.8 5.8 2.08 
Local linear regression  
(kernel-type = biweight) 
40.6 34.7 5.9 1.97 
Local kinear regression  
(kernel-type = normal) 
40.6 34.7 6.0 2.00 
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Nearest-neighbour with bias adjustment  40.6 32.7 7.9 2.52 
 
Caveats  
In the absence of true randomised experimental design, quasi-experimental impact analysis has 
obvious shortcomings as it is not easy to estimate the counterfactual. However, a quasi-
experimental approach is often the only politically and ethically viable approach.  
Propensity score matching techniques, in theory, eliminate all biases despite not having a 
randomised experiment control group. However, this only occurs when the observable 
characteristics identified completely explain the assignment to the various groups. In the event 
that these characteristics are found incomplete, the various assignments will be flawed, 
producing biased estimates. Based on the findings about saving behaviour in 
pension/retirement funds and unit trusts/shares, there may be room for improvement of the 
characteristics employed in segmenting the sample population.  
An additional caveat is regarding the data itself. The Labour Force Survey relies on accurate 
answers from respondents for its accuracy. As exemplified by the qualitative case studies, at 
times individuals do not have full command over their financial behaviour (e.g. mistaking a life 
insurance policy for a health insurance policy or stating they have a pension when they actually 
have some other instrument). For many of the findings, particularly for savings behaviour, the 
results are so robust that errors due to incorrect responses are not of primary concern.  
The propensity score matching results for savings are more robust to variable specification 
modifications compared to borrowing mechanisms. While the findings for many of the 
borrowing mechanisms are meaningful and conducive to developmental goals, they should be 
interpreted as preliminary findings given their sensitivity to specification. The fact that 
borrowing is so low for grant recipients in so many areas – cooperatives, land banks, 
government agencies, stokvels, NGOs, commercial farmers, and other – is part of the reason 
why these results are less robust.  
Finally, the scope this research was directed towards grants in their totality. There may be some 
unobserved differentiation in outcomes based on various grants received. For instance, it is 
conceivable that the CSG has a much smaller impact on outcomes than the SOAG or the DG 
since it is so much smaller. In future research, FinScopexxvi data should be used to look at the 
impact of the grants disaggregated.  
Overall, the findings derived from the data suggest that the receipt of social grants leads to an 
increased tendency to use saving mechanisms (e.g. bank accounts); to a decreased tendency to 
use more formal borrowing mechanisms; and, for households with children, trends point to 
improved nutrition and increased school attendance.  
 
  
Conclusions  
South Africa’s social grants are intended to reduce poverty and promote human development. 
To this effect, the measurable impacts of social grants suggest a diverse collection of 
developmental impacts beyond meeting basic needs.  
In summary, the findings from this quantitative analysis suggest that those receiving social 
grants (treatment group) display an increased tendency to save and invest relative to 
comparable individuals in a similar socioeconomic standing, who were eligible to receive social 
grants, but did not (control group). Moreover, it finds that the treatment group has a decreased 
tendency to borrow on credit, particularly from commercial banks. However, the findings show 
that recipients display an increased tendency to borrow from informal, relationship-based 
sources (e.g. family and local shops). This finding correlates with past qualitative findings from 
Du Toit and Neves (2006, 2009a). The research’s findings on savings mechanisms were found to 
be more robust to specification changes than borrowing mechanisms. 
Drawing from a propensity score matching study completed by EPRI in 2008, further 
developmental impacts are found with Child Support Grants. ‘Specifically, the findings show 
that among all CSG-eligible children, school attendance was increasing and hunger was 
declining during the 2002–2004 period, but the reduction in hunger was approximately 4–7 
percentage points greater and the proportion newly in school was about 6–8 percentage points 
higher among those receiving the grant.’ (Samson et al, 2008). 
  
8. Report findings 
The quantitative and qualitative analyses in this report affirm the centrality of social grants in 
supporting the livelihoods of impoverished South Africans. More specifically, the research 
points to the importance of social grants in supporting improvements in consumption, 
investments in productive assets, human and physical capital, and favourable financial market 
behaviour. The qualitative analysis suggests that social grant receipt plays an often invisible, yet 
crucial, role within systems of social reciprocity, on which economically marginalised people 
rely. Social grants support the leveraging of resources within existing systems of informal social 
protection. They allow otherwise marginalised people to transact within these systems as well 
as providing material resources for households to flexibly adapt their livelihood-enabling 
activities in response to their changing circumstances.     
1. Social grants support consumption 
The literature review noted the documented effectiveness of social grants in elevating 
consumption expenditure and supporting human welfare (Ardington and Lund, 1995; Case and 
Deaton, 1998; Lund, 2002; Devereux, 2001a; Delany et al, 2008). These dynamics are strongly 
affirmed by this research. The qualitative and quantitative data show how social grant receipt is 
used to purchase food and groceries, with receipt of a grant associated with less reported 
hunger. Even receipt of the comparatively small CSG reduces reported hunger by almost 30 
percent, relative to comparable non-recipients. In addition, the qualitative case studies 
document how social grants are used for a range of other consumption expenditure, including 
transport, school fees and clothing. Due to their relatively small size, the CSG appeared to be 
predominantly, but not exclusively, used for direct consumptive expenditure.  
2. Social grants support investments in productive assets, human and physical capital 
The manner in which receipt of social grants is associated with investments in productive 
assets, human and physical capital, has been noted in other research (Ardington and Lund, 
1995; Lund, 2002). The present research suggests that after the purchase of food and fuel, the 
main use of social grants is to fund children’s schooling (including school fees, transport, school 
uniforms and stationery). This applies to the CSG and also the SOAG, which is frequently 
directed to the schooling of recipients’ grandchildren. Consistent with Budlender and Woolard’s 
(2006) findings, discussed in the literature review section, the quantitative analysis illustrates 
that CSG receipt is associated with higher levels of school enrolment. Among CSG-eligible 
children, receipt of a grant resulted in an increase in school enrolment by six to eight 
percentage points, relative to those children not receiving a grant. Finally, the qualitative data 
suggests receipt of a SOAG is in many cases directed to the upgrading or construction of new 
housing. With the exception of Ardington and Lund (1995), this issue appears to be the subject 
of relatively little systematic inquiry in the South African context. However, it is a finding that 
resonates with contexts outside of South Africa: Martinez (2005) notes similar use of grant 
income in Latin America. 
  
3. Receipt of social grants enables beneficiaries to save more  
Receipt of a social grant is associated with a range of financial market engagement and 
behaviour, such as elevated levels of savings and investment. This issue is relatively under-
researched in the South African context, but the finding is consistent with the investment effect 
noted in the international literature (Barrientos, 2008; Grosh et al, 2008). Although savings 
behaviour is noted in relation to the larger value grants, savings behaviour is also evident in 
relation to the lower value CSG. The qualitative case study data suggests the preponderance of 
informal savings mechanisms, such as stokvels, is associated with social grant receipt. The 
quantitative data, however, suggests the increase in use of formal bank savings accounts over 
time was higher than that of stokvels. There are two reasons that these seemingly divergent 
findings are observed. Primarily, the quantitative sample included a more diverse group of 
grant recipients, not just those most vulnerable and impoverished as in the qualitative analysis. 
Moreover, the quantitative analysis evaluated the change in behaviour of the period from 2001 
to 2003. Historically, lower-income groups have, as evidenced by the qualitative case studies, 
commonly invested in stokvels and the like – the relatively higher observed increase for formal 
institutions is the result of the increase coming off a much smaller base than for stokvels.  
4. Receipt of social grants enables recipients to engage more favourably with credit markets 
Grant receipt also affects borrowing behaviour. The quantitative research indicates grant 
recipients are increasing their borrowing from more formal institutions at a lower rate than 
their peers who are not receiving grants and, based on descriptive statistics, they are also 
borrowing less than those not receiving grants. This arguably makes them less vulnerable to 
external shocks that may, for example, affect interest rates. Moreover, the increased tendency 
of recipients to borrow from family and local retailers also supports the argument that the 
terms of lending are improving for recipients, as opposed to non-recipients.  
Significantly, the quantitative findings on savings and borrowing suggest that grant recipients 
are shifting from a dependency on borrowing to satisfy demands for liquidity to a precautionary 
demand for saving. That is, precautionary saving is acting as a substitute for borrowing as grant 
recipients build up income buffers through saving. Finally, this shift interfaces with the social 
dynamics discussed in the quantitative analysis, whereby savings help to strengthen the 
position of individuals and their households in relation to larger support networks. 
5. Social grants support impoverished livelihoods by enabling the leveraging of 
existing resources within systems of reciprocal social exchange  
Social grant income is not simply consumed, invested, saved or used to facilitate more 
favourable terms of borrowing. The qualitative data demonstrates how social grants are used in 
flexible ways to leverage and multiply the existing resources and capacities of receiving 
individuals and their households. Three of the case studies document the use of income from a 
social grant to support various forms of economic activity. This includes informal self-
employment (as operating or seed capital, consistent with Lund, 2002) and labour market 
  
engagement by working-age adults (Kingdon and Knight, 2000; Posel, Fairburn and Lund, 2004). 
In addition, social grants are harnessed to generate other, non-pecuniary forms of value. Social 
grant receipt provides the material basis for particular kinds of socially reproductive care work, 
which creates important forms of social value that ultimately serve to support the livelihoods of 
the impoverished. Two of the case studies clearly show the way in which receipt of a social 
grant enabled recipients to reconfigure their activities and engage in childcare, eldercare or the 
care of a disabled person. This care work is easily overlooked in much conventional analysis, 
and the value of these ‘shadow wages’ seldom computed, yet it represents a significant positive 
outcome of social grant receipt. In this way, through their role in underpinning self 
employment, labour market engagement and socially reproductive care work, social grants 
support productive activity.  
The manner in which grant receipt strengthens the ability of recipients to transact within their 
social networks is also highlighted in the quantitative data – this is suggested in grant 
recipients’ increased tendency to borrow from family members and local shops relative to non-
recipients. However, a note of caution must be applied to the findings about borrowing from 
family; these reported loans are more likely to be remittances, which are often not expected to 
be repaid. In addition, as family loans have a strong obligatory quality, there are more likely to 
be increased loans from family members relative to other mechanisms since the family 
members providing the loan will have observed that the household now has this guaranteed 
level of income each month (implying that the lender is more likely to be repaid). A level of 
crowding out of remittances or obligatory loans can be expected when a household receives a 
grant as less outside income is needed to satisfy basic household needs. These offsetting effects 
may be part of the reason why this finding is not robust when subject to specification 
adjustments. Finally, as the crowding out of private remittances recounted in the literature 
review notes (Jensen, 1998; Lund, 2002; Posel, 2001; Posel et al, 2004), evidence of crowding out 
reveals nothing of how, or to what, the unsent remittance is redirected. 
6. Social grants empower otherwise marginal household members to transact within 
systems of social reciprocity  
Receipt of social grants significantly affects intra-household relationships, including, in many 
cases, shifting the balance of power within receiving households. Although these empowering 
dynamics were suggested in the literature review (Sagner, 2000; Barrientos and Lloyd-Sherlock, 
2002; Du Toit and Neves, 2009a), they were lucidly evident in the qualitative enquiry. The case 
study of Vavile shows how his disabled stepson’s receipt of a DG underpinned the stepson’s 
continued claim to care, while the case study of Vuyiswa suggests the way in which receipt of a 
social grant strengthens the ability of an otherwise extremely marginal household member to 
socially transact within the systems of social reciprocity or informal social protection (Bracking 
and Sachikonye, 2006). Regular receipt of a social grant allows marginal and disempowered 
people to find a place for themselves within prevailing systems of social reciprocity. These 
people typically include, but are not limited to, various groups of women, the elderly and the 
  
disabled. By supporting people who would otherwise be marginalised within the systems of 
social reciprocity, social grants go some way to ameliorating the highly skewed power gradients 
that often mark these social networks and systems. 
Within these circuits of social reciprocity on which the impoverished crucially depend, social 
grants also facilitated expenditure on items or activities which could best be described under 
the broad rubric of ‘investments in social respectability’. A major precondition to enter into 
social reciprocity entails demonstrating oneself both worthy of beneficence and as able to 
reciprocate in future. These twin characteristics are evident in particular kinds of activity, such 
as performing socially reproductive care work. However, social respectability is also crucially 
intertwined with aspects of self-presentation and consumption. Examples of the role of 
consumption in relation to social respectability are provided by Vuyiswa’s use of her grant for 
the exuberant consumption associated with her daughter’s izila ceremony, which ultimately 
served to strengthen Vuyiswa’s position within her networks of social reciprocity. Similarly, 
Vavile’s diversion of high levels of household income to acquire consumer durables and the 
signs of domestic propriety are underpinned by comparable concerns. As social respectability is 
intertwined with material objects, a weatherproof, dignified home and consumer durables such 
as furniture do not simply represent expenditure on domestic comfort, they are investments in 
social respectability. These demonstrate that the person is able to reciprocate support, thereby 
positioning him or her more favourably within circuits of local patronage and beneficence. 
Being socially respectable entails not only acting socially respectable, but also appearing to be 
socially respectable. 
7. Receipt of social grants allows beneficiaries the flexibility to reconfigure household 
livelihood activities 
The case studies readily demonstrate how social grants are frequently directed to relatively 
dynamic patterns of expenditure and forms of investment. Social grant income is routinely 
transferred between people, activities and different locales, and changed over time. The cash 
nature of grants enables this flexibility, allowing beneficiaries to make changes in how they 
source their livelihoods.  
The complexity of this recirculating of grants and their various end users, or vicarious 
beneficiaries, is easily misunderstood or overlooked. For instance, the case study of Mamzoli 
demonstrates how her receipt of a SOAG saw her son Simpiwe’s remittance decline, a 
seemingly textbook example of the crowding out of a private remittance. However, when 
viewed within the complexity of the household’s livelihood provisioning over time, the 
deceased pressure on Simpiwe to remit saw him work fewer hours, improve his education and 
ultimately improve his employment prospects. The grant income allowed household members 
to recalibrate their activities and resource flows to their ultimate benefit.  
Finally, the shifting dynamics associated with social grant receipt is evident in the findings about 
the CSG’s impact on school enrolment. The proportion of children newly in school is six to eight 
  
percentage points higher among those receiving the grant relative to households not receiving 
a grant. In this case, livelihood-enhancing activities, such as human capital investment, which 
were previously out of reach, now received a higher proportion of the household’s net income.  
8. Impoverished households’ non-receipt of a social grant impedes favourable 
development-supporting behaviour 
The counterpoint to the positive findings of those receiving grants is that those who are grant-
eligible but non-receiving are not increasing their tendencies to save, borrow and take on 
development-promoting behaviour at the same pace as grant recipients. The quantitative data 
suggests that they are effectively being left behind in the development process. This is 
particularly worrisome when considering the findings about the impact of receipt of the CSG on 
school attendance and hunger.  
 
  
9.  Policy implications 
This concluding section considers the policy implications that emerge from the research. 
1. The developmental impact of social grant receipt strengthens the case for their 
sustainability, and suggests the need to consider their expansion  
In the South African context of limited opportunities for employment and subsistence 
agricultural production, social grant programmes support the economically marginalised in a 
range of ways. Grants are crucial to the survival of the poor as they provide for their basic 
needs and consumption. However, they also support productive investments in physical and 
human capital, as evidenced by this report’s findings on the favourable impacts of a grant on 
savings, borrowing and a range of development-promoting behaviours. Furthermore, social 
grant receipt also underpins underlying systems of informal social protection and social 
reciprocity on which poor people crucially depend. Conversely, none of these benefits accrue to 
those people who are not in receipt of grants and are not increasing their development-
promoting behaviours at the same pace as grant recipients. In light of these findings, there is a 
need to firstly recognise and acknowledge the complexity of the developmental impact of social 
grants. This includes improvements in consumption and human welfare, financial market 
behaviour and positive social dynamics. Secondly, this finding lends impetus to the need to 
consider how these effects can be magnified, both through scaling up the benefits and by 
expanding eligibility.  
2. There is a need to recognise the important role of informal social protection systems, and 
the way in which social grant receipt serves to underpin and strengthen these systems 
Many of the debates about social protection are characterised by disagreements over the 
measurement and nature of the data. This contestation can sometimes obscure substantial 
conceptual differences about how to interpret and understand the underlying social dynamics, 
such as how crowded out private remittances are redirected, or the meaning and use of 
seemingly exuberant consumptive expenditure. The crucial place of these social dynamics 
needs to be acknowledged, along with the utility of qualitative analysis to illustrate the rich, 
contextual back story about how social grants are received, used and benefit recipients and 
their larger social networks. Although these elements are typically difficult to measure, they 
represent a significant strength of social grant receipt.  
3. There is a need to recognise that the cash format of social grants confers flexibility on 
recipients, and is a distinct strength 
The flexibility of social grants represents an important strength of South Africa’s system of 
social transfers. The fact that these public transfers are paid in cash and are unconditional 
allows economically marginalised people to accommodate the hybrid and synergistic livelihood 
activities on which they rely. Attempts to limit the flexibility of grant use by imposing conditions 
and the use of targeting may well detract from their livelihood-enabling quality. The qualitative 
data also suggest that different kinds of expenditure can effectively be a form of investment in 
  
social reciprocity, particularly if such investments are understood in more expansive and social 
terms. These forms of investment are marked by the diversion of resources into acts of social 
reciprocity, with the reasonable expectation that they will provide future benefit. 
 
4. There is a need to consider carefully impulses towards imposing conditions on social grant 
recipients 
A recurrent theme in debates on social grants in South and Southern Africa is the imposition of 
conditions and the use of targeting to direct programme resources to those who most need 
them. Conditionalities are a defining feature of Latin America’s CCT programmes and seek to 
combine the aims of providing social assistance with addressing demand-side constraints (both 
resource and behavioural) to building human capital through accessing education and/or health 
services.xxvii CCT programmes are most prevalent in middle-income, high-inequality societies 
where they can serve to potentially elevate the use of existing social services, without excluding 
too many from social assistance.xxviii However, precisely what effects the imposition of 
conditions would achieve in relation to existing categories of grant recipients in South Africa 
remains unclear, and relatively unexplored in the literature. However, further to the discussion 
in the literature review section, there remain several compelling reasons not to apply 
conditions within South Africa. 
Firstly, several of the demand-side constraints and social ills that conditions seek to remediate, 
such as low school enrolment figures and child labour, are generally unknown in South Africa. 
Secondly, in domains where the uptake of social services is low or outcomes relatively poor 
(such as education and health), this frequently reflects supply-side rather than demand-side 
constraints. Not only are systemic weaknesses in the provision of state services in South Africa 
likely to be relatively unresponsive to demand-side interventions, imposing conditions risks 
further excluding the neediest in areas where services are sub-optimal or inaccessible. Thirdly, 
conditions also impose often-considerable costs both on administrators (who need to 
communicate, validate, monitor and manage compliance) and beneficiaries (who need to 
comply and demonstrate their compliance). Grosh et al (2008) therefore cautions: ‘where 
service use is all but universal, adding conditionalities to social assistance programmes will run 
little risk of inducing errors or exclusion, but the potential for gains from the condition is small, 
thus the extra administrative costs of verifying that conditions have been met may not be 
worthwhile’ (p.323).  
A fourth and final point is that conditions are generally well-suited to responding to poverty 
that is intertwined with compound forms of vulnerability and social exclusion. Consequently, 
most societiesxxix with CCT programmes target relatively specific and comparatively small sub-
populations, including Argentina (nine percent), Bangladesh (<five percent), Chile (six percent), 
Columbia (3.6 percent), Costa Rica (1.2 percent), Dominican Republic (nine percent), Jamaica 
(eight percent), Nicaragua (two percent), Pakistan (0.5 percent), Turkey (4.5 percent) and Peru 
(5.3 percent) (World Bank, 2005; Grosh et al, 2008). In many of these contexts social 
  
vulnerability is concentrated among vulnerable demographic groups (such as impoverished 
indigenous people in Latin America or impoverished unmarried or widowed women in Asia), 
and it warrants a directive, narrowly-targeted conditional intervention. In South Africa, 
however, poverty can hardly be thought of as residual. It is not the consequence of compound 
forms of ethnic, gender or caste-based exclusion, or exacerbated by factors such as child labour 
or early withdrawal of girls from school. Instead, poverty is widespread and common, and it is 
patterned by a structural context whereby many impoverished Africans are not excluded, but 
rather incorporated into the broader political economy of South Africa on extremely 
unfavourable terms.  
Social policy needs to be underpinned by clear objectives; hence the debate on using conditions 
needs to be informed by a clear sense of the benefit these would add to the existing system of 
social grants. 
5. There is a need to consider how to better include those falling outside the social grant net 
Social grants are not infinitely scalable upwards and there are limits to the expansion of South 
Africa’s system of social grants. Not only has grant expenditure plateaued after a period of 
rapid expansion but, as a percentage of GDP, social grants have also reached the upper end of 
the global norms for a middle-income country (Grosh et al, 2008). Against this backdrop there is 
a need to consider how the gap in the welfare net, constituted by unemployed, working-age, 
able-bodied adults, might be mended. Programmes that may be extended to this group include 
a universal income grant or forms of labour market subsidy. Social protection also needs to be 
examined alongside other aspects of state policy, such as economic policy, trade and industrial 
policy and employment creation.  
This will help to address one of the key political dangers of South Africa’s current programme of 
social grants: namely that by ameliorating rather than transforming the conditions that give rise 
to poverty, social grants merely serve to make it ‘politically sustainable’ in the short term. 
Under these conditions social grants may serve to ameliorate the social dissent and impetus for 
political change associated with enduring inequality and poverty, but only for the intermediate 
future. Yet, in the absence of fundamental social and economic change, these dynamics remain, 
and will prove disruptive and deleterious in the longer-term future. 
6. There is a need to continue to make social grants accessible to eligible recipients 
In the past, the effectiveness of social grant programmes has been undermined by 
administrative inefficiencies and the imposition of costs onto impoverished applicants. These 
include various transaction and opportunity costs, along with displacing the burden of grant 
administration onto would-be beneficiaries, which happened when impoverished applicants 
were, for instance, required to make multiple (and expensive) trips to service points, provide 
photocopies of essential documents, or pay traditional authorities to attest to their local 
residence. In addition, the effectiveness of cash transfers is potentially undermined by 
weakness of state service delivery in many impoverished areas and unsanctioned, yet 
  
widespread, practices such as the payment of school fees by grant recipients, from which they 
should be exempt. Although recent fieldwork has documented improvements, these 
weaknesses and costs erode the value of the cash transfer paid out to beneficiaries. Ensuring 
that these negative dynamics are contained and that social grant receipt remains accessible to 
eligible recipients remains an ongoing challenge.  
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Appendix I: Qualitative Case studies 
Case Study 1: Mamzoli Fikile  
Mamzoli Fikile’s rural homestead is two hours drive on unpaved roads from the nearest small 
Eastern Cape town. The homestead compound is a short walk up a steep path and vertical rise 
of about 50 metres, inaccessible to vehicles. 
A 2002 survey painted a picture of Mamzoli’s household as very poor and scraping by in the 
lowest income quintiles, not only did she report ‘no paid work’, month by month recall 
questions listed no income other than her state pension and R200 worth of wage income. There 
were, however, signs that the household had been able to invest in some household durables 
and assets: the survey listed a ‘refrigerator’ and a moderate number of livestock (seven goats, 
19 chickens, two geese and a pig).  
The research team returned in 2005 and was received by the elderly Mamzoli in her neat 
reception room, comfortably furnished with a velour lounge suite. Gurgling away in the corners 
was a large LPG (liquid petroleum gas) powered chest-type freezer. These material 
endowments alone suggested Mamzoli’s household was not among the poorest of the poor by 
village standards.  
In 2005 Mamzoli Fikile (b. 1942) and her 32-year-old daughter-in-law Nyathikazi were the only 
locally resident adults, in a household home to half-a-dozen grandchildren who were the 
progeny of Mamzoli’s adult children. Although none of her five adult children lived locally, they 
generally maintained close links with Mamzoli’s household. These children included Mamzoli’s 
daughter Khanyiswa; son Thabo (the husband of locally resident Nyathikazi); son Simpiwe; 
daughter Thandiwe, and the youngest, a son, Ndumisani.  Khanyiswa and Thabo were the 
parents of six of the locally resident grandchildren; Thandiwe had no children, while Simpiwe’s 
two children and Ndumisani’s infant lived with their respective parents. 
Khanyiswa (b.1966) was the mother of three of the six locally resident grandchildren. Based in 
Durban, Khanyiswa was a self-employed fruit and vegetable vendor. She was reportedly ‘not 
scarce on the phone’ (i.e. phoned regularly) but neither remitted money, nor received child 
support grants for her children. She lived in a brick township house, purchased jointly with her 
brothers Simpiwe and Ndumisani. Simpiwe 
While Thabo (b. 1968) and Nyathikazi’s three children frequently cooked and ate together with 
Mamzoli, they lived in their own comfortable homestead on an adjacent plot. Deciding on the 
precise parameters of Mamzoli’s household was not easy: while Nyathikazi and her children 
were readily counted as part of Mamzoli’s household they had their own homestead and access 
to the resource stream of Thabo’s remittances. Thabo was a semi-skilled metal formwork 
worker in the construction industry. Although a contract worker, he was highly mobile and had 
worked extensively across the African continent for a range of large South African construction 
companies. His mother and wife were unclear on the precise nature of his employment, but 
  
their description of his work and his solid homestead suggested he earned more than the 
average construction labourer. Nyathikazi worked part-time as an adult basic education and 
training instructor. During the 2005 interview she was temporarily employed in Mount Frere, 
and Mamzoli was overseeing all the grandchildren. At the time of the interview only one of 
Nyathikazi’s children was receiving a CSG. Nyathikazi had missed several opportunities to 
register the other children during designated ‘registration drives’ in the village because she was 
travelling outside of the village.  
In early 2006 Thabo became ill, reportedly with TB. His mother travelled to Durban to care for 
him, while Nyathikazi stayed in the village and looked after all the children. Thabo recuperated 
and returned to work, however at the end of 2006 he ailed and died reportedly of diabetes-
related complications. There was no life insurance payout, and after his death Nyathikazi’s far 
less prosperous household came to rely more closely on Mamzoli’s.  
Thandiwe (b. 1975), the third of Mamzoli’s adult children, completed her matric at an 
‘agricultural college’ in Pietermartizburg and worked as a supervisor for a catering company 
attached to the airline industry in 2005. She wasn’t married and didn’t have any children. 
Ndumisani (b. 1982) lived with his four-year-old son and his sister Khanyiswa in Durban in the 
house they had jointly purchased with their brother Simpiwe. Ndumisani was a contact worker 
in the construction sector, like his brother Thabo.  
Simpiwe (b. 1972) worked as a bakery manager in a regional town, having worked and trained 
as a baker at a Durban supermarket. (The research team subsequently visited Simpiwe and 
conducted an interview with him). In 2005 Simpiwe lived with his wife and child in the formally 
white area of a regional town. He visited his mother frequently, using his own car, and was an 
important benefactor to the entire extended household. The intertwined histories of Simpiwe 
and Mamzoli are described below. 
The early death of Mamzoli’s husband in the mid 1970s compelled her to seek employment. 
She worked as a domestic worker for many years in Mount Frere, and the larger centres of 
Mthatha, Cape Town and Durban. At this time her own mother looked after her children, and 
all but her very youngest son (Ndumisani) were fathered by her late husband. In 1989 Mamzoli 
stopped working and returned to the village, having built up the homestead during her years of 
working in the distant urban centers. While she physically made mud bricks during the holidays, 
she also hired people within the village to build for her. Mamzoli started receiving an old-age 
pension in the late 1990s, and generating an income selling meat and beer from her gas-
powered freezer. Key to these activities was the help of her son Simpiwe.  
In the 1980s, in his late teens, Simpiwe started working as a cleaner in a Durban supermarket. 
He steadily worked his way up the ranks in the bakery until he earned enough to tell his aging 
mother to ‘go home’ (i.e. retire to the village). He not only regularly remitted money but 
purchased the freezer, so she could generate an income within the village. When his mother 
started receiving a SOAG, the pressure on both of them eased. Mamzoli was able to sell less, 
  
because she did not have to make so much money to feed her resident grandchildren, and 
Simpiwe was able to reduce his hours at the supermarket to the evening shift and return to 
school. He duly matriculated, which enabled him to formalise his training as a baker, and 
eventually become a manager.  
By 2005 Mamzoli had been selling meat and beer for several years. This income was apparently 
crucial in her ability to send her youngest son (Ndumisani) and her grandchildren to school. At 
the time of the 2005 interview she described the freezer as ‘medium full’. A quick glance 
revealed it contained about 10 quart bottles (750ml) of beer and several commercially 
packaged trays of chicken portions. A standard 9kg bottle of gas powered the freezer and lasted 
approximately three-and-a-half weeks. Mamzoli sourced the meat in Matatiele (a town closer 
to commercial cattle farmlands, than the neighbouring former-Transkei towns) and appeared to 
be an astute shopper, comparing prices between several butcheries. She estimated she made 
about R500 profit a month, but indicated it was difficult to work out the precise profit because 
they routinely took money for household expenses from this sum. She reportedly earmarked 
the proceeds of specific products for specific purposes, explaining the ‘chicken money’ pays for 
the children’s school fees and expenses. Mamzoli reportedly also favoured selling ‘Russian 
sausages’ as the return on these was comparatively high.  
Although highly variable, she sold an average of seven cases of beer a week. Sourced from a 
small local bottle store, her two grandsons, aged 11 and 14, were an integral part of the 
business and they fetched the beer from the store, returning with it on the daily bus service 
through the village. They assisted with selling the beer when Mamzoli was absent, with the 
older grandson calculating customers’ change. Mamzoli estimated she made up to R600 a 
month from the beer, although had to extend more credit than with meat which was a 
disadvantage. She indicated that people normally paid their debts, and her two grandsons were 
occasionally dispatched to collect outstanding sums. Overweight and with obvious stiffness, 
Mamzoli did not look as if she was able to walk very far. Asked by a fieldworker if she sold 
umnandi (industrially produced sorghum beer), she replied that she did not as people who 
drink it like to fight and she is too old to break up fights or eject them from her home. 
Apart from vending out of her fridge, and using it to store her own food, Mamzoli occasionally 
helped other villagers by keeping their perishables in her fridge. She explained that she kept 
meat in her fridge for special occasions such as a recent school graduation (without charge). 
Fridge owners in the village who ran out of gas would also shift their perishables to somebody’s 
working fridge. Being able to provide refrigeration was a considerable favour in an unelectrified 
village, and positioned Mamzoli at the source of an endless stream of beneficence and social 
reciprocity.  
From her state old age grant, remittances and retail activities Mamzoli was able to be a regular 
contributor towards an umcalelo (rotating savings society). She collected cash from the cash 
pay point and had never had a bank account. In 2005 she was saving R150 per month with a 
group of four people, which provided her with R600 three times a year. In 2005 she bought 
  
several new sheets of zinc (corrugated iron) and was planning to add another room to her 
homestead (to be occupied by herself; visitors would occupy her current room). She also had a 
modest, R35, funeral plan with a local funeral parlour. By 2007 and 2009 she was contributing 
larger amounts to the umcalelo, using the proceeds to fund bouts of construction, and buy 
furnishings and fencing. 
Another significant avenue of Mamzoli’s efforts was agrarian production. In 2005 she listed six 
goats, about 27 chickens and two pigs. Her grandsons helped to tend a fair-sized vegetable 
garden (planting cabbage, spinach, potato and turnip), and in the distant communal planting 
field the household harvested beans, pumpkin and maize. She had sufficient income to pay a 
tractor to plough the field, at a cost of R500, and bought about R200 of manola (fertiliser) out 
of her pension. She reportedly harvested four bags of maize, and the garden supplied sufficient 
vegetables to avoid having to purchase store-bought vegetables during the summer. It is useful 
to reflect more closely on the broader networks of resource flows and interdependencies that 
marked the household. Simpiwe was not only an important benefactor to Mamzoli, but a key 
actor within the broader kinship network. Prior to 2005 Simpiwe supported his brother Thabo 
(along with the then pregnant Nyathikazi – later to be his wife) when Thabo was retrenched 
from the mine where he worked. Simpiwe also subsequently encouraged Nyathikazi to 
complete her schooling after the birth of her first child, and to train as an Adult Basic Education 
and Training instructor. Simpiwe funded his younger sister Thandiwe through agricultural 
school in Pietermaritzburg and ‘pushed’ (Simpiwe’s term) his own wife through ‘school’. She 
successfully completed training as an ambulance attendant and got her driver’s licence, and 
subsequently joined one of the state’s pension payout contractors as a clerk.  
This investment in education and training, and desire to secure a foothold in the formal labour 
market was maintained over time and evident in the siblings’ upward employment trajectories. 
By 2008 Simpiwe had accepted a more lucrative job as a manager with a listed catering supply 
company in East London, visiting his family who remained in the regional town where he 
worked earlier. After completing a diploma in agriculture, Thandiwe resigned from the catering 
company, and worked for a poultry company from 2007, but by 2009 has secured a ‘good job’ 
(Mamzoli’s words) at the local office of the department of agriculture. Mamzoli approvingly 
pointed to the new 2 500 litre rainwater tank that Thandiwe had just purchased her. Even 
Durban-based Khanyiswa and Ndumisani continued remitting small amounts of money (less 
than R150) to Mamzoli and remained in regular contact with her. Reflecting on this in 2009, 
Mamzoli, with obvious pride, explained that even though they grew up poor all of her children 
became successful and never forgot her. She even cited their abstinence from alcohol and 
smoking as further proof of their collective virtue; an assessment she made with no irony, 
despite her alcohol retail activities.  
Similar interdependencies within the household were evident in their rising agricultural 
production following the wet 2008/2009 summer. This period saw them harvest approximately 
11 bags of maize from the communal planting fields. Mamzoli hired a tractor to plough (R450), 
  
a span of oxen to plant (R150) and ‘hoe’ (drag a leveling implement across the field) (R250), and 
hired four labourers for a week to weed (at R30 each person a day), and finally load the maize 
(R300). Simpiwe and his family visited one weekend to help harvest the maize, taking some 
home with them. Although the total cost (at about R1 800) seemed close to the market value of 
the harvest, Mamzoli both paid several of the labourers in maize and the extended household 
ate a constant supply of green mielies. In response to the research team’s computation of her 
marginal profitability, Mamzoli impatiently insisted ‘it is our tradition’ and explained the entire 
family ate mielies for months from the field. Livestock numbers also seemed to creep upwards 
over time: 18 chickens, four pigs, 13 goats and eight cattle (that she insisted were Simpiwe’s), 
by 2009. Simpiwe paid a ‘herdboy’ to look after the cattle.  
Mamzoli managed to maintain her retail activities throughout the research period. By 2009 she 
was selling an average of about three cases of beer (to a maximum of about four or five), along 
with one or two ‘straights’ (750ml bottles) of brandy a week. She had a low opinion of brandy 
consumption and ventured that it ‘ate your insides’ (fieldworker’s translation), and complained 
of the competition posed by several other households now also selling alcohol. She continued 
to source and sell wors (sausage), and various other cuts of meat from Matatiele. Simpiwe 
regularly bought her cheaper meat for resale, and visited her at least once a month. Her 
children continued to remit, particularly Simpiwe who dutifully sent at least R400 a month in 
cash. Mamzoli explained that her pension was being spent on funeral insurance, groceries, and 
‘bandincedise ngezinto ezincinci’ (‘it helps with smaller things’) – such as sugar, toiletries, 
irregular amounts required by the children at school. 
Case study commentary  
The case study illustrates the way in which Mamzoli’s household is located in a network of 
social reciprocity and kin support, and how the receipt of a social grant allows her to leverage 
other resources. Her son Simpiwe’s support is part of a wider pattern of material support and 
moral encouragement to his various, extended kin. He is a lynchpin in wider circuits of 
providing for the family, and his efforts have helped build a livelihood system of formal sector 
employment, alongside a rural safety net of kin care for grandchildren by his mother.  
It is useful to carefully consider the precise flow of resources and entitlements between 
Simpiwe and his mother within this system. Simpiwe’s improved earnings enabled his elderly 
mother to retire from her urban-based domestic work; his monthly remittance and purchase of 
the refrigerator enabled Mamzoli to engage in informal retail within the village. The 
comparatively rare ownership of a fridge in an isolated, un-electrified village was not simply a 
lifestyle asset, but enabled her to generate income. The case study also shows how Mamzoli’s 
receipt of a state old age grant served to recalibrate the flow of resources within her household 
and in relation to urban-based Simpiwe: not only was she under less pressure to generate 
income to support her grandchildren, her son scaled back on his monthly remittance to her. 
  
Relieved of this fiscal obligation Simpiwe worked fewer hours and completed his schooling, a 
prerequisite for his subsequent mobility within the formal labour market.  
The income generated by access to the fridge enabled Mamzoli to leverage and multiply both 
the remittance from her son and her state old age grant. Systems of formal social protection 
and social reciprocity are here linked. The regularity and certainty of the state pension not only 
provided operating capital, it enabled her to offer credit to her frequently poor patrons, an 
important consideration in a resource poor environment. In addition the refrigerator facilitated 
the generation of other kinds of value. Mamzoli allows fellow villagers to store perishables in 
her fridge/freezer; a considerable favour in an un-electrified village, where keeping a 
refrigerator powered demands the ongoing expense and effort of procuring bottles of LPG gas. 
Mamzoli’s beneficence positions her within local, intimate networks of patronage and 
represents an ongoing, renewable source of social capital.  
If the fridge enables Mamzoli to generate income and cement a favourable position in local 
networks of obligation and reciprocity, it is useful to note that operating her enterprise relies 
on the input of other household members. Her constrained mobility means that the running of 
the tavern is crucially dependent on the work of the young grandsons who purchase and 
transport the beer locally to restock the refrigerator. A similar deployment of household labour 
is reflected in the agrarian production. In this way even relatively young household members 
(one a pre-teen) are a part of the webs of social reciprocity on which the household’s economic 
activity crucially depends. To a large extent, the success of these efforts relies on the availability 
of household labour and the ability to co-ordinate it. This entails a certain degree of household 
cohesiveness and co-ordination of authority within the household. Finally, it is useful to reflect 
on the way Mamzoli directs her income to not only supporting consumptive expenditure, but 
also saved via informal mechanisms to enlarge and furnish it.  
  
Case Study 2: Vavile Xaba 
When the research team first visited Vavile’s household in Khayelitsha 2005, it occupied a 
squalid lean-to shack. Built against the back of the unfinished shell of an RDP house, it was set 
rather incongruously in a street consisting of a tidy row of completed houses. Entering the 
shack required visitors walk through the unroofed, incomplete shell to get to the back. The 
household consisted of elderly Vavile (born in the 1930s), his 43-year-old wife Nomonde, a 15 
year old teenage niece Nolufefe, an adult daughter Utathile (in her early 20s), and a five-year-
old granddaughter Avela (Utathile’s child). Also resident at the homestead was Nomonde’s 24-
year-old intellectually impaired son Samkile (viz. Vavile’s stepson). The household subsisted off 
Vavile’s SOAG, Samkile’s disability grant and the informal vending of fruit and vegetables. 
Vavile was relatively unclear about the chronology of his work history. He described growing up 
in the Transkei before working as a labourer in a mine on the Highveld, following which he 
worked for three years in a shop in the East London area. Vavile then moved to the Western 
Cape, where he worked as a labourer on a dairy farm. He described how despite the fact he 
could drive the farm tractors and truck, the farmer never allowed him to go for his driver’s 
licence. He left the farm after conflict with the white farmer and had a series of casual jobs in 
the construction industry, describing himself as a plasterer. Vavile was in his forties when he 
married Nomonde, who is more than 20 years his junior. Prior to this relatively later marriage, 
he reportedly had not married or had a family. Vavile stopped working in the construction 
industry job in the late 1980s, and from 1989 onwards sold seasonal fruit and vegetables, along 
with loose cigarettes and snacks such as peanuts from a stand.  
Nomonde was born in the same Transkei village as Vavile. She knew him by sight, as he used to 
return to the village every Christmas holiday, but the account of how they met and married was 
rather ambivalent. Leaving two young sons from a previous union at home, Nomonde came to 
Cape Town in the mid 1980s on the promise of a job. However, Vavile readily admitted to 
having orchestrated her arrival through the deception of a potential job. (He was reportedly 
afraid of her father). Nomonde’s account of this period suggests her anxiety and feelings of 
being marginalised because of being lured to unfamiliar Cape Town. Not knowing anybody, she 
was compelled to live with Vavile, and ‘in the third week became his wife’ (fieldworker’s 
translation). This narrative invokes elements of the practice of ukutwala (a now rare mode of 
customary marriage, wherein the betrothal is preceded by the abduction of the bride). They 
initially lived in the establish township of Crossroads, before moving to Khayelitsha as it became 
settled in the mid 1980s. 
Nomonde sold fruit and vegetables at a train station from her arrival in Cape Town (sometime 
in 1983/1984) until around 1999. She stopped selling after her health deteriorated and a doctor 
advised her to avoid sitting out in the cold. In most years, Nomonde joined the seasonal grape 
pickers during the first quarter. She, along with many other casual labourers, was picked up 
daily and transported on the back of trucks to the commercial farms of the outside Cape Town. 
  
She described this as poorly paid work (earning about R30 a day in 2008), the onerous nature of 
the work magnified by the fact that people are paid by the weight of produce harvested, 
allowing little chance for respite.  
After having sold fruit and vegetables at the station for much of the 1990s, Vavile and 
Nomonde gave this up in the early 2000s.  By 2002/2003 Vavile started to routinely sell at the 
side of a busy road leading into Khayalitsha. His modest stand consisted of little more than a 
few upturned plastic crates in front of a small (telephone-booth sized) stall cobbled together 
from bits of scrap timber, corrugated iron and plastic sheeting. Located on a busy arterial route 
leading into Khayelitsha, he sold mainly to pedestrians, but the wide road verge also allowed 
motorists to stop and buy. Although there were two or three stalls selling fresh produce close 
by, Vavile disavowed the notion of them being in competition. The vendors readily referred 
customers between each other’s stalls, and looked out for each other against the depredations 
of thieves.  
Vavile explained that he gave up selling fruit and vegetables in town because he found the early 
morning rising, to be at the Epping fresh produce market, and walking the long distances with 
the fresh produce to get his spot on the station concourse became increasingly onerous as he 
aged. He had to wake up at 03h30 to wash, travel to the market, and then to the station to 
secure a viable spot from which to vend. In 2005 Vavile still sourced fruit and vegetables from a 
wholesaler in Epping (close to the fresh produce market), along with peanuts and cigarettes in 
Mitchells Plain. He would source relatively small quantities and carry his goods on public 
transport. By 2009 he was simply buying his fresh produce from a large wholesaler in 
Khayelitsha, to avoid the now greater travel expenses. He worked every weekday and on 
Saturday morning, estimating in 2005 that he was making up to R40 a day, but just over R100 a 
week in 2008. However, this estimate ought to be viewed with caution. Not only did Vavile 
seem unsure of the figures and not keep written records, in light of the household’s ongoing 
personal consumption of the perishable stock (particularly as it became too ripe to sell), and 
the ad hoc replenishment of the stock (with varieties and prices fluctuating seasonally), 
calculating profit was a difficult undertaking. His figures did, however, give an order of 
magnitude. When asked about his future plans, Vavile replied that he had no intention of 
expanding his fruit and vegetable stand, as nobody back at home is working, so profit from the 
stand needed to be ploughed back into groceries rather than used to expand the stand.  
Vavile and Nomonde’s eldest daughter Utathile also assisted in running the stand. She left 
school in standard 7 after falling pregnant with Avela in 2000. In 2005 she described her 
unsuccessful efforts to secure a position as a domestic worker in the middle-class suburbs of 
Cape Town. She worked for a brief time for a low salary (R25 a day) for a ‘foreigner’ selling 
cellphone accessories at the taxi terminus in Wynburg. She, however, gave up this employment 
to escape his sexual advances. She tried, unsuccessfully, to sell fruit and vegetables from their 
unfavourably located home, before joining her father, assisting him at his fruit and vegetable 
stall. Utathile would take over vending from Vavile in the afternoons, although the trade in the 
  
mornings was brisker as commuters waited for public transport. In late 2008 Utathile spent 
over a month in hospital, apparently with uncontrolled hypertension, and in January 2009 gave 
birth her second child, a boy. This curtailed her ability to work at the fruit and vegetable stall. 
Her mother stopped the grape picking, in part to help her hypertensive daughter with the new-
born infant. By 2005 Utathile had secured a CSG for Avela, and readily secured one for the new 
infant soon after his birth. Utathile indicated she intended to seek private parental 
maintenance from the infant's father who, unlike Avela’s elusive and unemployed father, she 
knew how to find. He reportedly lived with another woman elsewhere on the Cape Flats, but 
crucially, was in paid employment as a security guard. 
Another consistent household member has been Vavile’s stepson (Nomonde’s son), Samkile. 
Mentally disabled and withdrawn, Samkile lacks manual dexterity, is shy, impassive and largely 
mute. Samkile takes a long time to complete even basic household and personal tasks. As he 
did not complete more than a single year of schooling, he is also illiterate and totally 
innumerate. Although his teachers referred him to a special school in the Eastern Cape, his 
maternal grandmother refused to send him so far away. Samkile and his able-bodied brother, 
Nothuthuzelo (also in his twenties), arrived in Cape Town in 2003 after the death of their 
maternal grandmother in the Eastern Cape, with whom they had been living. As the son of a 
man other than Vavile, Samkile’s continued residence in the house is somewhat inconsistent 
with cultural precedent, however he needs care and his Disability Grant has been an important 
contribution to the household economy. In 2008 the grant lapsed for a few months, but was 
successfully reapplied for. 
Samkile’s brother Nothuthuzelo was also locally resident between 2003 and 2005. Poorly 
educated in the rural Eastern Cape (he only completed standard 6), Nothuthuzelo worked as a 
labourer on Cape Town construction sites for two years. In this time, he reportedly saved about 
R3 000 (kept in cash, hidden in the household) in order to undergo his initiation into Xhosa 
manhood. By 2005 he had returned to live with extended kin in the Eastern Cape and did odd 
jobs such as tend cattle and exercise his self-taught aptitude for fixing ‘wirelesses’ (radios). 
Apart from Nothuthuzelo’s two-year sojourn at the house, and the birth of a new grandchild, 
the household’s composition has remained relatively constant. 
With regards to income, expenditure and debt, the fruit and vegetable stall was largely self-
funding and generated a small surplus, which was spent on food. In 2005 Vavile denied 
borrowing from the machonisa (informal moneylender), asserting somewhat implausibly that 
they do not like to lend to impoverished pensioners. The household had no reported machonisa 
debt in 2009 either, but a significant source of debt was furniture store accounts the household 
maintained between 2005 and 2009. In 2005 they were paying R155 a month on a medium-
sized colour TV. In 2008/2009, when questioned on their expenditure, Nomonde enumerated 
they were paying R300 a month for a new ‘room divider’ (a veneer wall unit with cupboards 
and shelves), this amount reportedly diverted from Samkile’s Disability Grant. The house had a 
tidy lounge suite, and a large fridge previously bought on installment.  
  
In 2005, they were paying R25 for their burial society, which covered four people, but by 2008 
they were diverting R200 of their monthly income to a more generous policy, which covered 
eight people including family in the Eastern Cape. With the SOAG they buy groceries, clothes 
and pay school fees. They also invested quite large amounts in an umcalelo (rotating mutual 
savings society), diverting R300 from the Disability Grant, and R300 from the SOAG (a total of 
R600) every month for the purpose. This, and the furniture store account, depleted the bulk of 
Samkile’s DG. There were four people in the umcalelo so they would receive R2 400 quarterly. 
While the research participants were vague on what they were planning to do with future 
payouts, besides ‘buying things for the house’ (i.e. furniture and furnishings), it was far easier to 
discern what they had been spending the umcalelo payouts on, namely house building. 
A major area of expenditure had been the completion of their three-roomed RDP house. In 
2005, the building of the house was retarded by the inexplicable non-delivery of the standard 
fibre cement (‘asbestos’) roof sheeting, which all the neighbouring houses received. Vavile’s 
attempts to follow this up met with the response that the local housing project had closed 
down. In 2005 they had recently spent R700 (saved via the umcalelo) on the timber for rafters. 
They were also saving up to buy the cheapest roofing they could, second-hand corrugated iron 
sheeting. In 2005 although concrete blocks to build up the height of the uncompleted walls 
were piled nearby, they complained of being unable to afford to pay the R1 000 for a builder to 
do this. They also did not have money to buy 16 second-hand corrugated iron sheets at R80 a 
sheet (i.e. R1 280). In 2006, the walls were built up, and the house was roofed by 2007. Vavile 
and Utathile finished the construction themselves, work she described as laborious, while the 
roofing was done with second-hand sheets over a period of time by a neighbor to whom they 
paid R300. The internal plastering was done by another neighbor for R600, despite the fact that 
Vavile previously worked as a plasterer. He explained that he is old, and it was easier for him to 
sell (i.e. work at his stall) than to plaster. Completing the house required significant effort by 
household members, and their collective savings, but represented a substantial improvement in 
the quality of their accommodation. The house offered discernibly more protection from the 
inclement Cape winter weather than their previous structure. Vavile explained that they built 
the house with the social grants and the fruit and vegetable selling, because they could use the 
grants to build while they ate from the stall. 
When questioned about their plans for the future and any rural investment, Vavile and 
Nomonde explained they did not have a rural homestead, or livestock. There seemed to be 
little indication of Vavile contemplating retiring to the Eastern Cape, and he ventured that 
Utathile would probably inherit the house from him.  
In terms of their social relationships, Vavile is a senior member (‘a senator’) of one of 
Khayelitsha’s multitude of small churches, The New Born Church in Zion, with about 20 
congregants. The small church alternates between meeting in various members houses. Vavile 
could reportedly read in Xhosa, and the household owns a bible. Vavile ascribed his health and 
vitality, despite his age, to the beneficence of God, and the fact that he never smoked or drank. 
  
In 2005 the household listed Vavile’s relatives in another section of Khayalitsha as substantial 
sources of aid. Even though the patriarch of that family had died in 2003, his wife, employed in 
a comparatively good job as a domestic worker, occasionally bought them grocery items and 
would lend them money if necessary. Nomonde’s sister, also living elsewhere in Khayelitsha, 
would lend and borrow money (sub R200 sums) as required. Well prior to 2005, in the 1980s 
and 1990s, the household reported remitting small sums of money to Nomonde’s mother and 
her two sons in the Eastern Cape, but this was reportedly constrained by Vavile’s low earnings. 
This remitting ceased with the death of Nomonde’s mother, and arrival of her sons in Cape 
Town. Finally, in 2005 there was little reported ‘helping’ or social reciprocity between the 
street’s various residents, but by 2008, Nomonde and Utathile were intermittently caring for 
the neighbour’s small baby and reportedly lending various small grocery items and even small 
amounts of money to their closest neighbours. The neighbours also kept an eye out for each 
other’s laundry, which festooned the front of their houses on sunny days. It is not clear if this 
represented an earlier understating of social relationships, or alternatively, a deepening of 
social reciprocity in an area recently redeveloped and resettled in soon before 2005.  
Case study commentary  
Vavile’s relatively unfavourable history of employment is evident in his employment in a 
paternalistic agricultural job with poor prospects for skills acquisition, and trajectory of casual 
and informal self employment. His poor history of accumulation is arguably intertwined with his 
relatively late marriage. Although Vavile is embedded in networks of social reciprocity, and 
holds a position in his small local church, he did not appear very effective in terms of 
positioning himself within the local RDP house development initiative. In 2005 the uncompleted 
house and piles of unused building materials looked like a failed investment strategy, but by 
2008 the household had saved up sufficient resources from Valile’s SOAG, and mustered the 
labour necessary to complete it. This represented a major investment in their comfort and 
standard of living. The house furnishings and furniture store debt they serviced suggested their 
felt imperative to invest in social respectability and forms of urban modernity. Commensurately 
the household was urban focused with little back investment to the Eastern Cape.  
The fruit and vegetable stall Vavile ran served to synergistically leverage the household’s 
income. The grant income reportedly enabled the retail by freeing them from the need to 
consume the enterprise’s operating capital. A major savings instrument has been their mutual 
savings society, as they remain unbanked, although this has not stopped them from acquiring a 
range of consumer durables via furniture store accounts.  
A clear constraint within the household was its labour poor nature: Vavile grew too old for the 
early rising to vend from the station, his wife too sickly, his stepson disabled, and their 
hypertensive daughter has a young infant to care for. The continued residency of Samkile is 
significant – although inconsistent with cultural precedent, it is a pragmatic accommodation 
that satisfies the imperative of securing his care, with capturing the resources of the grant.  
  
Case study 3: Vuyiswa Magadla 
In 2005 the diminutive and wizen Vuyiswa lived in a tiny shack in the urban township of 
Khayelitsha, on the outskirts of Cape Town. Her shack could only be reached by winding 
through the narrow alleyways of the shack settlement. Set well back from the road, the shack 
was not positioned in the middle of its small plot, but was instead part of a collection of small 
shacks clustered around a small central courtyard. One of the small shacks belonged to 
Vuyiswa’s niece, Nolusindiso, alongside it was Vuyiswa’s and next to her, a larger kitchen 
structure. All the shacks were constructed from scrap wood and sheets of corroded corrugated 
iron. The sandy central courtyard between the shacks was covered in ancient, weathered 
carpet — testimony to the residents’ ceaseless battle against the winter stormwater and the 
sand of the low-lying Cape flats. The room that functions as a kitchen was threadbare and 
damp, the concrete floor covered with ancient linoleum; and the walls papered with pages torn 
from glossy magazines. The room was sparsely furnished: a weathered wood bench and little 
stool along a wall, a table with a paraffin stove and an old kitchen dresser with a collection of 
battered but polished thin aluminium pots. Through the kitchen door was a dark, empty lounge 
with a fireplace that was perpetually unlit. 
Elderly and with poor eyesight (her eyes milky with what looked like cataracts), Vuyiswa could 
often be found on clear winter days sunning herself with her kin outside her shack, to escape 
the cold and damp inside. Moving slowly and deliberately, she initially appeared guarded and 
reserved; but as time passed what becomes apparent is that this reserved manner does not 
seem to flow from timidity but from a carefully cultivated comportment. Though poor, Vuyiswa 
has what in Xhosa is known as isidima – esteem or dignity – evident both in her careful, 
traditional dress and her courtly insistence on formalities.  
Vuyiswa and her immediate neighbours had been living alongside one another in this densely 
settled corner of Khayelitsha, adjacent to a busy highway, since they were settled here by the 
apartheid state in the aftermath of the internecine conflict in Crossroads more than 20 years 
ago. When the research team visited her in 2005, the household was composed of the widowed 
60-year-old Vuyiswa; her older sister Nombeko’s 37-year-old daughter Nolusindiso, who 
worked as a domestic worker for two wealthy white households in suburban Constantia; 
Nolusindiso’s infant daughter Thandiwe, and Vuyiswa’s own grandchild 20-year-old Noluntu. 
Alongside this core of residents, was a shifting cast of other visitors – in fact there was so much 
flux and fluidity in the household that transient visitors could easily be confused with longer-
term household residents. For instance one person who had been listed as a ‘permanent 
household member’ in a 2002 survey was Vuyiswa’s elder sister (and Nolusindiso’s mother) 
Thembeka. Yet Thembeka only visited Vuyiswa’s house for extended periods to seek medical 
care in Western Cape hospitals (which she trusted more than Eastern Cape facilities), and her 
regular home was in Krancolo in the Eastern Cape, where she (nominally) took care of 
Nolusindiso’s other children, Zandile (13) and Sipho (6). ‘Nominally’, because it appeared to be 
young Zandile who looked after her young brother, Sipho and elderly grandmother. In addition 
  
to her pension, Zandile’s father (whom Nolusindiso never married) paid R300 maintenance on 
Nolusindiso’s behalf to Thembeka; this helped her take care of the children.  
Also in the Eastern Cape were Vuyiswa’s daughter Nomsa (Noluntu’s mother). Nomsa had 
recently become a widow, and was living in Qumbu along with her other daughters, Lindiwe 
and Thandiwe. At the time of the research team’s visit, Nomsa’s son Welile was also living in 
the Eastern Cape, schooling there and only visiting his mother during the holidays. Later in 
2006, Lindiwe and Thandiwe, in turn, visited the shack street for their holidays. 
Vuyiswa had come to Cape Town in 1979, shortly after the death of her husband. Initially she 
resided at the house of her brother Madoda Simani, and survived by doing domestic work in 
Cape Town’s coloured suburbs. This was a time of hardship for her; not only did she suffer from 
her employer’s racism, the job also involved lots of ironing and her lower back constantly hurt. 
She lost her job after an extended visit to the Eastern Cape, and subsequently found 
employment as a domestic worker in the more affluent white neighbourhood of Newlands. It 
was in this period, in the mid 1980s, that she moved into her present shack as the area was 
being newly settled. In 1989 she fell down a flight of stairs at her employer’s house and broke 
her leg; she was incapacitated and lost her job. For a while she sold ‘smilies’ (cooked sheeps’ 
heads), relatively unpleasant and poorly paid work. She then switched to selling fruit and 
vegetables – her brother Madoda extended her R100 starting capital. According to Vuyiswa, the 
money was not a loan but a gift given in gratitude for all the times she had helped him, buying 
him shoes when he had no money and paying a village tax on his behalf.  
In about 2000 Vuyiswa was diagnosed with diabetes and awarded a Disability Grant. Ever since 
then she has lived in her shack with her niece Nolusindiso, using her grant to supplement 
Nolusindiso’s income – and using it to help keep the business going. Vuyiswa would use R300 or 
R400 of her grant to buy fresh vegetables. However, she could not sell the fruit and vegetables 
from her own shack, which was situated unfavourably far off the road, so she would vend from 
the front of her brother Madoda’s house. One of the advantages of a fruit and vegetable stall 
was the relatively sedentary nature of the work, as she could sit and did not have to stand on 
her injured leg. Though troubled by her eyesight, she could see well enough to count change. 
Vuyiswa did comparatively well out of the business, and reported that she made more money 
than the white family in Newlands had paid her. Vuyiswa also occasionally helped Madoda’s 
wife, Nolusapho, out with the dressmaking business she ran from a kiosk near a local taxi 
terminus. Madoda had returned to the Eastern Cape several years before, and whenever his 
wife left to spend some time with him, Vuyiswa would tend the business. 
Another important source of income by 2006 was Nolusindiso’s wages as a domestic worker. 
Nolusindiso never married, and had initially only planned to visit Cape Town for a short while 
(her young daughter Zandile had been ill so they had come to seek medical attention in Cape 
Town). She initially stayed with extended family (in this case, another sister of Vuyiswa’s), but 
had better luck with employment than Vuyiswa. She soon found work as a domestic worker in 
wealthy, white Constantia. In 2006 she was bringing home in the region of R1 200 a month.  
  
Caring for Nolusindiso’s young daughter Thandiwe put more pressure on Vuyiswa’s fruit and 
vegetable vending. Not only did Thandiwe’s presence mean there was less money to use as 
operating capital for the business, Vuyiswa had to look after Thandiwe while Nolusindiso 
worked. Hence Vuyiswa felt too constrained to keep her business going and abandoned it. It 
was also at this time that her daughter Nomsa’s husband died. In 2005 Vuyiswa was managing 
to save a considerable sum of between R300 and R400 a month from her Disability Grant 
towards her daughter Nomsa’s izila (coming out of mourning) ceremony. So Nolusindiso was 
covering the bulk of domestic expenses, buying groceries from the Somalian-run spaza shop 
down the road, while Vuyiswa contributed by caring for Thandiwe and purchasing the ‘small 
things’ – beef stock, soup, extra paraffin, and train tickets for her granddaughter Noluntu, who 
was schooling in Langa. Vuyiswa hoped that she would be able to return to selling fruit and 
vegetables from Madoda’s home when Thandiwe was a little older. She said that she planned 
to keep the business small, since if it got too big, it would attract the attention of criminals. 
Crucial to Vuyiswa and Nolusindiso’s survival was their connection to a broader social network. 
Some of this network was relatively easy to identify: her shack was visited by a steady trickle of 
visitors, most of them family. Her brother’s sister-in-law Unathi (Nolusapho’s sister) was a 
regular visitor. Often these visits were only the occasion for conversation and gossip, but 
inquiry into Vuyiswa’s household network revealed that these familial links were significant 
conduits of resources. Vuyiswa’s household, though in one sense a relatively independent unit, 
was also part of a larger network of individuals and households all connected through vectors 
of kinship, friendship, and alliance to that of her brother Madoda.  
Although Madoda was at the time of the research living in the Eastern Cape, tending to his 
cattle and homestead, he played a central role in the organisation of this larger network. As 
Nolusindiso explained, he was ‘the only man’, so he was supposed to look after them all: the 
women in his ‘own’ family as well as the women in his wife’s family. Madoda was a formidable 
but rather shadowy figure, and much about his past was not uncovered by the research team; 
partly because key moments in his history were passed over in silence by his relatives. It was 
fairly clear that he spent a while working on the mines in the 1970s before being injured in an 
accident that cost him the toes on one foot. After spending some time in the Eastern Cape 
recovering, he migrated to Cape Town and found work in a cement factory, followed by a stint 
as a crew member on a fishing trawler. It may be that he spent some time in prison — when the 
team eventually visited him in the Eastern Cape his arms bore the tattoos typical of Cape 
Town’s ‘numbers’ gangs: this, and the tough, streetwise hauteur with which he received the 
team seemed to suggest to the fieldworkers that he had spent at least part of his life among the 
tsotsis (gangsters). But none of this was mentioned in the descriptions of him by his wife 
Nolusapho or his sister, who both painted him as a paragon of respectability and virtue.  
It was clear that Madoda’s shack elsewhere in Khayelitsha had played a key role as an urban 
beachhead for kin, clan members and other villagers seeking to migrate; according to his wife 
there were at one stage 14 different people all living in the tiny property. It is also clear that his 
  
injury did not cripple the household financially. A key role was played by Nombula and her 
sisters, who had started their own dressmaking business. It is this dressmaking business that 
the women credited for the fact that when Madoda’s shack burned down in 1998, the 
household was able to recover relatively quickly.  
Dressmaking was not the only activity in Madoda’s Cape Town household. His eldest son was 
also establishing himself in business: among other things he was the owner of a shipping 
container-based business perched on the side of a road not far from Vuyiswa’s home – 
prominently signposted as an “Internet Café”. The business’s name had proved to be 
misleading though; although it once did have an internet connection this proved to lose money 
– the dialup connection was too expensive and there were too few customers. Although it kept 
its 21st century name, the business now sold hair extensions and shampoo. Another important 
connection, about which Vuyiswa did not reveal much until well into the research process, was 
her relationship with Andile Mathole, her ‘boyfriend’, a grizzled shebeen owner who lived down 
the road from her, and with whom she freely shared resources and money.  
Without these connections, Vuyiswa’s household would have been a lot worse off. They were 
substantially cushioned, and their poverty significantly reduced, by the fact that they were part 
of this spatially extended and tightly knit network of kin. But at the same time, it would be a 
mistake to see these relationships only as harmonious. In some ways, Vuyiswa’s position could 
be seen as relatively precarious. The situation encountered by the researchers was in some 
ways merely the outcome of a long and complex back story relating to Vuyiswa’s life before she 
came to Cape Town. She did not share much of this story with the team, but it became known 
that the death of her husband in 1983, while she was still a relatively young woman, was a 
major blow. By marrying him, she had in effect left her own lineage and had no real claim on 
her family for support; as his widow she was expected to continue living in his homestead and 
raise his children. It appears that her relationships with his family soured, and that there was a 
sustained campaign of attrition against her on the part of a ‘jealous’ aunt which steadily made 
her life more and more difficult. She attributed her survival during this difficult time to her 
friendship with Nombula, her brother’s wife, and Nombula’s sister Unathi, who interceded on 
her behalf with Madoda and entreated him to take her back into the family fold. Within the 
Xhosa cultural mores of patrilineal unilateral descent, there is no strong moral obligation for an 
elder brother to receive back into the family a sister who has married, but apparently Unathi 
was successful in her entreaty. Much of the configuration of Vuyiswa’s social network and 
obligations seemed to be shaped by the larger context of Vuyiswa’s relative powerlessness and 
her considerable debt to Unathi and Madoda. 
Similarly, though there clearly was a strongly co-operative element in the domestic 
arrangements in Vuyiswa’s household, there were also limits to what was shared. The 
threadbare interior of Vuyiswa’s house contrasted sharply with what was behind Nolusindo’s 
padlocked door. Nolu’s tiny room contained a glossy new wall unit displaying a new hi-fi and 
small television, as well as a sturdy bed with a brightly coloured new bed linen. Vuyiswa had 
  
access to the room, and was allowed to watch TV or listen to the radio, but even so it is clear 
that Nolusindiso’s income was far from evenly distributed among the members of the 
household: her contribution was limited to the groceries and daily running costs. Vuyiswa was 
unable to use that income to accumulate household durables for her own room. In fact, 
Nolusindiso confessed to the team that she would much rather stay on her own. She could not 
buy any more things because her little shack was too small, and as convenient as Vuyiswa’s 
child care was, Thandiwe would soon be old enough to be sent to a crèche. The most important 
reason why Nolusindiso had not moved out was location. If she moved she would have to 
relocate to the newly settled and distant settlements of greater Khayelitsha, which would be 
both inconvenient and expensive for someone who needed to travel in to Constantia regularly.  
Yet by 2008 Nolusindiso’s decision was made for her. The municipality demolished every 
alternate shack in the settlement, including Nolusindiso’s, and relocated the residents to the 
newly completed concrete RDP-style houses in Kuyasa on the outskirts of Khayelitsha. This 
process of (in town planning parlance) ‘de-densification’ was in preparation for the upgrading 
of the entire shack settlement where Vuyiswa continued to live. Nolusindiso and Thandiwe 
moved out. Although Nolusindiso had to commute the longer distances to the local train 
station, she was heartened by the newly constructed train tracks snaking their way into Kuyasa.  
Nolusindiso’s departure forced a radical reconfiguring of the residential arrangements. 
Nolusindiso’s shack disappeared, and the previously open courtyard was enclosed to 
incorporate a low-roofed, windowless seating area. The claustrophobia of this rather abject 
interior room starkly contrasted with the space which had now opened up around each 
individual shack. Perhaps even more significantly, the household composition had shifted with 
the arrival of new residents. Vuyiswa’s boyfriend Andile joined her at the shack (although 
Vuyiswa remained decorously reticent on the precise contours of their relationship). Elderly 
Andile’s shack had also been demolished and although also reallocated a newly built house in 
Kuyasa, he arranged for a relative to take occupancy of it. He complained that as he was old, 
and as he had lived in this part of Khayelitsha for over 20 years did not want to move to a new 
area full of strangers. Andile built the new sitting room on Vuyiswa’s shack as he effectively 
brought his shebeen with him, altering the portfolio of livelihood activities associated with 
Vuyiswa’s household. The third resident at the reconfigured shack was Vuyiswa’s 
granddaughter, Nolutu, who was now herself also a mother. Her toddler was resident with 
Nolutu’s mother in the Eastern Cape, to whom Nolutu apparently remitted most (R200 of R240) 
of the Child Support Grant she received for the child, retaining R40 for herself. The final two 
immediate household members were Sipho and Zandile, the children of Vuyiswa’s niece, 
Nolusindiso. Previously resident in the Eastern Cape they had come to live in Cape Town, 
reportedly to both assist their elderly aunt and attend the better quality schools. Vuyiswa was 
the designated recipient of Sipho’s Child Support Grant. 
The reconfigured household’s sources of income therefore included Vuyiswa’s Disability Grant, 
Sipho’s Child Support Grant and the income earned by Andile, and these were largely pooled. 
  
Vuyiswa did not return to fruit and vegetable retailing, although she remained close to her 
other kin (her brother Madoda briefly resident in Cape Town, visited during one of the research 
team’s visits). Although Andile received a Disability Grant (he lost an eye in an accident many 
years ago) and was close to retirement age, he worked as a gardener for two to four days a 
week in the leafy white suburb of Constantia. He surprisingly described this physical work as 
relatively undemanding: not only was he strong, he explained, he had worked for several of his 
good employers for many years and they got on well. Andile’s small shebeen, run from the 
newly constructed sitting room, vended only two or three cases of beer a week. His patrons 
seemed to consist entirely of elderly men, who would talk and nurse a single bottle of beer for 
hours on end. The relative smallness of the enterprise, and subdued nature of the patrons, 
meant that the resident children or Vuyiswa easily ran the shebeen in Andile’s absence. Andile 
reportedly lived off the proceeds from the gardening and his beer sales, remitting the full value 
of old age pension to his (formal) wife and household in the rural Eastern Cape. He indicated 
that his residency at the shack was temporary – although he eventually intended to return to 
the Eastern Cape, he explained that the beer vending and undemanding gardening work kept 
him in Cape Town. If he returned to the Eastern Cape, he and his family would be compelled to 
live on nothing more than his pension. The upgraded RDP house, to be built on the current site 
of the shack when the area is upgraded, would be Vuyiswa’s, he clarified. In response to the 
research team’s delicate inquiries about how he and Vuyiswa met, Andile replied that he had 
known her for decades. They had grown up in the same Krancolo village. 
Case study commentary 
The case study illustrates a number of general points about the nature of households and 
practices of household making. It illustrates the often fluid, spatially stretched nature of 
households, as people and resources circulate. The case study also illustrates the often 
extended nature of the linkages and the centrality of care work to households of post-apartheid 
migrant networks. The precise parameters of the household are mutable, as its composition 
and rings of entitlement and obligation shift over time.  
The case study highlights the roots of Vuyiswa’s vulnerability, and documents how she 
successfully negotiated her return to her kin. Motivated by a debt of obligation, she is a 
respectable Xhosa matron, inserted into systems of social reciprocity. These complex reciprocal 
exchanges included Vuyiswa’s tending to her sister-in-law’s business, caring for her resident 
niece’s young daughter, saving up her DG payments for her daughter’s izila ceremony and 
tending Andile’s shebeen. It was through these acts of labour and beneficence that Vuyiswa 
was able to cement herself within circuits of social reciprocity and ameliorate her vulnerability. 
Although Vuyiswa disavowed having any savings or making any investments, she carried a 
substantial burden of care and invested heavily in her relationships and social respectability. 
Finally, in reflecting on this social reciprocity, it is useful to stress that while pecuniary resources 
are important, they are only one of the forms (alongside unpaid labour, material goods, advice, 
moral support etc) exchanged.  
  
Finally, alternates for housing and household composition emerged in 2008 with the 
redevelopment of the area. The departure of Vuyiswa’s niece from the household saw 
Vuyiswa’s boyfriend join her at the shack. He represented not only an important holder of 
resources but also a socio-political guarantor.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Case Study 4: Veronica and Simon Zama 
At the time of the 2005 visit, Veronica and Simon’s homestead consisted of two mud block 
structures  on the edge of a rural Eastern Cape village, about one hour’s drive from the nearest 
small town. The household consisted of 43-year-old Veronica, 64-year-old (about to turn 65) 
Simon, two sons – 13-year- old Themba and nine-year-old Nkosithethile – and a seven-year-old 
granddaughter (of a married daughter). The interview was conducted with Veronica in her 
small, thatched cooking hut, sparsely furnished with a bench, a few basic kitchen items and 
agricultural implements. Behind Veronica was a storage area, containing a bathtub-sized 
volume of maize on the cob and several large gourds. The paucity of the accommodation, the 
relative lack of consumer durables or furniture, and the household members’ threadbare 
clothes suggested this to be a comparatively poor household, even by village standards. 
Veronica’s husband Simon was helping to organise the funeral arrangements of a cousin who 
had recently died, but even on subsequent occasions when he was present, it was the 
loquacious Veronica who dominated the interviews.  
Veronica’s husband Simon worked on the goldmines of the Reef until he was injured on duty in 
the late 1980s/early 1990s. He broke his ribs and legs; injuries which still visibly affected his 
gait. He returned to the village to recuperate and lost his job, never to return to the mines. 
Veronica reported that their life was better when her husband was working in the 1980s, as he 
used to send money to the local ‘trading store’ which she collected and spent on groceries. At 
the time of the 2005 interview Simon was doing ‘piece jobs’ in the village, mixing daka (the 
mud and grass mixture) for his wife’s mud bricks. His health was poor (he reportedly suffered 
from fits, and a range of respiratory complaints) so he struggled to work, but he was poised on 
the age eligibility threshold for a State Old Age Grant.  
Veronica never worked outside the village; she earned a meagre income making sun-dried mud 
blocks and collecting firewood. Her husband would help with the mud brick production by 
mixing the mud and grass mixture, or if he was too ill to help she would hire other male 
villagers, retrospectively paying them once payment was received for the bricks. Veronica used 
to make 100 bricks a week, but indicated that by 2005 her hands with ‘arthritis’ (her 
description) only allowed her to make this quantity a fortnight. She also expressed reluctance 
to take payment up-front for bricks, lest she fall ill and was not be able to deliver. She charged 
R120 for 100 bricks in 2005. In addition to mud bricks, she also occasionally plastered (using a 
mixture of mud and dung) and whitewashed the exterior of huts with kalica (powdered lime), 
charging R100 for this service. However, clients who commission the bricks would sometimes 
argue that as she made the bricks she ought to plaster the structure for a reduced rate; she 
sometimes did so for a sum as low as R60. An alternate way of working, particularly if potential 
clients did not have money, was to accept much smaller sums of money pro-rata for 
constructing relatively small sections of wall. Mud bricks were usually made in the yard where 
required, or made elsewhere where the soil is soft and then carefully transported to the desired 
  
site. Producing bricks on-site is contingent on have water at hand, the procurement of which 
was the responsibility of the client or organised for an additional fee.  
In addition to making mud bricks and plastering, Veronica gathered wood used for fuel and 
construction. Collected from a small grove, about an hour walk down into a valley, a large 
bundle of wood was sold for a R15. She sold a few bundles (under 10) a month. Veronica 
reported her ability to make bricks and fetch wood was affected by her ill health. She 
reportedly has arthritis (she walked with a pronounced limp after being seated for the two-hour 
interview), and poor vision, tending to misjudge the number of objects in a distance. In 2007 
she applied for a Disability Grant, but her application was rejected as she was judged to be 
insufficiently incapacitated. 
Veronica and Simon also had two older, married daughters resident elsewhere. Veronica 
explained she had given birth nine times, but had four surviving children, with five of her 
infants having died during infancy.  
The eldest resident son in 2005 was 13-year-old Themba. Veronica only secured a CSG for him 
in 2005. The grant had apparently been received late because his age cohort had matured in 
advance of the rate at which the eligibility age for the grant was extended, and children of his 
age were (until relatively recently) discouraged from applying for the grant by officials. His 14th 
birthday would render him age ineligible. By 2008 the academically weak (and now 16-year-old) 
Themba had dropped out of school in grade five. After herding cattle for over a year he secured 
a ‘piece job’ in Mount Frere in early 2009. He worked as a building site labourer, living in his 
boss’ yard and reportedly going on to earn R1 200 a month. He had not been working long, but 
his parents thought he would be given a few groceries by his shop-owning employer. They were 
visibly proud at their son’s comparatively well remunerated employment, particularly with 
employment being so scarce in the area.  
The younger son, nine-year-old Nkosithethile, was attending grade two in 2005 and receiving a 
CSG. By 2008 he had progressed to grade four. Although he appeared to have lost a year on this 
age cohort he reportedly fared much better at school than his older brother. 
In 2005 a seven-year-old granddaughter intermittently lived with Veronica and Simon, 
alternating with the paternal kin. By 2008 she had left, but her six-year-old brother was locally 
resident. These were all the children of Veronica and Simon’s adult daughter, Nobathwa).  
Of the two adult daughters the eldest, Nobathwa (b. 1980), was married and living in the 
nearby village with her two children (both of whom were CSG beneficiaries) in 2005. In late 
2005 Nobathwa moved to Johannesburg, where she sewed and sold traditional German-print 
style dresses favoured by Xhosa matrons. Nobathwa’s husband secured various piece jobs, 
prior to 2005 as a security guard and by 2007 he was working as an electrician. In 2005 the 
older of Nobathwa’s two children alternated between the paternal and maternal grandparents, 
while the younger child lived with Nobathwa and her husband in Johannesburg. In 2007 both 
children went to live with Veronica at the rural homestead and only visited their parents in 
  
Johannesburg during school holidays. Nobathwa continued to receive the two CSGs in her bank 
account, and reportedly remitted slightly more than the value of the two grants (at R240 each) 
to Veronica – a monthly figure of R600. This sum was deposited in the bank account of a 
relative resident in an adjacent village, and collected monthly by Simon on horseback. Neither 
Veronica nor Simon had a bank account of their own. 
The second of the two adult daughters, Fotiwe (b. 1984), was married and resident at another 
village in the district. She was mother to both a toddler and a young infant in 2005. As she and 
her husband presided over fewer resources than Nobathwa, they did not furnish Veronica and 
Simon with much assistance, beyond ‘moral support’ (fieldworker’s term) at traditional events, 
and the reciprocation of small amounts of money (viz R20) and food. Fotiwe’s husband used to 
work in Johannesburg, but even before he married had incurred serious burn wounds in an 
accident and became unemployed. Fotiwe’s husband collected wood for resale, while she wove 
grass mats sold within the village, or sold to an intermediary who sold them to the seasonal 
tourist trade on the Wild Coast. In the course of 2007 they secured two CSGs for the children; 
by 2008 they had two more children (a total of four). One of the children, a preschooler, was 
severely disabled. Hence they received a total of three CSGs and a care dependency grant (or as 
a fieldworker translated their isiXhosa formulation ‘an old age pension for children’). The need 
to constantly care for the child reportedly constrained Fotiwe’s ability to do any remunerative 
work.  
The synergies between Veronica and Simon’s household and those of their adult daughters 
have already been suggested. A further key benefactor was locally resident Philemon 
(genealogically quite distant, a paternal cousin, several times removed). Veronica and Simon 
would help Philemon weed his fields and harvest, for which they received agricultural produce 
(such as maize and gourds evident in the 2005 interview). Veronica reported that when she was 
ill and in bed, she sent her children to Philemon to work in his field, from which they would 
never return empty-handed (i.e. they came back with food). Philemon also aided them by 
ploughing their small maize patch with his span of oxen, a significant and increasingly rare and 
unused asset in the rural Eastern Cape.  
Although Veronica and Simon owned two pigs and chickens of their own, Philemon assisted 
them by ‘lending’ them livestock to look after. In 2005 Veronica was looking after three sheep 
and two goats from Philemon. These animals were loaned in terms of the cultural practice of 
wazinqonywa, whereby an animal is lent, and its products (milk, eggs) or more commonly, 
offspring, would be retained by those looking after the animal. (A different term describes 
when a cow which is lent out – itsengibhekwa – but its various outputs: milk, traction power, 
offspring and social prestige similarly accrue to the borrower).  
These patterns of social reciprocity and beneficence endured across time and generation. In 
2008 Themba was herding Philemon’s cattle. Although unpaid, he was routinely given food for 
his efforts. If Veronica and Simon ran out of a grocery item, or broke a tool, they would ask 
Philemon to buy it for them, and then repay him at the end of the month. Philemon’s superior 
  
cash liquidity enabled him to lend them money, and he also retained small sums (less than a 
month’s SOAG) they wished to save. In response to the research team’s inquiry, Veronica 
explained Philemon’s superior material position by explaining that although he was the same 
age as Simon, and had also worked on the mines, he was never injured. He worked for most of 
his adult working life and retired with an endowment of assets and saved income which made 
him comparatively rich relative to Veronica and Simon. 
In addition to their close relationship to Philemon, Veronica and her husband were prominent 
in the local burial society. Veronica was sufficiently trusted to be responsible for collecting the 
villagers’ contributions to the funeral scheme, a position she held despite the fact that she was 
among the youngest of the burial society’s members.    
In terms of income and expenditure, the 2005 interview showed Veronica and Simon to 
essentially be living off two CSGs, an erratic sum of up to two or three hundred rand from mud 
brick making and wood gathering, and a little subsistence agrarian production. They were 
heavily reliant on the patronage of Philemon. Veronica reported they had no savings 
instruments (bank accounts or umcalelo), and was intermittently taking up to R150 worth of 
goods on credit from the local trading store – she would repay 50% off a month (i.e. R75 at a 
time) over two months. Their groceries were bought from the large supermarket chains in 
town, but she did not normally travel to town. Instead she gave a female member of Philemon’s 
family money and a list of groceries. Veronica and Simon were also part of a village-based 
funeral service (based in a distant village, but with links to a funeral parlour in the district), and 
paid R30 (and a 30 cents administrative costs literally ‘the ink in the pen’) monthly premium. 
When asked in 2005 what they intended to do with the prospect of a R780 increase in their 
monthly income from the SOAG, Veronica reported that they would use it to buy food and 
upgrade their existing housing. Although she aspired to rebuilding the structures with 
commercially made concrete blocks, she thought they would probably have to settle for mud 
bricks. A pressing priority was the need to renew the worm-eaten rafters and rusted corrugated 
iron sheeting on their sleeping quarters. These were in such poor condition that at the 
conclusion of the 2005 interview, while showing them to the research team, Veronica joked 
that if we visited them in future we might find them in their graves (i.e. the collapse of the roof 
was imminent).  
Simon duly secured his SOAG in late 2005 and they renewed the perilous roof in 2006. On the 
research team’s 2007 visit, Simon also proudly showed the research team his new horse (his 
‘four by four’, as he and the fieldworkers joked). They had bought two horses in 2007 which 
produced two offspring (although one of the original pair drowned in a river), along with three 
sheep. Simon had also bought two saddles to enable both him and a son to ride. This was in 
addition to the three goats he owned. Receipt of the SOAG appeared to have a discernible 
effect on their assets.  
  
When questioned retrospectively in 2007, Simon and Veronica reported the SOAG had been 
used to buy food, to reroof the sleeping quarters and buy livestock. They, however, remain far 
from affluent, and at the time of the autumn visit were taking advantage of the clear weather 
to cut wood for their own use through winter to avoid unnecessary expenditure on paraffin. 
Surviving largely on Simon’s SOAG, and Nobathwa’s R600 remittance, much of their 
expenditure was on groceries. They had not even upgraded their basic funeral plan, which now 
cost R40 a month. They neither belong to a rotating savings society (umcalelo) nor had a bank 
account. They were, however, planning to build a new homestead, the site of which was visible 
several hundred meters away from their own homestead, which they were to fund with savings 
and a lay-buy at a hardware store in the local town. 
By 2008 Simon and Veronica had almost finished building the rectangular single-roomed 
dwelling. About four by three metres in size, it was built on the edge of the village, close to a 
precipice where the plateau of the village fell away to the valley below. This structure was for 
their son Themba. Simon and Veronica had been allocated this site by the local headman, and 
were compelled to build on it within three years, because leaving it undeveloped would imperil 
their tenure of the site. Veronica and Simon readily enumerated the money, all diverted from 
Simon’s SOAG, they spent on the construction including R1 000 on corrugated iron (‘zinc’) 
roofing and R900 on rafters. Veronica made the 800 mud bricks required, and Simon laid them 
himself. (When asked to impute the market value of these costs, they estimated a conservative 
R2 400 for the mud bricks and R1 000 for the building work). They still plan to buy a door 
(between R300 and R400) and a window (R120) for the uncompleted hut, which was being 
occupied by Philemon’s children to ensure that livestock and the local ‘skollies’ (petty criminals) 
stay out. Simon and Veronica exuded a strong sense of accomplishment over the construction 
of the hut, as they showed it to the research team. 
In response to the research team’s queries about the flat, Simon and Veronica explained that it 
was the last of the favourably located sites within view and hailing distance of their own 
homestead. If they did not take this site they would eventually have to build on the other side 
of the village. In this region of the Eastern Cape (Baca) inheritance inverts the normal rules of 
primogeniture: the youngest rather than the eldest son inherits the homestead (viz. 
ultimogentiture), and is expected to look after his parents in their old age. Having his new 
homestead nearby would mean Simon and Veronica’s eldest son would also be conveniently 
resident. They elaborated that although he will have his own place, he will also be able to help 
them with their problems. Probing the issue further and asking what would happen if Themba 
migrated to the city never to return to the village, Veronica and Simon dismissed this scenario, 
and replied that they would deal with this at the time if it happened. They reiterated that it is 
good to have a son in the village, because the makoti (their daughter-in-law) could always look 
after the parents when they are old. They are not planning to build for the younger son they 
explained, he will continue to occupy and eventually inherit their current house.  
  
Finally when questioned on their future plans, Simon and Veronica intended to fence the yards 
of both homesteads. Although they had not investigated this for themselves, they understood 
that fencing costs R500 a roll. They were not sure of how much they require (how many 
metres), they aimed to buy a roll every second month or so, and store it until ready to 
undertake the work.  
Case study commentary  
The case study shows Veronica and her husband to be economically marginalised after a 
relatively unfavourable history of employment and asset accumulation, disrupted by Simon’s 
injury and retreat from formal sector employment. Despite their impoverishment, Veronica and 
Simon are both located within important circuits of reciprocity and clearly commanded some 
degree of local respect, evident in their being entrusted with a key position within the local 
burial society, and looking after animals on loan. A small and cohesive unit, the household 
absorbed different grandchildren at various points and, relied on the labour power of its 
children to aid with some of the subsistence agricultural production.  
The case study provided a particularly instructive pre- and post-hoc sense of the effects of 
social grant receipt and the way in which it was spent. Receipt of a SOAG was carefully 
strategised over and although reportedly spent on improving the food consumption of the 
impoverished household also enabled them to upgrade the quality of their accommodation, 
invest in forms of small-scale agrarian accumulation, and build a house for their son. There was 
no discernible sign of the grant income being directed to improving the quality of their clothing, 
or being spent on consumer durables or furniture. Their focus was the physical structure of the 
accommodation, livestock and other forms of agrarian assets.  
Although they reported not having an umcalelo, grant income was saved via informal savings 
mechanisms, being lodged with Philemon. It is also useful to the considerable investment, of 
both effort and income, made in building a homestead for their eldest son. This represented a 
considerable investment in future social and care relationships. Securing the presence of 
another resident son nearby was an important way in which Veronica and her husband were 
attempting to secure their future well being, and suggested their confidence that their son 
would honour this obligation and look after them in their old age. Not only was the homestead 
an entitlement in relation to their son, it also represented and investment in his and their 
respectability. 
 
 
  
Appendix II: Propensity score matching difference construct 
results 
Impact of social grants on savings (change from 2001 to 2003) Difference Constructs 
Type of 
Savings 
  Treated (%) Control (%) Difference (%) T-Stat 
Unmatched  -5.6 -3.9 -1.7 -1.27 Bank Saving 
Accounts Matched -6.9 -1.5 -5.4 -3.2 
  
Unmatched -0.9 1.6 -2.5 -2.94 Savings in 
Stokvels Matched -0.7 2.6 -3.2 -3.01 
  
Unmatched 0.5 -3.6 4.1 3.99 Pension/ 
Retirement Matched 0.6 -1.1 1.7 1.34 
            
Unmatched 0.5 0.8 -0.2 -0.39 Unit 
Trust/Shares Matched 0.4 0.8 -0.4 -0.58 
            
Unmatched 0.5 0.8 -0.2 -0.42 Cash Loans 
Matched 0.6 1.9 -1.4 -1.99 
  
Unmatched -1.5 1.1 -2.5 -2.19 Life Insurance 
Matched -2.0 1.4 -3.4 -2.33 
  
Unmatched -3.8 0.4 -4.2 -7.05 Other Savings 
Matched -3.8 0.1 -3.9 -5.10 
 
Impact of social grants on credit (change from 2001 to 2003) Difference Constructs 
Type of Credit   Treated (%) Control (%) Difference 
(%) 
T-Stat 
Unmatched  0.6 0.6 0.0 -0.16 Cooperative 
Matched 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.00 
  
Commercial 
Bank/Building 
Unmatched  0.3 -2.2 2.6 3.26 
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Societies9 Matched 0.4 -0.9 1.3 1.31 
  
Unmatched  0.3 0.8 -0.5 -1.78 Land Bank 
Matched 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.66 
            
Unmatched  -0.1 -0.3 0.1 0.88 Government Agency 
Matched -0.1 -0.3 0.2 1.00 
  
Unmatched  0.5 0.1 0.4 0.94 Stokvel 
Matched 0.5 0.0 0.5 1.13 
  
Unmatched  0.2 1.3 -1.1 -3.05 NGO 
Matched 0.2 0.6 -0.4 -1.00 
  
Unmatched  -0.2 2.1 -2.2 -2.28 Family 
Matched -0.2 -0.5 0.3 0.24 
  
Unmatched  3.0 0.7 2.2 2.50 Neighbor 
Matched 3.0 -2.5 5.5 4.67 
  
Unmatched  -4.1 -2.1 -1.9 -1.63 Local Dealer/Shops 
Matched -4.3 0.3 -4.6 -3.05 
  
Unmatched  0.4 0.9 -0.5 -0.96 Money 
Lender/Mashonisas Matched 0.0 0.7 -0.8 -1.15 
  
Unmatched  0.2 0.0 0.2 0.84 Commercial Farmer 
Matched 0.2 0.3 -0.1 -0.67 
  
Unmatched  0.9 0.9 0.0 -0.18 “Other” Credit 
Matched 0.7 0.9 -0.2 -0.36 
  
Appendix III: Further discussion of propensity score matching
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The general approach of matching is to estimate counterfactuals for each treated person so 
that his or her treated outcome (which is observed) can be compared to what would have 
happened in the absence of treatment (which we estimate using the comparison group). 
Although more flexible than linear regression, matching still requires a maintained assumption 
about the relationship between the treated (D=1) and untreated (D=0). Cross-sectional 
matching is valid only if after controlling for observable characteristics X, a person’s ultimate 
treatment status is not related to what their outcome would have been in the absence of 
treatment. In other words, people select into treatment based on observables only. In order to 
relax this assumption, a panel or “difference in differences” version of the matching estimator 
that allows a time-invariant (unobserved) difference in outcomes between the treated and 
untreated is used. These estimates use dependent variables (Y) defined as the difference 
between pre- and post-treatment outcomes for each individual. The following mean-
independence assumption must hold for the periods t (before treatment) and t’ (after 
treatment): 
E(Y0t’ – Y0t | D = 1, X) = E(Y0t’ – Y0t | D = 0, X) for X ε S, 
where S is defined as the overlapping support among the treatment and comparison groups, 
i.e. S = Supp(X | D=1) ∩ Supp(X | D=0). This assumption implies that the outcome trajectories of 
the treatment and comparison groups must match, but their outcome levels are allowed to 
differ by an unobserved constant. This panel version of the matching estimator often performs 
better than its cross-sectional counterpart, in part because it allows for this unobserved 
heterogeneity. 
The common application of matching used, called propensity score matching, is a two-step 
process in which first estimates the probability of treatment based on the conditioning 
variables. Generating predicted probabilities of treatment (i.e. propensity scores) reduces the 
matching process to the one-dimensional problem of comparing treated and untreated workers 
with similar propensity scores (rather than requiring matches on all of the X variables). 
Estimation of the propensity score includes a matching estimation using radius matching, kernel 
matching, local linear regression, and nearest-neighbour matching. 
Nearest neighbour matching is one of the most straightforward matching procedures. An 
individual from the comparison group is chosen as a match for a treated individual in terms of 
the closest propensity score (or the case most similar in terms of observed characteristics). 
Variants of nearest neighbour matching include “with replacement” and “without 
replacement,” where in the former case, an untreated individual can be used more than once 
as a match, and in the latter case, it is considered only once.  
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To avoid the risk of poor matches, radius matching specifies a “caliper” or maximum propensity 
score distance by which a match can be made. The basic idea of radius caliper matching is that 
it uses not only the nearest neighbour within each caliper, but all of the comparison group 
members within the caliper. In other words, it uses as many comparison cases as are available 
within the caliper, but not those that are poor matches (based on the specified distance). 
Kernel and local linear matching are non-parametric matching estimators that have in common 
that only a few observations from the comparison group are used to construct the 
counterfactual outcome of a treated individual. In other words, these techniques compare the 
outcome trajectory of each treated person to a weighted average of the outcome trajectories 
of untreated persons with similar propensity scores (with the highest weight being placed on 
those with scores closest to the treated individual). One major advantage of these approaches 
is the lower variance, which is achieved because more information is used. A drawback of these 
methods is that some of the observations used may be poor matches. Hence, the proper 
imposition of the common support condition is of major importance for these approaches.  
When applying kernel matching, it is necessary to choose the kernel function and the 
bandwidth parameter. The kernel matching estimator applied is based on a normal density 
function, and in the local linear regressions, the kernel types are specified as normal and 
biweight. 
 
  
  
Endnotes 
                                                 
i
 Administratively, the Social Assistance Act of 2004 placed the responsibility on national government for 
social security grants.  The South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) was established in 2005 to 
implements policy and administer grants, tasks previously charged to provincial government. 
ii Within Africa, cash transfers (particularly social pensions), are generally found in countries with high 
income inequality and comparatively small populations (such as Botswana and Namibia).  As a 
redistributive mechanism they are better suited to these societies, rather than those that are very 
populous and poor. 
iii In recent official documentation the SOAG is increasingly referred to as the ‘Older Person’s Grant’.  In 
the interests of reader comprehension the former and better known moniker is used. 
iv The age eligibility threshold for men is being incrementally being lowered to 60 years, to attain parity 
with women by 2010. 
v The notion that being insulated from risk encourages risk taking that an agent might otherwise not take 
on, if they were not insulated from the risk (e.g. the proposition that a safety net encourages greater 
risk taking behaviour).  
vi Households and individuals can receive multiple grants.  For instance it is not uncommon for a SOAG 
receiving pensioner to receive one or more Child Support Grants for grandchildren in her care. 
vii These, and other comparatively minor areas of welfare expenditure, such as ‘grants in aid’ for carers, 
and short-term ‘social relief of distress’ grants, food parcels and vouches are not a focus of the current 
inquiry. 
viii It is useful to make a distinction between a beneficiary for whose benefit a grant is intended, and a 
recipient who receives the grant on the beneficiary’s behalf.  This might be because the beneficiary is a 
legal minor (as in the case of the child-orientated grants) or unable to physically access the grant. 
ix The beneficiary child’s Road to Health clinic card was initially a one off entitlement requirement 
(rather than a ‘conditionality’ in the strict sense), but dropped in later regulations.  Despite this these 
are routine demanded by ground level officials. 
x Errors of exclusion are the proportion of people who meet eligibility criteria erroneously precluded 
from grant receipt, conversely errors of inclusion are the proportion of ineligible recipients erroneously 
or fraudulently included in the pool of grant recipients. 
xi The means test thresholds are differentiated by whether the beneficiary lives in a formal urban area 
(R800), or alternatively an informal urban or rural area (R1 200).  These geographical differentials 
attempt to price in the value of public goods that beneficiaries living in formal urban areas may receive 
(utilities, housing, improved access to services). 
xii This is the maximum value of the grant.  Like the SOAG, the value DG is reduced in relation to the 
other income of the recipient, but in reality the overwhelming majority of recipients simply receive the 
full cash value of the grant. 
xiii In the absence of social security for non-disabled unemployed working-age adults, some (Nattrass, 
2007) have pointed out there the welfare system compels DG recipients to ‘trade off income and 
health’.  They choose between attaining health through treatment compliance on one hand (thereby the 
losing the DG), and remaining ill (in order to continue to receive the DG).  
xiv A coefficient or index of concentration showing the relationship between two sets of percentage 
frequencies.  The Gini coefficient is used to describe income inequality.   
  
                                                                                                                                                             
xv
 Despite the fact that policy exempts poverty-based grant recipients from such fees, research indicates 
that many still pay them.  Knowledge and application of eligibility for fee exemptions is generally low. 
xvi Measuring the physical characteristics of human bodies. Measuring the distribution of bodily 
dimensions (such as  height, weight and body fat) within a given population enables researchers to 
readily quantify stunting and malnutrition. 
xvii Grant application frequently entails multiple trips by impoverished applicants both to welfare officials 
and Department of Home Affairs officials who issue the official identity documents necessary for grant 
application. 
xviii Wood (2003) terms this the ‘Faustian bargain’ of exchanging long-term security for short-term 
survival.  Potentially an evocative formulation, it perhaps risks attributing an unwarranted degree of 
agency, and moral culpability to the poor, for their poverty. 
xix While microfinance interventions have for several years generated much policy interest, evidence of 
widespread success are rare and only found in relatively limited national contexts, most notably 
Bangladesh. 
xx Migration remains high, and although the South African population has become predominantly urban 
residing, the transition has happened far slower than initially predicted.  In the post-apartheid era rural 
migration (particularly from the populous provinces of the eastern seaboard viz. the Eastern Cape and 
KwaZulu Natal) often continues to be marked by oscillatory rural-urban return quality. The reasons for 
this are complex, but the limited resources of many migrants and a desire to provide for urban 
livelihood shocks and eventual rural retirement have slowed South Africa’s urban transition. 
xxi
 A RDP house takes its name from the now defunct Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) programme of the 1990s.  The moniker continues to be widely used to describe the low-cost, 
small (approximately 40 square meters) government-funded, free-standing dwellings.  
xxii Trading stores no longer buy agricultural surpluses, and are therefore essentially rural spaza shops.  
xxiii This does not include mashonisas (informal moneylenders) 
xxiv For more information about propensity score matching, see Appendix III.  
xxv For a pre-specified positive delta, a treated individual is matched to a non-treated individual as long 
as their propensity scores are within the range of delta. If there are no non-treated individuals within 
that rage, then the individual is left unmatched. 
xxvi A nationally representative study of consumer perceptions on financial services and issues, run by the 
FinMark Trust.  See http://www.finscope.co.za/southafrica.html 
xxvii There are tensions between these functions.  For instance, conditions that encourage secondary 
school enrollment would elevate human capital formation, but the exclusion of primary school learners 
would render it an incomplete form of social protection.  
xxviii Conditionalities are of less utility in high poverty contexts with demand-side constraints (as exist in 
much of sub-Saharan Africa) because they incur the risk of excluding the neediest.    
xxix Brazil and Mexico are noteable exceptions, with approximately a quarter of their population enrolled 
in CCTs. 
